FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-90-063
Monday
2 April 1990

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-90-063 CONTENTS *2 April 1990*

NOTICE TO READERS: * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

BULGARIA

National Assembly Continues; Approves Laws *[BTA]* 1
    Debates Ecological Problems *[BTA]* 1
    Agreement on Presidency *[BTA]* 2
    Zhelev Closing Statement *[Sofia Radio]* 2
    Lilov Closing Statement *[Sofia Radio]* 2
    Amendments Approved *[BTA]* 3
    Consensus on Grand National Assembly Law *[BTA]* 4
    Further on National Assembly *[BTA]* 4
    Political Parties Law Adopted *[BTA]* 4
    Session To Resume 3 Apr *[Sofia Radio]* 5
Roundtable Agrees on Mladenov as President *[BTA]* 5
    Elections 10, 17 Jun *[BTA]* 5
Fatherland Front Congress Opens *[Sofia Radio]* 6
    Lukanov Addresses Congress *[Sofia Radio]* 6
    Name of Movement Changed *[BTA]* 7
    Union Elects Leadership *[Sofia Radio]* 7
Social Democratic Party Opens Conference *[Sofia Radio]* 7
    Party Ends Conference *[BTA]* 7
Mircho Spasov Deprived of Medals, Titles *[Sofia Radio]* 8
Commerce Chamber Chief on Company Registrations *[BTA]* 8
Trade Minister on Domestic Market Problems *[Sofia Radio]* 8
Kurdzhali Judges To Assist in Changing Name *[BTA]* 8
BCP, Opposition Dailies Lead in Circulation *[BTA]* 9
New Magazine on 'Power, Business, and Sex' Issued *[TRUD 29 Mar]* 9
Socialist Party Defends Name in News Conference *[BTA]* 9
BCP Alternative Socialist Faction Meets *[Sofia Radio]* 9
Lilov Stresses 'National Consensus' at Rally *[Sofia Radio]* 10
Plovdiv Communists Propose Expelling Vulcheva *[RABOTNICHESKO DELO 29 Mar]* 10
Militia Commander Discusses New Tasks *[ANTENI 28 Mar]* 10
Soviet Says No Nuclear Weapons in Bulgaria *[BTA]* 11
Turkish Media Coverage of Talks Criticized *[RABOTNICHESKO DELO 29 Mar]* 11
Staykov Holds 'Constructive' Talks in Ankara *[BTA]* 11
Finance Minister Announces Debt Talks With West *[BTA]* 12
Foreign Trade Bank 'Temporarily Stops Payments' *[BTA]* 12
UN Food, Agriculture Chief Handed Message *[BTA]* 12
Lukanov Meets Socialist International Delegation *[BTA]* 12
    Lilov Meets Delegation *[BTA]* 12
Kyuranov Discusses Bonn Seminar on Europe *[RABOTNICHESKO DELO 26]* 13

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Petition Calls for Slovak Independence *[CTK]* 14
SNC's Schuster Protests Federation Name *[Bratislava Radio]* 14
Regional Democratic Party Urges Slovak Unity *[Prague Radio]* 14
Anti-Magyar Sentiments Appearing in Slovakia *[Budapest Radio]* 15
Restrictions on U.S. Diplomats Lifted *[RUDE PRAVO 29 Mar]* 15
Commission Updated on Soviet Troop Withdrawal *[Prague Radio]* 15
Soviet Troop Withdrawal Delayed in Turnov *[Prague Radio]* 15
Lithuanian Independence Issue Viewed *[ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY 27 Mar]* 16

- Adamec Speaks at Founding of New C P *[CTK]* 16
  - New Party Chief Interviewed *[Prague Radio]* 17
  - CPCZ Supports New Party *[RUDE PRAVO 24 Mar]* 17
  - CPCZ's Machalik on New Party, Property *[CTK]* 18
- Havel Expresses Support for Lithuania *[Prague Radio]* 18
  - Lithuania's Landsbergis Thanks Havel *[Prague Radio]* 18
- Czech, Slovak Groups Release Joint Statement *[CTK]* 18
- Jun Election Tops Civic Forum Deliberation *[CTK]* 18
- Czechoslovak Democratic Forum Holds Congress *[Prague Radio]* 19
  - Urges Czech, Slovak Consensus *[Prague Radio]* 19
- Calfa Identifies Need for Competition, Efficiency *[SMENA 28 Mar]* 19
- Komarek on Economic Development, Prospects *[Vienna WOCHENPRESSE 30 Mar]* 20
- Soviets Stop Selling Korunas to Tourists *[Prague Radio]* 21
- Gasoline Coupons Introduced for Foreigners *[RUDE PRAVO 27 Mar]* 21
- Dubcek Meets With Protesting Entrepreneurs *[Bratislava PRAVDA 29 Mar]* 21
- Western Military District Commander Replaced *[Prague Radio]* 21

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- Modrow on Unification Before End of Talks *[ADN]* 22
- Eppelmann Sees No German Unity Before 1992 *[ADN]* 22
- Minister Romberg on Unification, Europe *[BERLINER ZEITUNG 16 Mar]* 22
- Controversy Surrounds Mark Exchange Rate 24
  - 2:1 Rate Recommended *[ADN]* 24
  - SPD Proposal *[Hamburg DPA]* 25
  - FDGB Protests *[ADN]* 25
  - Proposal 'Unreasonable' *[ADN]* 25
  - Modrow, Others View Proposal *[Hamburg DPA]* 25
  - Lambsdorff Criticized *[Pachmann in BERLINER ZEITUNG 28 Mar]* 26
  - FRG Minister Praises Proposal *[ADN]* 26
- Official Doubts Media Report on Boehme *[NEUE ZEIT 28 Mar]* 26
- De Maiziere's Stasi Links Said Unsubstantiated *[ADN]* 27
- SPD'S Boehme Views Personal Stasi Files *[ADN]* 27
- No Stasi Files on Boehme Cooperation Found *[Hamburg DPA]* 27
- Boehme Claims Exoneration, Resumes Party Post *[ADN]* 27
- TV Program Alleges Stasi Had Internment Plans *[Hamburg DPA]* 27
- Peoples Chamber To Meet for First Session *[ADN]* 28
- SPD May Decide on Future Coalition with CDU *[ADN]* 28
- CDU, SPD Exploratory Coalition Talks End *[Hamburg DPA]* 28
- SPD Official Comments on SPD, CDU Talks *[ADN]* 29
- SPD Presidium Considers Coalition Negotiations *[ADN]* 29
- Rauls Cited on Merger of Center Parties *[ADN]* 29
- CDU People's Chamber Group Constituted *[NEUE ZEIT 28 Mar]* 29
- Democratic Awakening Youth Association Founded *[NEUE ZEIT 28 Mar]* 30
- Former Official Schalck-Golodkowski Disappears *[Hamburg DPA]* 30
- Conversion of State Bank Begins *[Hamburg DPA]* 30
- Import of Polish Press Products Suspended *[ADN]* 30

HUNGARY

- Railway, Defense Ministry on Soviet Withdrawal *[Budapest Radio]* 31
- Election Committee Announces Second Round Date *[Budapest Radio]* 31
- Preliminary Election Results Analyzed *[Banki in MAGYAR HIRLAP 27 Mar]* 31
- Antall, Kis Interviewed on Coalition Prospects *[Budapest Radio]* 32
- Party Representatives Discuss Elections *[Budapest Radio]* 33
- MDF, FKP, Christian Party Form Coalition *[MTI]* 36
- Party Leaders Air Electoral Alliance Issues *[MTI]* 36
- Smallholders Party Leader Denies Coalition Pact *[Budapest Radio]* 37
- Pozsgay Not To Run in Second Election *[Budapest Radio]* 37
  - Explains Resignation of Candidacy *[MTI]* 37

- Social Democratic Party Reportedly Suspends Head *[Budapest Radio]* 37
  - Petrasovits on Party *[Budapest Radio]* 37
  - Alleged Party Moves Denied *[Budapest Radio]* 38
- Anti-Hungarian Slanders, Demands Continue *[Budapest Radio]* 38
- Horn on Current Relations With Romania *[Budapest Radio]* 39
- Nemeth Sends Letter to World Jewish Federation *[Budapest Radio]* 39
- Budapest, Pretoria Representation Offices To Open *[MTI]* 39
- EC Grants Restructuring Loan *[MTI]* 40
- Italian Foreign Minister Arrives for Meetings *[MTI]* 40

POLAND

- Commentary Views Lithuanian-Soviet Situation *[Bojko in GAZETA WYBORCZA 27 Mar]* 42
- Warsaw Radio Reports Lithuanian Situation 42
- Sejm Speaker Kozakiewicz Concludes Belgian Visit *[PAP]* 42
- Government Stance on 4-Plus-2 Talks Gets Support 43
  - Chief Spanish Diplomat Gives Support *[Warsaw Radio]* 43
  - Soviet Ambassador Conveys Backing *[PAP]* 43
- Foreign Ministry Vows To Oppose Terrorism *[Warsaw Radio]* 43
- SdRP Head Protests 'Distortion' of War History *[Warsaw Radio]* 43
- Mazowiecki on German Unification *[Warsaw Radio]* 43
- Walesa Interview on Solidarity's Political Power *[POLITYKA 27 Jan]* 44
- Newspaper Discusses Role, Future of Miltia *[POLITYKA 10 Feb]* 47
- Government Spokesman Holds News Conference *[PAP]* 50
- Katyn Group Demonstrates at Soviet Embassy *[Warsaw Radio]* 51
- Independence Rally Demands 'Debolshevization' *[Warsaw Radio]* 52

ROMANIA

- TU Members Demonstrate in Bucharest 1 Apr *[Bucharest Radio]* 53
  - 3,000 Reported at 'Anti-Government' Rally *[AFP]* 53
- 'About 4,000' Denounce 'Communist Nomenclatura' *[Bucharest Radio]* 53
  - 'Faster Democratization' Demanded *[ROMPRES]* 53
  - Troops Seal Off Government Building *[AFP]* 53
- V. Romaneasca Protests Transylvania Situation *[ROMPRES]* 54
- Ceausescu's Brother Andruta Goes on Trial *[ROMPRES]* 54
- PNUC Discusses Agenda Items, 17 Decree-Laws *[ROMPRES]* 54
  - Roman Addresses PNUC Session *[ROMPRES]* 55
  - Adjourns Until 11 Apr *[ROMPRES]* 55
- New Cultural Review LUMEA DE MIINE *[ROMPRES]* 56
- * Ambiguities of Timisoara Trial Cited *[ROMANIA LIBERA 16 Mar]* 56
- * Voican Responds to Criminal Charges *[ROMANIA LIBERA 11 Mar]* 57
- * Army Representatives Discuss 'Urgent Objectives' *[ROMANIA LIBERA 13 Mar]* 58
- * Vatra Romaneasca Views Hungarian Minority *[ROMANIA LIBERA 17 Mar]* 59
- * Goals of German Democratic Forum Listed *[ADEVARUL 11 Mar]* 62
- * Expressions of Anti-Semitism Deplored *[ROMANIA LIBERA 17 Mar]* 63
- * Position of Hungarian Union Detailed *[ROMANIA LIBERA 17 Mar]* 64
- * Cluj Democratic Party Leader Interviewed *[ROMANIA LIBERA 13, 14 Mar]* 67

YUGOSLAVIA

- Details of LCY CC Session Noted *[TANJUG]* 70
  - Pancevski Speaks at Session *[TANJUG]* 73
  - Proposals on Party's Future *[TANJUG]* 76
- Serbian Political Groups Elect Leaders *[TANJUG]* 77
- Gosev on Macedonians Not Attending LCY Plenum *[Belgrade Radio]* 77
- Durakovic Explains Bosnia LC's Walkout *[TANJUG]* 78
- Kosovo LC on Failure To Attend LCY Plenum *[TANJUG]* 78
- Markovic, Agricultural Representatives Meet *[TANJUG]* 79
- Serbian Democratic Party Holds Founding Assembly *[TANJUG]* 80
- Serbian Political Groups Elect Leaders *[TANJUG]* 80

Pristina Roundtable To View Democratic Initiatives *[Pristina Radio]* 81
Kosovo Serbs Leave Alternative Groups' Meeting *[Belgrade Radio]* 81
Kosovo Democratic Alliance Notes Situation *[Pristina Radio]* 81
Security Operation in Kosovo Extended *[TANJUG]* 82
Commentary on Milosevic Policy in Kosovo *[Jez in DELO 27 Mar]* 82
Slovene Opposition Leader Pucnik on Elections *[Vienna Radio]* 83
Independent Slovene Union Founding Congress Held *[TANJUG]* 83
Slovene Democratic Alliance Holds Convention *[DELO 28 Mar]* 84
Slovene Political Weekly Paper Folds *[TANJUG]* 85
Croat Youth Federation Conference Disbands *[TANJUG]* 85
Serbs From Benkovac Area Want Autonomy *[BORBA 22 Mar]* 85
Newspaper Views Benkovac Case *[Vranic in BORBA 20 Mar]* 86
3 New Parties Established in Croatia *[BORBA 20 Mar]* 86
Radio Yugoslavia Expects New Sponsor *[BORBA 20 Mar]* 87
Quarterly Magazine for Gypsies Published *[TANJUG]* 87
Bogicevic on European Changes *[TANJUG]* 87

National Assembly Continues; Approves Laws

AU3003145990 Sofia BTA in English 1433 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—Today the National Assembly continued its session adopting at second reading the laws discussed on Wednesday and Thursday [28 and 29 March].

The national representatives have adopted the amendments to the Law on Territorial and Town Development, to the Civil Code of Procedure, to the organization of law courts, an amendment to the Pensions Law and yet another seven laws.

On the final adoption of the amendment to the Penal Procedure Code the proposal to abolish capital punishment has not been approved. In view of the humanization of the society, the National Assembly decided to abolish capital punishment in the near future, when an entirely new penal and procedure code will be considered.

Voting for the amendments to the Labour Code made in connection with the proposal for a new list of public holidays in Bulgaria, the proposal to make December 26 (the second day of Christmas) and May 2 general holidays has been rejected. The public holidays in the country are: January 1—New Year's Day; March 3—a national holiday celebrating the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke; May 1 or Labour Day; Easter; May 24—the Day of Bulgarian Education, Culture and Slavonic Scripture; September 9—the Day of Freedom; and December 25, Christmas.

The Decree on Stimulating the Birth Rate has been also amended. According to the adopted amendment the so called bachelors' tax ranging from five to 15 per cent, depending on the age of unmarried men and women, is revoked. According to another amendment to the same decree, parents will be getting family allowances until their children turn 18 years of age (formerly this age being 16), if their children are still at school.

The important amendments proposed by the government concerning Economic Activity Decree No. 56 of the State Council of 1988 have also been adopted. In this way a number of restrictions on companies' initiative and enterprise are removed, no matter what form of property the companies may be based on.

The National Assembly has adopted a Law on Combating "Intellectual Piracy", i.e. the illegal use of the works of literature, the cinema, the other arts and science, which is the first of its kind in Eastern Europe.

Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov backed up the proposal according to which all companies, irrespective of the form of property they are based on, can carry out foreign trade activity on an equal basis by selling 50 per cent of their foreign currency exchange receipts to the state. The government will have the right to decide when and which companies should be given privileges in carrying out foreign trade activities.

Debates Ecological Problems

AU3003155490 Sofia BTA in English 1521 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—At today's session of the National Assembly, the parliamentary group appointed to study the ecological situation in Dimitrovgrad in response to the petition of the inhabitants of that town has reported the results of the inspection and proposed concrete measures for the improvement of the ecology there.

The opinion of the working group is that the population's alarm is justified, because as a result of making use of ecologically outdated technologies and worn-out facilities, breaking the technological regime prescribed for separate production processes and not maintaining the purifiers in good working condition, the air in Dimitrovgrad is polluted systematically. In terms of air pollution the town comes fifth in the country. The pollution has a negative effect on the health of the population.

The National Assembly has approved the most urgent measures that should be taken with regard to the three major air polluters in the area: the Vulkan Factory, the Maritsa-3 Thermoelectric Power Plant and the chemical combined works.

The National Assembly has also adopted a decision on the ecological situation in the vicinity of the nonferrous metals combined works and the Agria Factory near Plovdiv and Asenovgrad. Some time ago the National Assembly approved concrete measures, but despite this fact the social tension in the area has not eased down, and on the day the National Assembly opened its session there was a demonstration organized by the population in the area.

A parliamentary group has been set up to survey the implementation of the decisions made by the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers and to study the new demands of the population. The group will report the results of its work to the National Assembly at its next session.

Questions about the serious ecological situation in other regions of the country have also been raised.

In this connection the minister of environment undertook on behalf of his ministry to study the matter and come out with an opinion.

An amendment to the Penal Code has been additionally included in the agenda and was adopted.

The amendment has to do with the limitation during which, by statute, an action can be brought for killing two or more people. The limitation period was extended from 20 to 35 years.

This amendment is made in view of the data that have been revealed of late about the cruel manslaughter committed in the detention camps near Lovech and the village of Skravena in the 1959-1962 period.

But the extension of the limitation will cover other cases of especially serious crimes committed after 1955 as well.

The National Assembly declared the political and civil rehabilitation of 63 persons convicted and repressed after the trials against the opposition parties in the end of the 1940's, the trial of BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] activist Traycho Kostov and the trials in the 1974-1981 period.

Agreement on Presidency

AU3003163190 Sofia BTA in English 1559 GMT 30 Mar 90

["Bulgaria Headed by President"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—The participants in the national roundtable talks have agreed that the National Assembly should elect Mr. Petur Mladenov, the present president of the State Council, head of state. The head of state will be called president of the Republic. This was laid down in the agreement on the basic ideas and principles of the amendment to the Constitution concluded today by the political forces represented at the roundtable. The Constitution Amendment Law is to be considered at the present session of the National Assembly.

The new Constitution, which will be worked out by the Grand (Constituent) National Assembly, will define the form of state rule, the functions and the mandate of the head of state. Until the new Constitution is approved, the head of state has the power to form a cabinet, the program and members of which are approved in advance by Parliament, to discharge his functions as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, to make decisions which are not of normative character. According to the participants in the roundtable the head of state should not be a member of the leadership of any party. They recommend the abolishment of the State Council as an institution.

It is underlined in the agreement that the change of the Constitution is a step towards an all-round constitutional reform of the social system. Political pluralism, democracy and humanism are considered to be the basic principles of the political system. The rulers and the opposition accept the principle of delimiting the functions of the country's authorities as a foundation-laying principle.

The roundtable participants agreed that the elections in June should be for a Grand or Constituent National Assembly. Within a year and a half it will have to work out and adopt a new Constitution after holding a referendum for its approval. The Grand National Assembly will be made up of 400 national representatives elected through a mixed system—half of them will be elected on the basis of the majority principle and the other half through the proportional system. The Grand Assembly will operate as a permanent working legislative body, too. After the adoption of the new Constitution the Grand Assembly will decide whether to dissolve or to continue its activity.

The roundtable has expressed the opinion that the elections for local governing bodies should be held before the end of 1990.

An agreement on the basic ideas and principles of the Political Parties Law has also been signed.

Zhelev Closing Statement

AU3003165290 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1551 GMT 30 Mar 90

["Closing statement" by Union of Democratic Forces Chairman Zhelyu Zhelev at national roundtable talks in Sofia on 30 March—live]

[Text] Today we had to discuss and reexamine some exceptionally important documents in order to achieve results likely to guarantee the normal development of the political process in our country during the period prior to the forthcoming elections.

We signed three documents:

An agreement on the fundamental ideas and principles of the draft law on political parties, an agreement on the fundamental ideas and principles related to amendments and addenda to the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and an agreement on the principles and basic postulates of the draft law on the election of a Grand National Assembly.

As I have already said, the three documents are closely related to each other and represent a package that cannot be divided. They contain important principles, such as those related to the forthcoming elections for a Grand National Assembly, to the number of deputies in the Grand National Assembly, the question of the election system, and the question related to the statute on the head of state within the period prior to the election of the Grand National Assembly and prior to the adoption of a new democratic constitution.

I think that the roundtable can state with satisfaction that it has accomplished important and useful work for the country's political development.

Lilov Closing Statement

AU3003165390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1554 GMT 30 Mar 90

["Closing statement" by Alekandur Lilov, Bulgarian Communist Party Supreme Council chairman, at national roundtable talks in Sofia on 30 March—live]

[Text] Thank you, Dr. Zhelev. Permit us, in our turn, to express our satisfaction with the fact that we were actually able to sign three documents of such importance. I entirely share your evaluation that they represent a reliable political basis for the normal development of the political process in our country.

I am confident that with these agreements our roundtable will, so to say, restore its good reputation to a great extent, and it will be considered a body which is truly capable of serious work and one that is able to accomplish important tasks for the creation of the political prerequisites for the necessary legislative acts to be adopted and supported by all political forces in our country.

We hope that all those who are represented here at the roundtable and the other strata of our population not directly represented today will support these legislative documents.

I would like to add to your statement only a few words of gratitude for all those who participated in the preparation of these documents, and I would like to express particular gratitude to Dimitur Ludzhev, my partner in the contact group, for his understanding, for his perseverance, and for his readiness to find sensible and mutually acceptable solutions. Last but not least, let me share my conviction that this result which we affirm today demonstrates our capacity, through joint efforts, to ensure the peaceful transition that I am sure we all sincerely desire. Thank you.

Amendments Approved

*AU3003184690 Sofia BTA in English
1807 GMT 30 Mar 90*

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—The National Assembly has adopted a law on amending the Bulgarian Constitution on the first reading. The law will be finally adopted at the next parliamentary session on Tuesday, April 3.

The draft law was worked out by a constitutional commission appointed by the National Assembly; it was published for discussion, and literally few minutes before it was submitted to the session of the National Assembly the participants in the roundtable talks reached an agreement on it.

In response to the dynamic changes in Bulgaria after November 10, 1989, amendments are made to the Constitution which admit of no delay. They are aimed at ensuring the constitutional basis for a peaceful transition from the totalitarian system to a democratic society and to pave the way for free democratic elections.

One-third of the texts are amended. During the debates it was pointed out that other changes are also necessary, but they will have to be done by the future Grand (constituent) National Assembly which will adopt a new Constitution.

The basic principles laid down in the new text of the Constitution are: sovereignty of the people, political pluralism, democracy and humanism. The People's Republic of Bulgaria is defined as a "democratic state committed to the rule of law." According to the previous text in the Constitution Bulgaria was "a socialist state of the working people in towns and villages headed by the working class."

All texts in the Constitution are deideologized. Words and phrases like "socialist," "communist," "developed socialist society," "democratic centralism," "socialist internationalism," "people's intelligentsia," "world socialist economic system," etc. are deleted.

The Bulgarian language is the official language of the country. There has not been such a text in the Constitution before.

In the section devoted to the structure of the economy, the amendments ensure the right to free initiative and economic competition on the basis of different forms of property—state, municipal, cooperative and private property, all of them being placed on an equal footing. In the conditions of a socially orientated market economy, the state undertakes to guarantee a just distribution of the national product and to protect the disadvantaged strata of the population.

The subjects of exclusive state property are limited. State control of economic activity will be exercised through economic means; no monopoly, unfair competition and violation of consumers' rights are allowed.

According to a new article included in the Constitution, the Bulgarian National Bank is an independent issuing institution of the state which has to report to the National Assembly.

The monopoly of the state on foreign economic relations is eliminated.

The amendments to the Constitution create the conditions for the exercise of the constitutional rights and freedoms of Bulgaria's citizens in compliance with the international agreements signed by the country. The monopoly and the domination of a single ideology are abolished. The citizens' right to express freely their views on political, economic, social, cultural and religious matters is legalized.

The role of political parties is defined as one of the major forms of citizens' associations enabling them to participate in the country's political life.

The right to freedom of religion is brought into line with the internationally recognized standards.

Constitutional guarantees are given which prevent the excessive concentration of power in the hands of separate persons or institutions and any acts of power abuse on their part.

According to another amendment to the Constitution the new Constitution shall be worked out and adopted by the Grand (constituent) National Assembly made up of 400 national representatives elected through a system determined by law. After adopting the new Constitution the Grand National Assembly shall decide whether to continue its work as a common National Assembly until the expiry of its four-year term or to dissolve.

The common National Assembly will function as a permanent operative legislative body for a four-year term. The previous mandate of the National Assembly was five years.

According to yet another amendment the new head of state institution is introduced namely, a president elected by the National Assembly with a majority of two-thirds of the attending M.P.'s [members of parliament], his office-holding term being until the end of the National Assembly which will adopt the new Constitution. The State Council is abolished. The people who will run for the post of president should be not younger than 40 years.

The president and the vice-president cannot perform any other leading state, political, public or economic functions.

During the debates it was underlined that the changes of the Constitution, along with the other laws discussed, have a common object to ensure the peaceful transition to a democratic social system. The basic principles laid down in the amendments were accepted, but some M.P.'s sharply raised objections against the decisions of the roundtable which they consider to have been imposed on them. At the same time other M.P.'s insisted on realism and pointed out that the present political situation in the country should be taken into account.

The draft law was submitted for further discussion at the Legislative Commission of the National Assembly and will most likely be adopted on Tuesday after editing some texts.

Consensus on Grand National Assembly Law

AU3003210690 Sofia BTA in English
2025 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—The national representatives have adopted at first reading the Grand (Constituent) National Assembly Election Law. After long debates on the draft of the law, the roundtable reached consensus on this law and finished its work by signing an agreement on this question.

The initial draft proposed by the National Assembly was for a law of a common National Assembly with a four-year mandate.

At the proposal of the participants in the roundtable talks the Grand (Constituent) National Assembly will work out a new Constitution and after that it will decide whether to extend the term of its mandate or to dissolve in anticipation of the new parliamentary elections.

In the initial variant it was envisaged to elect 250 national representatives; 175 were to be elected through the majority system and 75 based on the proportional election principle.

The new variant also envisages elections through a mixed system, but the number of national representatives to be elected is 400—half of the seats will be taken through the majority election system and the other half through the proportional system.

The problem of diselection is still pending. The former election law envisaged the diselection of MPs [members of parliament] who did not justify the confidence of the electorate under definite conditions, but actually there has been no precedent for it.

The law will be finally adopted on Tuesday, April 3, at the last session of the present National Assembly.

Further on National Assembly

AU3003205290 Sofia BTA in English
2005 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—After heated debates the National Assembly adopted at first reading the law of amendments to the Bulgarian Constitution, the Grand (Constituent) National Assembly Election Law and the Political Parties Law. (Details on the laws are transmitted separately.)

Today a consensus was reached on the basic principles of these laws by the participants in the national roundtable talks. Most of the national representatives accepted the agreements reached by the roundtable, but some MPs [members of parliament] made sharp protests. This made some of their colleagues to remind them of the non-democratic way the present National Assembly was elected in the conditions of the totalitarian rule. Their speeches gave rise to another wave of protests on the part of some national representatives.

And yet the laws were adopted in principle. They will be submitted to final vote at the next session of the National Assembly scheduled for Tuesday, April 3. The president of Bulgaria will be elected on the same date. He will be given a provisional mandate. Then the National Assembly will dissolve in anticipation of the free elections the first free elections in 45 years.

Political Parties Law Adopted

AU3103143690 Sofia BTA in English
2047 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—After the roundtable signed an agreement on the basic ideas and principles of the political parties law today at noon, the law was discussed and adopted at first reading by the National Assembly. Provisions for the right to form political parties are made in the Bulgarian Constitution, but it has not been legally regulated by the legislation.

The law legalizes political pluralism and guarantees the citizens' right to form political parties. Political parties will carry out their activities within the framework of the Constitution and according to the operative laws in compliance with their statutes. All political parties are given equal opportunities to take part in the country's political life.

The law bans the formation of political parties the activity of which undermines the sovereignty or the territorial integrity of the country; the formation of parties the aims of which run counter to the Constitution and the law in the country; the formation of parties on a religious or ethnic basis or parties formed to fan up racial, national, ethnic or religious hatred; parties which seek to achieve their ends through violence or other means prohibited by the law; the formation of militarized and illegal parties.

The establishment of children and youth's organizations made up of young people under 16 years of age with the political parties is prohibited.

The political parties cannot set up organizations at enterprises, institutions and other organizations, nor are they allowed to intervene in their management and activity.

The political parties and other organizations and movements—trade unions, public movements, etc.—are forbidden to carry out organized political activity at workplaces: rallies, demonstrations, meetings and other forms of public campaigns in support of political parties or for canvassing votes.

The political parties cannot be financed by foreign states in the person of their bodies, institutions and organizations; they cannot receive money or property from foreign organizations and anonymous sources. Foreign citizens may make private or collective donations in favour of the political parties to the amount of maximum 500 U.S. dollars for individual donations and 200 U.S. dollars for collective ones. [numbers as received] This paragraph of the law gave rise to sharp protests on the part of some M.P.'s—members of the Bulgarian Communist Party and of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party, who see in this possibility of raising funds from abroad a threat to the sovereignty of the state. It was explained to them that the question is about money which the political parties would use for buying multiplication and other equipment which they need for their election campaign.

The parties cannot be financed by state bodies, institutions and economic enterprises, but the state can help them, guaranteeing the political parties equal rights by providing them with premises and materials.

The acquisition and the management of the parties' property will be controlled by a parliamentary-public permanently operating body set up with the National Assembly.

It is envisaged to levy taxes on the parties' property.

Session To Resume 3 Apr

AU3003181590 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] The third day of the 16th session of the Ninth National Assembly ended this evening. At today's session, the National Assembly deputies adopted 15 laws on the second reading.

A draft law on the Penal Code amendment was examined and adopted on principle. A report by the parliamentary commission on the ecological situation in Dimitrovgrad, a proposal on political and civic rehabilitation of unjustly convicted and repressed individuals, and a decision on the ecological situation in the area of the nonferrous metals plant near Plovdiv and Asenovgrad were discussed.

The draft laws on amendments and addenda to the Constitution, on electing the National Assembly, and a draft law on political parties were discussed and adopted on the first reading.

The 16th session of the Ninth National Assembly will reopen on 3 April as of 0900 [0600 GMT].

Roundtable Agrees on Mladenov as President

AU3003141390 Sofia BTA in English 1356 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—The participants in the roundtable talks today agreed that the republic will be headed by a president. They consider the present State Council of Bulgaria institution unnecessary.

The participants in the national roundtable talks also agreed on the election of the present president of the State Council, Mr. Petur Mladenov, as head of state or president of Bulgaria.

The new Constitution will regulate the form of state rule, the functions and the mandate of the head of state.

Parliamentary elections will be held on June 10 and 17, 1990.

Elections 10, 17 Jun

AU3003205590 Sofia BTA in English 1920 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—The participants in the national roundtable talks have specified the dates on which the elections for Grand (Constituent) National Assembly will be held—June 10 and 17, 1990. Today they also signed an agreement on the principles and the basic formulations of the election law. Together with the agreements on the Constitution Amendment Law and the Political Parties Law, this agreement forms the package of documents on the political reform adopted by the delegations of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Bulgarian Agrarian Party, the Union of Democratic Forces and other political and public organizations.

According to a politician, after "long, tedious and painful debates" consensus has been achieved on all questions at issue. The differences concerning the election system seemed the most difficult to settle. The roundtable participants made a compromise, deciding on a mixed system. The roundtable proposes that half of the 400 seats in the Grand National Assembly should be taken through the direct election of candidates in one-mandate election regions based on the majority principle with a majority of more than a half of the actual votes. The other 200 seats will be taken through the proportional election system in polimandated [word as received] territorial units based on party lists. Each voter should have the right to two votes—one for electing a candidate in a one-mandate election region and another vote for making a choice from the party lists, it is envisaged in the document.

If it is established that less than a half of the electorate have cast their vote or if none of the candidates is elected, there will be a second ballot within a week after the first vote.

Political parties, party coalitions or at least 500 voters have the right to nominate their candidates for the elections.

During the discussion of the documents the participants in the roundtable talks agreed to invite foreign representatives for the elections.

Fatherland Front Congress Opens

AU3003203690 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] The 11th Extraordinary Congress of the Fatherland Front opened in Sofia today. In his opening speech, Ginyu Ganev, Fatherland Front National Council chairman, described the development of this organization and its mission, pointing out that it was gradually deprived of its character and was transformed into an appendage of the totalitarian power. The conclusion is that the organization must proceed toward its renewal so that it may survive. The Fatherland Front is called upon to play a unifying role between parties and social forces. It must be a sociopolitical organization of the citizens in their places of residence.

The statements on the introductory speech, on a new statute and program of the organization, and on a moral code for the election campaign were very contradictory.

The statement of the People's Front of the Nonparty People prompted a particularly heated reaction. It was read at the session of the national roundtable. It demands that the Fatherland Front be disbanded, that its property be confiscated, and that the delegates of the Fatherland Front be expelled from the roundtable talks.

The delegates at the congress voted for a declaration, which was also read at the roundtable session. It resolutely rejects the gross violation of the national roundtable and the unceremonious interference in the life and activities of an independent and autonomous organization. The congress continues on 31 March.

Lukanov Addresses Congress

AU3103145590 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Dispatch by reporter Elena Shtereva on morning proceedings of Fatherland Front Congress in Sofia on 31 March—recorded]

[Excerpts] A feeling of drama is in the air of the Congress Hall, because the delegates' supreme goal is to decide how the Fatherland Front is to renew itself for its new historical mission and how it is to take a truly active part in the development of a civic society.

The draft platform states that this makes it necessary for the Fatherland Front to be transformed into a broadly based voluntary fatherland alliance of progressive democratic and patriotic forces in Bulgaria.

This morning the delegates had an opportunity to make proposals on the draft documents for the statute, platform, and code of ethics for the election campaign. In fact, the delegates are raising in a rhetorical manner many more issues than the ones for which they gathered to decide in Hall No. 1 of the People's Palace of Culture. [passage omitted]

I hope that before the congress' end the delegates will begin to discuss the problems in a concrete way because it is already clear that to ignore these problems will only make them more serious.

The speeches this morning concerning the organization's name were rather more specific. One of the delegates attributed the need to change the name to the fact that the words, front and democracy, are not words that hang well together. Another proposal was that the name should be: Fatherland Unity Alliance.

In response to the insistent wishes voiced by the delegates on 30 March, Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov came to the hall this morning to address the delegates. He pointed out that the changes and reassessments today affect all members of our society—the parties, the state, the traditional structures, and the newly formed parties and movements. Andrey Lukanov discussed the government's ideas for stabilizing the economy and rescuing the country from the economic crisis. The congress is continuing its work.

Name of Movement Changed

AU3103184390 Sofia BTA in English 1722 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 31 (BTA)—The Fatherland Front in Bulgaria, which has known the heights and falls, passed away today in history to give way to the new organization "Fatherland Union." The extraordinary congress of the Fatherland Front which is having a session for a second day today decided after long hesitations to bid farewell to its rather front-like sound of the word "Front."

The delegates voted a number of documents, among which is a platform of the Fatherland Union, placing the accent on its role in the construction of a civil society in this country.

As a voluntary socio-political organization the Fatherland Union unites the progressive, democratic and patriotic forces and political parties. It is independent and self-managing.

An important objective of the Fatherland Union is to protect national interests, strengthen national unity and concord, and unite everybody in the name of Bulgaria.

The platform considers the union's socio-protective functions, its role to raise the people's intellectual level and guarantee the free development of the personality.

The efforts are backed for building of a peaceful and democratic world, for friendship and cooperation between peoples, for building of a common European home.

A statute and an ethical code for a pre-election campaign have also been adopted, which contain recommending norms, principles and rules to the political forces in Bulgaria in the forthcoming free and democratic election.

The union leadership will be elected late during the night.

Union Elects Leadership

AU0104200790 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] The Congress of the Fatherland Union ended early this morning with the election of a National Council and a Control-Auditing Commission.

At its first plenum, the National Council elected Ginyo Ganev chairman of the Fatherland Union National Council. The Coordination Bureau will be elected on 3 April.

Social Democratic Party Opens Conference

AU3103145190 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] This afternoon the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party opened a national conference in the Bulgaria Hall in Sofia. Freedom, Solidarity, Justice—this motto of the world social democratic movement has also become the banner of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party.

Our reporter, Aglaya Shamlieva, reports that the conference is being attended by guests from Austria, Italy, Great Britain, Holland, and France.

In his speech, party Chairman Dr. Petur Dertliev emphasized that social democracy in Bulgaria is occupying an increasingly worthy place in political life. We do not stand for privileges; let our great sufferings during the past 45 years strengthen our oath to always remain faithful to the ideals of social democracy. We have never aimed at dictatorship, nor will we do so in the future. We believe in freedom and democracy, said the speaker.

In his greetings message, Socialist Party of Austria Chairman Heinz Fischer said: We propose to care for the young plant of democracy in Bulgaria. I am not surprised at the [words indistinct], they are a sign of common sense and self-confidence, which is the first formula for success. The second formula for your success is cooperation and the exchange of ideas.

The national conference is continuing with debates on the party's statute and program.

Party Ends Conference

AU3103211090 Sofia BTA in English 1915 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 31 (BTA)—Bulgarian Social Democrats desire a humane and democratic society, based on social justice, a society without privileges and discrimination.

This objective of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) was formulated today in the BSDP programme adopted at this party's national conference held here today. The programme is in compliance with the ideological and political heritage of Bulgarian social democracy, with the principles and aims of Socialist International of which the BSDP is a member.

Representatives of the BSDP's 158 organizations throughout the country participated in the conference. They adopted a statute and empowered the interim leadership to set the date for holding of a party congress.

In his speech at the conference BSDP leader Petur Dertliev spoke of the historical way of Bulgarian social democracy, which has always desired a peaceful, nonviolent restructuring of society by legal means, as the speaker said. He spoke of the [indistinct word] and repressions against BSDP activists after the party had been banned more than 40 years ago and stressed that life has proven the programme principle of the BSDP: "There is no socialism without democracy."

The participants greeted Mr. Heinz Fischer, from the Austrian Socialist Party, leader of the delegation of the Socialist International at the conference.

In a lively discussion a proposal was made, among other things, for raising Petur Dertliev's nomination for Bulgaria's president. This was fervently backed by the participants.

At a press conference before Bulgarian and foreign journalists Petur Dertliev characterized as "businesslike and happy" the first BSDP conference after the party restored its activity four months ago. He refuted rumours about an alleged pre-election coalition between Social Democrats and the Agrarians and stressed that the BSDP will struggle for election victory in the common list of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS).

Heinz Fischer expressed the satisfaction and support of the Socialist International for democratization in Bulgaria. Answering on whether communist and other parties which have transformed to socialist and social democratic ones could count on membership in the Socialist International, H. Fischer said that only a party which applies in reality the programme principles of the Socialist International can be a member of this organization.

Mircho Spasov Deprived of Medals, Titles

AU3003203890 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] According to a State Council decree, Mircho Spasov Khristov is deprived of the rank of colonel general, the title Hero of Socialist Labor, and of the medals and orders conferred on him in the past because of his grave encroachments against the laws of the country and the rules of the moral code.

Commerce Chamber Chief on Company Registrations

AU3003124090 Sofia BTA in English 1216 GMT 30 Mar 90

["Commerce and Industry Chamber To Help Companies"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—A total of 19,521 companies had been registered in this country by the beginning of this year, Mr. Vladimir Lambrev, president of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told a news conference here today. Of them, 3,300 are partnerships, 14,000 are private companies, 53 are mixed companies with a foreign percentage share participation, and 27 are subsidiaries of companies based abroad.

One of the principal objectives in the work of the chamber will be to help expand international trade exchanges by facilitating direct contacts between Bulgarian and foreign companies and economic organisations, Mr. Vladimir Lambrev said. On January 18, 1990, the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the International Private Economic Council of South Korea (IPEC) established a bilateral committee for economic cooperation. The chamber has already contacted and is holding cooperation negotiations with counterpart organisations in Israel, South Africa and other countries with which until recently Bulgaria had no contacts at all.

Trade Minister on Domestic Market Problems

AU3003201590 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] At a news conference at the Ministry of Trade and Public Services in Sofia today, Minister Ekaterina Marinova spoke about the situation of the domestic market and about the economic reform that is about to be implemented in this branch.

She pointed out that thanks to the measures adopted, the difficulties in supplying the population with foodstuffs is being overcome. The government allocates a large amount of resources to the import of various industrial goods that are in short supply.

As it was pointed out, the centralized pricing of 18 small, everyday commodities and of the majority of everyday life services is being eliminated within the framework of the reform. The prices of these goods and services will be fixed according to the principles of supply and demand as of 1 April 1990.

A package of documents for the transformation of several trade companies into shareholders' companies has been approved. It is also envisioned that the municipal people's councils should gradually sell some stores and artisan shops to private individuals and to foreign companies if they are ready to buy.

The privatization plays a special role in the economic reform under way in our country, Minister Ekaterina Marinova stated.

Kurdzhali Judges To Assist in Changing Name

AU3003193490 Sofia BTA in English 1813 GMT 30 Mar 90

["Trends After Adopting Names Law"—BTA headline]

[Text] Kurdzhali, March 30 (BTA)—Twelve juries of judges have arrived in the town to help the local judges try the cases related to the forcible change of the names of a big part of the population in the area. They will start their work on Monday, April 2.

It is expected that this will facilitate the matters of procedure involved and that the Turko-Arab names of about 265,000 people will be restored in the next few months. The time that has passed after the adoption of the Names Law by the National Assembly, however, revealed some trends: In the biggest municipality, that of Kurdzhali, only 1,853 applications for changing names have been filed, and in a number of other big municipalities there are none. In the town of Kurdzhali only three applications have been filed. In many places it is demanded that the names should be restored according to a procedure different from that established by the law.

At the same time an average of 10,000 dollars [currency not specified] per day are drawn from the Economic Bank in Kurdzhali for travels abroad, mainly to Turkey.

BCP, Opposition Dailies Lead in Circulation

AU3003122890 Sofia BTA in English
0905 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—The RABOTNICHESKO DELO newspaper is still the daily with the largest circulation in Bulgaria. Today the paper puts its daily press run at nearly 760,000 copies, 562,362 of which go to subscribers and 194,486 are sold at newsstands. DEMOKRATSIYA, the daily which the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) began publishing two months ago, sells 205,776 copies of its 300,776-copy circulation to subscribers and 95,000 at news stands. Next come TRUD, the daily of the independent trade unions (286,000) and KOOPERATIVNO SELO, a publication of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Supreme Council (247,700).

The largest weeklies by circulation are POGLED (422,500) and STURSHEL (382,000). The weekly newspaper of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party SVOBODEN NAROD appears in a circulation of 49,000 and the Green party weekly EKOPOLITIKA in 20,000.

These circulation figures will be maintained until the end of June. After that each newspaper will have to rely on its performance for a circulation determined by readership demand and newsprint supply.

New Magazine on 'Power, Business, and Sex' Issued

AU3103191390

[Editorial Report] Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian on 29 March 1990 carries on page 3 a 200-word report by Maya Pangelova, entitled: "Independent Magazine," announcing the appearance of the first issue of a new monthly magazine, called DANO (Yes, But). The magazine is a publication of the "Social Choice—Democracy Society for the Propagation of Scientific Knowledge" and reportedly "deals with power, business, and sex." It is described as "an independent press outlet because it is not financed by any state, social, or political institution, but from its own resources." Pangelova further reports that, according to the publishers of the magazine, "DANO is independent from political organizations, which does not mean that it is not involved in the country's political life." Pangelova explains the title of the magazine in the following terms: "The editors' ambition is to deal with crucial problems, without trying to escape from the eternal human rift between yes and but."

The first issue is reported to carry an article on the "command- administrative system" and an interview with Professor Krutyu Petkov, Independent Trade Unions Confederation chairman, among other materials.

Socialist Party Defends Name in News Conference

AU3103184590 Sofia BTA in English
1712 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 31 (BTA)—Disputes on the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] change of name to Bulgarian Socialist Party, for which a referendum was carried among its members, was one of the major reasons for today's press conference convened by the opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party. Outlining the basic principles on which this party's activities are based and the work which has so far been done, this party's leaders tried to protect this party's right of existence.

Chairman Ivan Velkov determined the Bulgarian Socialist Party as a left centrist political formation which struggles for "equality, freedom, solidarity, dignity and responsibility." According to him it exists as a political circle from the end of 1988 while as a party from December 30, 1989, and has some 10,000 members and adherents.

A stress was made at a press conference that the Bulgarian Socialist Party will use all legal means to protect its name. The speakers said that they would like to participate in a public discussion on this issue, but they have been refused this so far. After strictly differentiating themselves from "the orthodox Communist Party," they said they were ready to cooperate with all Communists who have not discredited themselves, who have adopted the principles of democracy and have denounced the proletariat dictatorship. The party leadership thinks that there are no convincing arguments for the BCP's moral and juridical right to call itself socialist.

BCP Alternative Socialist Faction Meets

AU0104155390 Sofia Domestic Service
in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] A national conference of the Alternative Socialist Association [ASO] council of representatives, a faction of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP], ended in Sofia today.

In his introductory speech, the ASO chairman [name indistinct] analyzed the faction's position as a political force. The conference participants discussed a program for action. The document makes demands for a nationwide, not a purely party, approach to the convening of the Grand National Assembly, for an investigation of the violations of human rights and freedoms committed, and for bringing to trial those responsible for the political, economic, and ecological crisis in the country.

The participants adopted [words indistinct] the first representative of the Supreme Party Council. The document insists that the party building should be handed over to the Council of Ministers before the end of April.

Lilov Stresses 'National Consensus' at Rally

AU3003193190 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] A Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] rally took place in Kazunluk today. It was organized by the BCP Municipal Committee. It was attended by working people from the Kazunluk, Pavel Banya, and Muglizh municipalities.

BCP Supreme Council Chairman Aleksandur Lilov was among the speakers at the meeting. He dwelled on the changes under way in our country since 10 November 1989 and stressed that today, more than ever, we need national consensus and the construction of a peaceful, socialist society for Bulgaria's consolidation and renewal.

Plovdiv Communists Propose Expelling Vulcheva

AU3103193390 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 29 Mar 90 p 2

[Report by Plovdiv Oblast correspondent Stefan Severin: "Proposal To Expel Drazha Vulcheva from BCP]

[Text] Plovdiv, 28 Mar—At today's session, the local Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Commission on Party Ethics in Plovdiv approved the proposal of the Central BCP Commission on Ethics to expel Drazha Vulcheva from the party ranks. The reason for this proposal is the so-called "Purvenets story" related to the repression of 34 Communists from the former Purvenets Okrug. They were fully rehabilitated by the Plovdiv Oblast Control-Auditing Commission in February 1990, and the case was defined as a "gross slander and political intrigue aimed against criticism within the party, against the democratic spirit in the Plovdiv party organization," which contributed to the assertion of the authoritarian and unlimited power exerted by Drazha Vulchev, who was BCP Okrug Committee first secretary at that time.

Militia Commander Discusses New Tasks

AU3103191990 Sofia ANTENI in Bulgarian Issue No. 13, 28 Mar 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Major General Stefan Angelov, commander of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Forces, by Yasen Georgiev; place and date not given: "I Am A Soldier Who Prays That His Troops Never Go Into Action"]

[Text] Major General Stefan Angelov was born on 22 September 1936 in Paunovo Village, Sofia Oblast. He is of peasant origins, a fact of which the present commander is especially proud of, having chosen the principle: "Hard work is the basis of success" as his life's motto. In 1955 he enrolled in military school, and in 1958 he was admitted to a three-year semi-higher education course. He was a platoon commander in the Bulgarian People's Army, and subsequently he was appointed deputy commander of a border guard unit. Between 1968 and 1971, he enrolled for a three-year training course at the Military Academy, after which he studied in the USSR. He served in an operational combat unit of the Border Guards Troops, and was later appointed Border Guard Troops deputy commander. His wife is a hospital nurse; his son is a medical doctor working in an emergency ward. He is paying back a loan to the State Saving Bank, and has no bank accounts, whatsoever. Apart from his favorite occupation—namely his profession—he likes television, and is a Central Army Sports Club fan. Let us mention a very honorable fact—until autumn 1989, Stefan Angelov obediently and willingly complied with the Border Guards Troops regulations that require regular physical exercise for one hour, four times weekly. He still plays table tennis, soccer, and volley ball....

[Georgiev] People say that we do not need such a large "repressive apparatus...."

[Angelov] We should not forget that the Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops are part of the country's Armed Forces. Since just a short time ago, they have been expected to merge with the Border Guards. Under these circumstances, part of the internal forces command staff will be reduced and part of it is assigned tasks connected with the border protection. The expected economic effect of these measures is evident. As to the term "repressive," let me tell you that the internal forces have acted and will always act only in situations of crisis, and that this task is exclusively limited to the defense and protection of state property, and to the maintenance of law and order. I am a military man, who prays that his troops never go into action....

[Georgiev] Has anything changed about the situation at our borders since the Law on Foreign Travel Passports has come into force?

[Angelov] Not in the least. Attempts to illegally cross the border in both directions continue, while the reasons for such breaches are well known—they are related to smuggling and criminal acts, but also with political motives. The situation at the border accurately reflects the domestic situation in our country and in neighboring countries. The more unrest there is in our country and abroad, the more work this means for us. Some people are trying to make comparisons with the states of the West European communities, but they forget the specific political differences existing between the two regions, let alone the economic differences....If we should really "open" the borders, can you imagine the chaos that would result from it? Last, but not least, let us deal with the most topical question of the day: How is the depolitization of our troops proceeding? I firmly declare: We do not care about allegiance to this, or that ideology, but only about patriotism.

Soviet Says No Nuclear Weapons in Bulgaria

AU3003193390 Sofia BTA in English
1816 GMT 30 Mar 90

["No Nuclear Weapons in Bulgaria"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—In connection with the information that Soviet missiles of the type OTR-23 (SS-23) are deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, on March 27 this year a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR stated that before the signature of the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles Treaty, in fulfilment of its obligations as an ally, the Soviet Union had delivered to these countries and to Bulgaria missiles of type OTR-23.

In reply to an enquiry made by the Embassy of the United States in Sofia, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria gave the following explanation:

According to the data about the Armed Forces of the country officially announced on January 31, 1989, the Bulgarian People's Army has in its possession 72 operational tactical missiles, including eight OTR-23 missiles with a maximum range of 500 km. The eight missiles were bought and received in 1986, they are Bulgaria's property and are under exclusive Bulgarian control.

There have never been and there are not at the moment any missiles in Bulgaria which should be declared and destroyed on the strength of the IMF Treaty signed between the USSR and the United States in 1987.

The OTR-23 missiles bought from the USSR have never had nor has there been any intention to supply them with nuclear heads.

The Bulgarian Government has always backed up the proposal to include in the negotiations on disarmament in Europe the so-called double-function weapons to which the Bulgarian OTR-23 missiles are related.

Turkish Media Coverage of Talks Criticized

AU3003180090 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 29 Mar 90 pp 1, 5

[Text] Ankara, 28 March (BTA special correspondent Apostol Saruivanov)—On 30 March, two days of talks will open between Bulgarian and Turkish delegations led by the two countries' first deputy foreign ministers, Stefan Staykov and Tugay Ozceri, respectively. This represents the next step on the road of the Bulgarian-Turkish dialogue that started in Kuwait and continued in Ottawa, which is aimed at finding solutions to the problems in the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey that have arisen and deepened during recent years. In conversations with the members of the two delegations who will sit down tomorrow at the negotiating table, a clearly expressed desire emerged to find mutually acceptable solutions for the contentious issues because this corresponds to the interests of both countries and their peoples, and at the same time will make a substantial contribution to the development of positive processes in the Balkans and Europe.

Against the background of this common desire, the way in which some of the Turkish mass media are presenting the aims of the Bulgarian-Turkish dialogue and attempting to prepare Turkish public opinion for the forthcoming talks seems strange, to say the least. Two days ago, the VOICE OF TURKEY Radio announced to its listeners that the aim of these talks was "to find a solution to the problems of the Turkish Muslim minority in Bulgaria," and today MILLIYET informs its readers that "Ankara has no hopes for the dialogue with Bulgaria." Citing highly placed representatives of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the article's author, Nilufer Yalcin, notes that tomorrow the Turkish delegation is expected to put forward claims that, according to her description at least, do not sound particularly diplomatic and sound very much like ultimatums. According to this report, the Turkish side's first demand is as follows: "The Turkish minority in Bulgaria is a reality; it is a fact. This minority possesses a status and rights determined in international treaties. These rights must be acknowledged, and the government in Sofia must ensure their full and uniform application." Later the author sets out further detailed claims addressed to the Bulgarian side, presented in the same tone, and concludes with the words: "If this problem is not settled to advantage, one can expect no improvement in bilateral relations to their former level."

Reports of this kind, apart from contributing nothing to objectively informing the public, do not correspond either to the wishes of certain members of the Turkish delegation. The Bulgarian delegation emphasizes that it is essential for the bilateral relations with Turkey to be placed on a new foundation.

Staykov Holds 'Constructive' Talks in Ankara

AU3003180290 Sofia BTA in English
1625 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Ankara, March 30 (BTA special correspondent)—In compliance with the agreement reached by the ministers of foreign affairs of Bulgaria and Turkey, delegations of the two countries held talks yesterday and today. The delegations were headed by the first deputy ministers of foreign affairs, Mr. Stefan Staykov (Bulgaria) and Mr. Tugay Ozceri (Turkey).

In a constructive atmosphere the participants carried out an extensive exchange of views on the actions which the two governments could take to normalize and promote the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey and to carry out mutually advantageous cooperation. It was established that it is possible to establish contacts between representatives of the two countries who would ensure a better mutual understanding and rapprochement of positions in different fields.

After the meeting was over, the leaders of the two delegations expressed their satisfaction with the talks and with what had been achieved. The two sides announced that they had agreed to resume the talks in Sofia on a date that would be specified later.

Yesterday afternoon the leader of the Bulgarian delegation, Mr. Stefan Staykov, was received by Mr. Ali Bozer, minister of foreign affairs of Turkey. At the meeting the two sides underlined the desire of Bulgaria and Turkey to conduct a constructive dialogue for the establishment of relations of mutually advantageous cooperation. Mr. Stefan Staykov pointed out that the two countries' relations should enter a new period and that measures should be taken to strengthen their mutual confidence.

Finance Minister Announces Debt Talks With West

AU3003142090 Sofia BTA in English
1351 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—The Bulgarian Government has contacted its Western creditors asking for consultations on the payment of the country's foreign debt. This statement was made by Mr. Belcho Belchev, minister of finance, in connection with the announcements made by some foreign mass media.

Commenting on the same question in his report to the National Assembly, yesterday [29 March] Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov said, "obviously it would not be realistic to try to maintain a relative stability of the economy and implement a radical financial and currency reform relying only on our present possibilities and resources, without having received the understanding and the support of our partners and creditors concerning the problems of our foreign debt; we are willing to hold consultation on the problem on a bilateral and multilateral basis. We could discuss some constructive solutions aimed at helping along the economic reform in Bulgaria and preserving the traditional financial and commercial relations of Bulgaria with her western partners".

Foreign Trade Bank 'Temporarily Stops Payments'

AU3103184790 Sofia BTA in English
1709 GMT 31 Mar 90

["Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Temporarily Stops Payments"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 31 (BTA)—The Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank has informed its partners, the foreign banks, that it temporarily stops payments of maturities for credits used by it. This concerns installments on all types of credits: short-term deposits, credits for short-term financing of imported goods, for financing of investment projects, as well as medium-term and long- term financial credits.

The stopping of payments does not refer to investments in foreign currency of the Bulgarian citizens.

This measure was taken due to the difficulties which the country encounters in its transition to a pluralistic democratic system and the carrying of a radical economic reform, directed at the establishment of a market economy.

The bank confirms that it will continue to pay back the interests as well as its contractual loan liabilities. Concurrently a proposal was made to the foreign banks to hold joint consultations with their representatives and seek solutions and constructive approaches for refinancing of liabilities which should be paid this year. Efforts will be made to activate the export of Bulgarian goods and services and increase receipts so as to reduce the country's foreign debt.

UN Food, Agriculture Chief Handed Message

AU3103195790 Sofia BTA in English
1817 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Rome, March 31 (BTA corr.)—Edward Sauma, director general of FAO [UN Food and Agriculture Organization], received Bulgaria's permanent representative at this organization Yuliy Minchev, who handed him a letter from Foreign Affairs Minister Boyko Dimitrov. The letter makes a survey of the course of processes of democratization in this country and proposes further expansion of mutually advantageous cooperation between Bulgaria and FAO. Mr. Sauma said he will prepare an early reply and expressed a wish to meet the Bulgarian minister and have talks with him on issues which are of mutual interest.

Lukanov Meets Socialist International Delegation

AU3003142690 Sofia BTA in English
1354 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—Mr. Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, today received a delegation of the Socialist International headed by Mr. Heinz Fischer. Mr. Lukanov informed the guests about the democratic processes which are under way in the country and the efforts at reforming the economy. Mr. Fischer expressed his support for the processes of democratization in Bulgaria.

Lilov Meets Delegation

AU3103184990 Sofia BTA in English
1616 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Sofia, March 31 (BTA)—The chairman of the Supreme Party Council Aleksandur Lilov met today with representatives of the Socialist International. The delegation, headed by Heinz Fischer, deputy chairman of the

Socialist Party of Austria, is paying a visit to the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party. The guests showed interest in the change of name of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and the forthcoming elections.

We have no time to waste for cosmetic changes. We would like to create a modern socialist party which will not only be related to the old social-democratic traditions, but will also be placed on a much broader theoretical base. The BCP's desire is to improve itself with political ideas, and to be renewed organizationally, Aleksandur Lilov said. He said that the opinion of the majority of party members for a change of the BCP name symbolizes the wish for a new content it its activity. Asked if a minority could faction and create a communist party he said it might happen but it is hardly likely to take place before the elections. After the elections political excitement is still to continue and it is quite likely that such a party could be formed which will be useful for this country's political life, A. Lilov said.

It was specially stressed that the BCP stands for free and democratic elections, for which representatives of international organizations and of various states have been invited. If the BCP wins we would like that a coalition government be formed. If it loses we will become an opposition and will draw all the conclusions no matter how bitter they are, said the BCP chairman.

Kyuranov Discusses Bonn Seminar on Europe

AU3003100490 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 26 Mar 90 p 1,6

[Report on interview with Professor Dr. Chavdar Kyuranov, Bulgarian Communist Party Supreme Council member, by RABOTNICHESKO DELO correspondent Dimitur Khadzhinikolov, in Bonn on 25 March: "The Bonn Seminar on Common European Future"]

[Text] The Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the FRG Social Democratic Party [SPD] organized an international seminar on the subject: "The Unification of Germany and Europe—A Common European Future," which was held from 23 through 25 March 1990.

Parties, organizations, and scientific institutes from 19 countries were represented at the seminar. Professor Dr. Chavdar Kyuranov, Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Supreme Council member, was also among the participants. He made a statement on the subject: "Germany's Unification and the Small Countries of East Europe." In his statement, he examined the influence of the reunification process on the economy and foreign economic relations of the aforementioned countries. The conclusion was drawn that, in spite of the risks involved resulting from the profound changes under way in the European system, these changes, Germany's reunification included, should be considered a reality.

This is what Prof. Kyuranov told us about his impressions from the seminar:

"Concern was voiced on the situation of the East European states and it was pointed out that they should not be abandoned, that along with the changes taking place in those countries, we should proceed toward creating equal economic conditions in Europe. This should not be a political unification of Europe, but an economic unification based on democratic principles."

Several speakers who took the floor at the seminar pointed out the difficulties awaiting the East European countries in connection with linking their economies to those of the Western countries. The question was pointed out that this should not lead to one-sidedness in multilateral relations and that the relations among the East European countries, including their relations with the Soviet Union, should not be disrupted.

Asked about any meetings he had during his brief stay in Bonn, Prof. Kyuranov answered:

I had a very interesting meeting with Prof. Ehmke, the leader of the seminar. (Prof. Doctor Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the SPD Bundestag faction, and the Social Democrats' expert on questions of security and foreign policy.) I told him about our party's transformation, about the structural changes and the new principles of our statute, which are changing the image of the party to a great extent. We discussed the possible election results, and I expressed my views on cooperation with other parties following the elections. I also voiced our party's stand that, regardless of the election results, we will try to establish a coalition government, considering that the problems facing the country cannot be resolved by one single party alone.

Petition Calls for Slovak Independence

LD3003163890 Prague CTK in English 1200 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Bratislava March 30 (CTK)—The participants in today's stormy demonstration outside the building of the Slovak National Council welcomed with applause a petition addressed to the highest legislative body of Slovakia.

The document pointed out that the Czech nation does not recognize the existence of the Slovak nation before the world, which was proved by the course of Thursday's session of the Federal Assembly, and called on the Slovak National Council to start negotiations on full recognition of sovereignty and independence of the Slovak nation.

The petition with signatures collected among the participants was handed over to chairman of the Slovak National Council Rudolf Schuster by a delegation of demonstrators.

The session of the Slovak National Council was then interrupted. During the interval Rudolf Schuster addressed the participants in the demonstration from a balcony and promised that the Slovak supreme bodies will discuss the demands contained in the petition with the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly.

The participants then agreed to hold another meeting on Slovak National Uprising Square at 5 p.m. and ended their demonstration. They called on Slovaks all over Slovakia to go to streets and demonstrate for equality and national sovereignty.

SNC's Schuster Protests Federation Name

LD3003183290 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] A statement on the current situation was issued today by the Slovak National Council [SNC] and the Slovak Government. It was delivered by SNC Chairman Rudolf Schuster, and here it is:

[Begin Schuster recording] Following a decision made at an emergency consultative meeting of the SNC Presidium, the government and representatives of the main political forces, a commission of the SNC Presidium and government, consisting of Jan Budaj, Boris Zala, Ivan Carnogursky, Vladimir Minac, Jozef Dubnicek, Silvester Minarovic, and Ladislav Kosta, has drawn up a draft statement, which I am going to read to you now:

At its session on 29 March, the Federal Assembly passed a law on the name of the republic which caused concern and dissension among people in Slovakia. The SNC and the government have taken a consistent stand on the name of the republic and the federation. Within its terms of reference, the SNC adopted the name Slovak Republic as well as the Slovak state emblem, flag, and anthem. These steps were received by the Slovak public in a positive manner, because they expressed the will of the majority of the people.

At its last meeting, the SNC adopted a resolution in which it proposed The Federation of Czecho-Slovakia [Federacia Cesko-Slovensko], with a hyphen and a capital "S", as the name of our common state.

The SNC and the government express regret at the fact that the Federal Assembly has not accepted this resolution, which expressed the will and aspirations of the people of the Slovak Republic. We are convinced that the name of the republic expresses and determines the form that the state takes, and the way in which our two nations coexist. Therefore, the name of our country, as a federation of two sovereign republics, must unambiguously reflect this fact.

The decision made by the Federal Assembly does not tally with this principle. It is our conviction that a single federative republic should not have two names. Therefore we propose that tripartite talks be held between the presidiums of the Federal Assembly and the Slovak and Czech national councils, the federal and two republican governments, and the main political forces.

The SNC and the government consider the issues of Slovak statehood and national sovereignty to be fundamental principles of their policy, and they wish to resolve them in a peaceful way by negotiation, and by drawing on all the existing positive experience of the coexistence of Slovaks and Czechs.

We also appeal to all political forces not to misuse the national sentiments of the public. We believe that the authority of the president of the republic could make a significant contribution to resolving the issue of the name of the state in a way acceptable to both republics.

The SNC and the government of the Slovak Republic ask all our citizens to support this stand and to show the patience and level-headedness required to resolve this issue, which is such a sensitive one for our nations. [applause] [end recording]

That was a statement on the current situation delivered at today's session of the SNC by its chairman Rudolf Schuster.

Regional Democratic Party Urges Slovak Unity

LD3103140590 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1030 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] The members of the Democratic Party in the East Slovak region have issued a statement on the situation in Slovakia. The regional committee of this party in Kosice distances itself from any nationalistic actions which jeopardize the integrity of the republic. The statement stresses that sovereignty of Slovakia can be sufficiently safeguarded within the framework of the Czechoslovak Federative state. It is pointless to lose sympathies, which we have won in the world by virtue of the gentle revolution, through such useless arguments. We should not be divided now by lack of deliberation, fanned by the separatist tendencies from any side. We appeal for a calm solution from all democratic forces, which were united in the streets last November by the slogan There is Strength in Unity—the statement of the regional Committee of the Democratic Party in Kosice says in conclusion.

Anti-Magyar Sentiments Appearing in Slovakia

LD3003185290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Evelyn Forro reports on debates on the nationality issue in Slovakia:

[Begin Forro recording] The Presidium of the Slovak National Council believes that the laws legislated so far have created justice and the fundamental conditions for healthy national relationships. However, not all the rights of the minorities prevail in practice. The body has reviewed those govenment measures which have been introduced or planned for the national minorities. One of these is the training of teachers whose precondition would be the establishment of the Magyar university in Komarno. The proponents of the proposal and the Slovak Government representatives will negotiate this today.

In the "Good Morning" program on Bratislava radio today, the rector of the Nitra High School sharply attacked the plan. (Vladimir Mnac), a writer, proposed that since everybody can go abroad, the training of Slovak teachers should be carried out in Hungary.

By the way, in recent days further anti-Magyar articles appeared in the Slovak press. HLAS LUDU reports on the call of the Matica Slovenska Nove Zamky branch, which demands that a law should stipulate that in Slovakia the only official language can be Slovak, and they ask the state organs to prevent the use of the Magyar language for names of settlements and streets. These Magyar name plates were placed within the past two months. They accused Csemadok and the Independent Magyar Initiative of demanding autonomy in south Slovakia. It must be noted that none of the programs of either of the Magyar organizations mentions such a demand. [end recording]

Restrictions on U.S. Diplomats Lifted

AU3103164190 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 Mar 90 p 2

[CTK report from the "International Contacts" column]

[Text] Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier received U.S. Ambassador Shirley Temple-Black in Prague 28 March. He informed her, among other things, that the Czechoslovak side is unilaterally lifting measures restricting the movement of U.S. diplomats in Czechoslovakia. These measures had been introduced in 1986 in response to a similar course of action from the U.S. side.

Commission Updated on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD3003173890 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] A mixed parliamentary commission met at its first session in Prague today to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our republic. Lubos Lidicky asked General Svetczar Nadovic, who is the head of administration for safeguarding the departure of Soviet troops, about the progress of the withdrawal.

[Begin recording] [Lidicky] Mr. General, today is 30 March. I should like to ask you how many Soviet troops, soldiers, and how much technical machinery has left Czechoslovakia as of today.

[Nadovic] Five-thousand three hundred and seventy-two persons, 338 tanks, 350 military vehicles of the infantry, and 1,572 cars. One can say the tank unit from Bruntal has, for the most part, been shifted to the USSR.

[Lidicky] Well, and what do you expect in April? What is the situation going to be like in April?

[Nadovic] More work. Above all this will consist of the withdrawal of a motorized rifle unit from Vysoke Myto, two other brigades, and the departure of the helicopter detachment. All the numbers planned for the first stage will be adhered to. Thirty-five percent of the contingent of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia will leave our territory.

[Lidicky] Our listeners often ask us what will happen to the military objects after that. Will they be used by our army or will they be done away with completely?

[Nadovic] Ninety percent of all these objects and plots will be returned to the National Committees and will be used in the civilian sector. [end recording]

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Delayed in Turnov

LD0104190490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Correspondent Vaclav Martinik report from the Turnov area in East Bohemia]

[Summary] The date for the [Soviet troop] withdrawal "has been postponed by six weeks for reasons not specified by the Soviet side." The troops use three localities in the area: Ohrazenice and Vesetsko for exercises and Turnov for accomodation. Some of the vacated buildings and land will be taken over by industrial and agricultural enterprises. No one has as yet expressed interest in taking over the barracks. Checks are being carried out at present to establish the state of apartments used by the troops. A local official says "soldiers are leaving behind a mess." Checks on soil pollution are being conducted. There are still questions hanging over the demolition of a 12-story panel building which should be paid for by the Soviet side which "intends to leave Turnov for good by the end of May."

Lithuanian Independence Issue Viewed

AU0104132990 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 27 Mar 90 p 5

["(JAGA)"-signed commentary: "Lithuania Like Chernobyl?"]

[Text] According to some West European newspapers, the current situation in Lithuania is reminiscent of the Prague Spring and, according to the director general of TASS, the loss of Lithuania would be as severe a blow for the Soviet Union as was the Chernobyl catastrophe. Both comparisons are rather feeble, but Leonid Kravchenko's words are, in any case, a suggestive analogy. However, they do not draw on reason but on emotions. And in Moscow—as in Vilnius—there are more than enough of those. However, surprisingly, these have not encroached upon the surrounding world; it has adopted a sober stance. So much so that Lithuanian representatives are unable to conceal their disappointment.

Vilnius' decision has placed Western states in a rather delicate situation. In view of the fact that they have never recognized Lithuania's annexation to the USSR in 1940, that for years they have been appealing to the Baltic states to take up the struggle for self-determination, and that they have supported these states morally, nothing should prevent them today from recognizing the declaration of independence. However, instead of this, representatives of Western states are giving more consideration to which criteria Lithuania is not fulfilling and are merely "bearing its decision in mind." A reason for this careful—but, nevertheless, cold stance—is provided by the fears that violating the Soviet Union's territorial integrity could worsen the political situation and stability both in Europe and in the Soviet Union, could threaten the restructuring process in which the West has an interest and, of no less importance, could damage relations between the superpowers.

As was stated on the American CNN television station on 25 March, recent developments in Lithuania have created a very difficult situation for the Soviet and U.S. presidents. The conjecture was made that the Soviet side is hesitating to confirm the date of the meeting between Gorbachev and Bush, a meeting which should take place in the United States at the end of June, in order to obviate the possible postponement of this meeting by the American side in reaction to Soviet military intervention in Lithuania. Although Moscow continually excludes this possibility, the repeated movement of tanks in front of the Lithuanian parliament is, to say the least, a disquieting manifestation of strength. This has not gone without notice in the West, nor has it passed by without alarming questions being raised. Everyone recognizes that the Lithuanian problem is the Soviet Union's internal affair and Western states have made it abundantly clear that they do not want to worsen Gorbachev's position. According to them, the question now is whether Lithuania will succumb to the current pressure being exerted by Moscow. Similarly, another question is whether Gorbachev will in the end take steps which are at variance with his policy. And finally, will a group wanting to remove the president from office and take over the government itself attempt to use the current situation or its possible deterioration? There is no comparison between Lithuania and Chernobyl, although in broader circumstances, it is almost realistic.

Adamec Speaks at Founding of New C P

LD3103113790 Prague CTK in English 1038 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Prague March 31 (CTK)—The establishment of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia constitutes resolute parting with the old concept of a nationalized party whose internal life and forms of activity were arranged so as to fulfil orders from above. Ladislav Adamec said here today.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party Chairman spoke at the constituent congress of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia attended by 243 delegates representing more than 700,000 party members from the Czech Republic.

The birth of the idea of a Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia is linked with the reform Prague Spring 1968. Later, however, it was suppressed just as many other positive initiatives. The asymmetrical set-up of the party—Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Slovak Communist Party—led to separation of its policy from the needs of Czech society.

Speaking about the Czechoslovak Communist Party's policy, Ladislav Adamec said that there can be no return to the Stalinist model of socialism. Building of socialism must be not separated from the main civilization currents of the modern world.

Czechoslovakia's return to Europe requires active participation in European integration. This necessitates new forms of enterprise, including use of the foreign capital, and plurality forms of political life, which will lead to new prospects of growth of productivity of labour and the standard of living.

Ladislav Adamec resolutely rejected various attempts at challenging the legality of the Czechoslovak Communist Party activity which is embedded also in the new act on political parties.

The party is for such a pre-election campaign that would be honest, non-confrontational, and in which the rules of political culture would be respected.

Ladislav Adamec said that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia will continue to resolutely defend the idea of Czechoslovak statehood which became the basis of the state in 1918.

He rejected artificial fomenting of nationalism moods and pressure moves. The party will do its utmost for strengthening fraternal relations between the Czechs and Slovaks on an equality basis, and for ensuring equal rights of all nationalities, including the gypsies, Ladislav Adamec stressed.

New Party Chief Interviewed

LD3103211190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] The constituent congress of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia was held in Prague today. Delegates elected Jiri Machalik as the party chairman, and we asked him why the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia had been established.

[Begin Machalik recording] The establishment of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia is in effect a continuation of the rebirth of the party as a modern, left-wing party of a new type. The aim of this step is to truly restore the party's purity and its capacity to take action in the good sense of the word. This means to part ways with democratic centralism, the 21 conditions set by the Communist International, all Stalinist and neo-Stalinist distortions.

We want to convince the public that our program and our policy statement are not words, that the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and along with it the whole CPCZ are genuinely changing into a new party, a party in which the class and ideological struggle has been set aside for the good of the interests of the whole society, a party that does not want and shall not push for anything that would not lead to mutual understanding, a party pledged to seeking what binds us together and overcoming what divides us.

I believe that all citizens of this republic will understand that our parting with the ways of the past are not empty words but an endeavor to share in the rebuilding of our society, to help tackle all economic, ecological, and other areas. We do not want and shall not use social demagogy and problems connected with it, because we know that if we want to make Czechoslovakia a prosperous country there is no alternative to the path on which we have embarked.

This does not mean that we have given up our social program. We do not and shall not agree with the sale of our national wealth abroad. We want to preserve the sovereignty of our nation both in the political, economic, cultural, artistic, and historical areas. [end recording]

CPCZ Supports New Party

AU0204104590 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 24 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

["(ZA)"-signed report: "Preparations For the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Constituent Congress"]

[Text] The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Central Committee Executive Committee held a session on 23 March. The session was chaired by Ladislav Adamec, CPCZ chairman. Vasil Mohorita, CPCZ Central Committee first secretary, gave a briefing on the objectives of the upcoming meeting of the party's Central Committee. Its objective, as he said, is to assess the present situation in the Communist Party and to express the party's standpoint on important questions affecting social life. The CPCZ Central Committee meeting will take place on 24 March.

A draft policy statement for the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Constituent Congress will be presented to the CPCZ Central Committee which will meet in Prague on 31 March 1990. During a discussion, members of the Executive Committee gave their support to the policy's main principles and they reached an agreement that the establishment of a Communist Party territorial organization in Bohemia and Moravia is one of the preconditions for transforming the CPCZ into a modern left-wing party. In this connection, they unequivocally rejected the various fabrications of socialism which disregard the present development of civilization as well as manifestations of intolerance toward the opinions and ideas of others. The present situation requires an intensification of the dialogue among all left-wing forces on both a republican and federal scale.

The Executive Committee was briefed on the activity of the CPCZ Central Committee commission established to assess political responsibility for the crisis period in the party and in society. The commission's final report will also be discussed by the CPCZ Central Committee at the 24 March meeting. In accordance with the preparations for the 18th CPCZ Congress, the Executive Committee was briefed on the draft of the CPCZ's new organizational regulations. It recommended that the draft be discussed within the party through the media of RUDE PRAVO and PRAVDA. The draft stresses that the CPCZ's objective is a socially just society and democratic socialism. The CPCZ fully respects political pluralism as the basis of political life in society and is developing its activity on a constitutional basis.

The Executive Committee decided that two more CPCZ Central Committee commissions will be created—a commission for work with youth and a women's commission. They will operate as advisory bodies to the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committee and will collect and analyze information which will then be presented to the party's administrative bodies as a recommendation for Communists' activity in these social spheres.

The Central Control and Audit Commission briefed the Executive Committee about its activity since the Extraordinary CPCZ Congress last December. From this report, among other things, it ensues that the Central Control and Audit Commission has received 695 letters since the end of February. Most of them requested the return of party membership—174. Rehabilitation was requested in 30 letters; rehabilitation and compensation in 25 letters; and cancellation of punishment imposed by the party was requested in 20 letters. The Central Control and Audit Commission also received 74 letters which referred to the abuse of power by some CPCZ officials.

Members of the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committee were briefed on the course of CPCZ district conferences in the Czech Republic and also discussed other organizational and cadre issues.

CPCZ's Machalik on New Party, Property

LD3003182290 Prague CTK in English 1300 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Prague March 30 (CTK)—The future establishment of a communist party of Bohemia and Moravia will be another step on the road towards a split with the past of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which wants to open itself to the new world and is abandoning a number of principles—democratic centralism and deformed Marxism-Leninism, Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Jiri Machalik said at a press conference here today.

He said that the new party will be part of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and wants to become an active and equal section of the Czechoslovak political system.

Speaking about the property of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Jiri Machalik said that the party will fully respect the decision of the constitutional bodies in this respect. As far as the property gained from state subsidies is concerned, the party will be glad to give it up, but the party had considerable incomes from membership fees (in 1989 they were worth 1,360 million crowns). It would be contrary to law and to common effort to build a state based on the rule of law if the party would be deprived of this property, Jiri Machalik said.

He pointed out that the data about the Czechoslovak Communist Party property that are spread among the public are often distorted. In this connection he denied that any secret fund existed for financing the party's activity in an emergency situation.

Havel Expresses Support for Lithuania

LD3103104190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1000 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] The press center of the Lithuanian legislature published today a telegram from President Vaclav Havel addressed to Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Lithuania. The Czechoslovak president expresses support to the Republic of Lithuania and, at the same time, proposes that Czechoslovak territory become the place of talks between Moscow and Lithuania.

Lithuania's Landsbergis Thanks Havel

LD0204093790 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 0900 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, Chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, sent a telegram to Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel.

In the telegram he describes as very significant his support for Lithuania's effort to achieve freedom. He accepted Vaclav Havel's proposal to organize talks between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Lithuania in Czechoslovakia. Vytautas Landsbergis appreciates the fact that Vaclav Havel was the first state representative to suggest it and stressed that Lithuania will never forget it.

Czech, Slovak Groups Release Joint Statement

LD3003174990 Prague CTK in English 0908 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Prague March 30 (CTK)—Representatives of the coordinating centers of the Public Against Violence and the Civic Forum met here last night to agree on joint strategy in parliamentary elections in June.

They said their electoral programs are identical in the main questions and adopted the following statement:

"Both movements strive mainly for Czechoslovakia's return among European countries. Another common target is the democratic implementation of the Czech and Slovak republics' statehood in a common, federatively organized state. We proceed from European democratic tradition expressed by the will of the nations of Europe in the documents of the Helsinki conference, mainly the inviolability of state borders and consistent observance of the human and minority rights. We want to act and therefore vote as free and responsible citizens of equal republics in a common, sovereign, democratic and prosperous state."

"We want to assert basic economic changes and corresponding social programs. Social policy must be aimed at those who really need social support. We want to solve ecological problems, cater for the living environment, health, culture and education of the population," the statement stressed.

Jun Election Tops Civic Forum Deliberation

LD3103141290 Prague CTK in English 1145 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Prague March 31 (CTK)—Completion of the election list of the Civic forum for the June parliamentary voting, final reading of its election program, and drawing out of the strategy and tactics of the pre-election campaign topped the agenda of today's deliberations of the Civic Forum Assembly.

Jan Urban, who manages the Civic Forum Coordinating Centre Council, stressed that the Civic Forum should go to the polls as a united force whose activity is oriented mainly on the future.

He informed the assembly about the agreement reached by the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence on a joint line in the elections.

He described the withdrawal of Social and Christian Democrats from the Civic Forum joint list as expected, but premature.

The Assembly expressed protest against the government bill on land as the sole alternative, and recommended to the Federal Assembly to discuss also other drafts.

Czechoslovak Democratic Forum Holds Congress

LD3103163690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1400 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] The Constituent Congress of the Czechoslovak Democratic Forum, which was formed by breaking away from the Democratic Forum of Communists, is holding a session in Prague today.

The participants are discussing the party program. Among speeches delivered by the guest speakers, a speech by Josef Lesak, first deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party attracted the participants' attention, due especially to his uncompromising criticism of the communist past. The participants also supported his statement on the readiness of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party to enter the election fight together with all other democratic forces on a high ethical level.

Urges Czech, Slovak Consensus

LD0104175590 Prague Democratic Service in Czech 1530 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] The participants of the founding congress of the Czechoslovak Democratic Forum adopted a statement on the situation in Czechoslovakia, which they described as alarming. The statement says that the foundations of the joint state of two fraternal nations are threatened. Their national interests cannot be the object of hateful arguments. The delegates thus appeal to all citizens who care about the future democratic development in our republic to make the greatest possible effort for national understanding.

The statement goes on to say that all political parties and movements must act according to this effort. It would therefore be highly appropriate to call a meeting of their representatives as soon as possible. In conclusion, the participants of the congress of the Czechoslovak Democratic Forum therefore turn to the guarantors of democratic development in our joint state—the President of the Republic Vaclav Havel, and the Chairman of the Federal Assembly, Alexander Dubcek—and ask them to urgently organize a meeting of political and cultural representatives of the Czech and Slovak nations in order to find a joint concensus on a way out of this dangerous situation.

Calfa Identifies Need for Competition, Efficiency

AU3103170590 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 28 Mar 90 p 1

[Report on interview with Premier Marian Calfa by Tibor Bucha; place and date not given: "Apropos Healing a Sick 'Patient'"]

[Text] Yesterday, the majority of parliamentary deputies agreed that this year's budget must be an anti-inflationary one. They applauded Minister Klaus in this regard. Let us, however, begin the anti-inflationary calculations at the family table. The applause disappears. It arose from the discussion that the 15 percent increase in expenditure translates into about a 690-koruna increase in an average family's monthly expenditure. That makes quite a dent in the wallet.

[Bucha] The worst part of this entire thing is that the head of a household cannot make any preparations as no one knows when food and housing will cost more.

[Calfa] It is a question of patience. A team of experts has joined Minister Miller and, for the past month, they have been working toward establishing an objective minimum subsistence level in Czechoslovakia for this year. We eagerly await the result because this will tell us what we can bear and what we cannot bear and what steps we can take without breaking our legs. We are also analyzing the earnings of individual income groups. Price increases are not the only way. Production has an array of tools for manufacturing its wares more cheaply which would, even without state subsidies, make generally acceptable prices possible.

[Bucha] Does this apply to the government?

[Calfa] Certainly, it does. Lower subsidies from the state budget compel higher effectiveness in production. A company cannot increase prices indefinitely. Otherwise, people would stop buying its products. In other words, it must adjust its production costs. Moreover, competition is unavoidable, even international competition. However, it may sound paradoxical, competition improves the company.

[Bucha] Minister Klaus's words imply that you are facing a problem, namely, how to make sure that the state budget's income exceeds its expenditure?

[Calfa] Naturally, we want balance, perhaps, even a small surplus. In the meantime, however, we have a safety margin of about five billion korunas. It is a bare minimum. Should a crop fail, or should some social problems occur during the year, the margin is gone. Even more important is production efficiency. The assumption that this could be achieved in every enterprise immediately would be rather naive.

[Bucha] Society is aware of the situation. The deputies did not even attempt to conceal the fact that the people expect price increases.

[Calfa] Once again, before taking this unpopular step, I am asking, do we have to do it? First of all, we have to establish an objectively valid level of prices. Several experts are at work preparing various concessions. The final draft should be presented to the government by 12 April. I am coming to housing, which you also asked about. Prices of cooperative-housing apartments cannot be raised; this leads to higher rents in state-financed housing. This brings the price of the latter to the level of the former. At the same time, we will limit state housing to truly social cases (young families, single mothers, senior citizens). They cannot pay the deposit for cooperative housing, but even they must reckon with higher rents in state housing. Concurrently, we have to accept private ownership of apartments, thus, creating another class of market goods. We cannot, however, make such a statement overnight. Tenants will be given time to consider their family budget and calculate what they can afford, and perhaps even decide on moving to a cheaper location.

[Bucha] Your agenda is really crammed. The most difficult item must be, however, after forty years—statistically and, on paper, "ideal" years—to tell the objective truth. In the early days of the new government, Minister Dlouhy told me that this government is here until the elections just to do the dirty work. Should one understand the state budget, particularly an anti-inflationary one, and the restrictive trend, as one of the means, as a "stick" in your hand?

[Calfa] Healing the sick patient cannot end on 8 June. A market economy has its laws and stages; we are only at the beginning. If the new government, after the June elections, wants to adopt the market economy, it will have to continue these trends. The day, 8 June, is politically interesting, not economically interesting. I do not deny that in December when we selected the 21 members of the new government we were not always successful. After all, we have replaced two ministers already.

According to the premier, further changes are expected—even before the elections.

Komarek on Economic Development, Prospects

AU3103183290 Vienna WOCHENPRESSE in German 30 Mar 90 p 24

[Interview with Czechoslovak Federative Republic Economics Minister Valtr Komarek by Jan Polesovsky; place and date not given: "Give Me Five Years"]

[Text] [Polesovsky] Since 1945, the highly developed industrial nation, the Czechoslovak Federative Republic [CSR], has declined to the level of a developing country. You are considered the new star on the economic horizon of your country. Would you dare to make a forecast for the future?

[Komarek] I am not one of those people who consider the state of our economy hopeless. We are still a relatively rich country. Our engineers and workers are not worse than those in highly developed West European countries. I think that it is certainly possible to reach the level of the aforementioned countries in five to seven years if we can get a similarly large market for our products.

[Polesovsky] Much has recently been said about imminent unemployment. But also about below-average salaries and laziness at the workplace. As a counterargument, the existing network of social security was mentioned. Is an improvement in the economy possible without a beneficial shock?

[Komarek] Regarding the renewed upswing, we will certainly agree on the introduction of a market economy. Why should we not, after all? We have far-reaching economic self-sufficiency. Almost everything that we need we can produce ourselves. The competitiveness of our production can be increased by investments from foreign companies. This would be very important psychologically and would lead to an enrichment of the market.

[Polesovsky] All this presupposes the legal admission of private companies. When will this happen?

[Komarek] As regards the legal conditions, the necessary amendments to the laws can be soon presented to the Federal Parliament—that is, before the elections.

[Polesovsky] The average CSR citizen is naturally afraid of an increase in inflation—like in Hungary and in Poland. Also some other countries, Greece, Portugal, and Spain included, had to struggle with this after joining the EC....

[Komarek] In the government itself there is not yet agreement on the speed of the reforms. And this is good. However, so far hesitation has only led to maintaining the existing state of dissatisfaction. But I think that a new trend cannot be implemented without prior thorough analyses and forecasts. Too much is at stake. The government has to act very carefully. And it must keep an eye on the social, economic, and, of course, political consequences of its actions. A sudden price shock would probably have a negative effect on trust in the government, but also on the economy itself. This might lead to waves of speculative purchases. The people would be frightened. They would withdraw all their savings from the banks and put them on the market all at once. Every movement of the prices must be compensated for in a sensible way.

[Polesovsky] Is there a specific CSR model to improve the country's economy?

[Komarek] Just as we are trying to learn the respective lessons from the situation in Poland and Hungary, we are trying to adjust our actions to the specific political and social realities in the CSR—and to our living conditions. In this we have to aim for the same goal. We cannot simply and elegantly pass on to certain structures, just because they seem to theoretically be without defects. In this we would not only gamble away the trust of our citizens in our new republic but also our chances for a better future.

Soviets Stop Selling Korunas to Tourists

LD3103125690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1200 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Soviet banks have stopped all sales of Czechoslovak korunas to Soviet tourists. This step is in response to Czechoslovakia's decision not to provide the Soviet Union with Czechoslovak currency until such time as the issue of balancing the accounting between the two countries is resolved.

Gasoline Coupons Introduced for Foreigners

AU3103195590 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 27 Mar 90 p 3

[CTK report: "No Coupons for Us"]

[Text] Prague—Our citizens will continue to buy gasoline at current prices and without any further restrictions—that is, for korunas and without coupons. Deputy Premier Vladimir Dlouhy made this announcement on Television News 26 March.

The sale of gasoline for coupons applies only to foreigners. There will be two types of coupons: coupons for visitors from countries with convertible currency and for tourists from other countries. As a rule, prices will be based on the prices in their own countries.

Vladimir Dlouhy stressed that this decision is of an administrative nature and, therefore, it has its shortcomings. There is a danger that speculators will appear, particularly at gas stations. Should this be the case, the government has decided to take firm steps.

Dubcek Meets With Protesting Entrepreneurs

AU3103165390 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Mar 90 p 2

[CTK report: "That Is Not the Intention"]

[Text] Prague—Slogans demanding the acceleration of discussions on and approval of the law on private enterprise were seen on placards at a citizens' demonstration in Prague's Old Town Square yesterday [28 March]. The demonstration had been organized by the Association of Czechoslovak Entrepreneurs. Its participants set out for the Federal Assembly building. A. Dubcek, Federal Assembly chairman, explained to the demonstrators that this situation has not arisen due to the deputies' incompetence, nor is it their intention. Every new law has to be approved and it cannot interfere with the validity of others; this cannot be done from day to day. He assured those present that he will support their demand that the debate on the law on private enterprise begin on the first day of the 27th joint Federal Assembly session (18-20 April 1990).

Western Military District Commander Replaced

LD3003205990 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1900 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] On the order of Vaclav Havel, president of the Republic and commander in chief of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, Colonel-General Miroslav Vacek, minister of national defense, installed Lieutenant General (Vaclav Grohman) as the new commander of the Western Military District. He replaces Lt. Gen. (Mojmir Zacharias) in this post.

Modrow on Unification Before End of Talks

LD0204094190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0758 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Amsterdam (ADN)—The German process of unification, according to acting GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow, could attain such a pace that a German government will exist even before the end of the four plus two negotiations and these negotiations will turn into four plus one negotiations. "Surely this would not harm anybody," he said in Amsterdam on Monday. However, as far as he is concerned it is important "for the process of unification not to take off independently, for the process not to be uncoupled from its international framework." He considered it "right and necessary" for Poland to be included in the negotiations inasmuch as they concern the question of Poland's western frontier.

In a speech held at an international conference at the Center for European Studies in the Netherlands capital, Modrow said that unification should be a democratic process. "It has to proceed from the existence of the two German states. International law—including the GDR-Federal Republic basic treaty and other treaties—as well as the interests of all other states must be observed." He said that the option according to Article 23 of the Bonn Basic law is "totally unsuitable."

Unification is an act of international import since, above all in Berlin, the special rights of the four allies of World War II have to be observed and overcome, the GDR prime minister said. The say of the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France should "on the one hand not impair the right to self-determination of the Germans, but on the other hand it might enable the four powers, together with the Germans, to close the account book for World War II. I leave it open whether a peace treaty is needed or whether a different form, binding in international terms, can be found."

Providing unification takes place in a sensible manner, Modrow said, "then future problems will be avoided. Such problems could arise and will arise should GDR citizens get the feeling of having been taken in, if, as it were, they are asked to hand in their values and conceptions at the greater German cloakroom." German unity would be established through the merger of the two states, the GDR head of government explained. "This requires a treaty valid in international law which is agreed by the two governments. This treaty has to be ratified by the parliaments of the two states. It would be a good idea to make it the subject of a referendum." Any other construction than "the clean way toward German unity, democratic, equal, and legally flawless" would ignore the realities, would even be highly questionable, in fact intolerable, Modrow said.

The GDR politician added that what is good for the Germans—their national unity—is also good for Europe. German unification should exert a positive influence on the whole of European policy. It should be linked to disarmament steps and troop reduction. A future Germany as a member of two different alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact is as unthinkable as the expansion of the Warsaw Pact to the territory of the present Federal Republic or of NATO to the territory of the present GDR. He favors the military neutralization of Germany, enshrined in a European security system. Modrow suggested that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Germany in 1991. He continues to believe that it would be a good idea to create a security corridor in Central Europe.

Eppelmann Sees No German Unity Before 1992

LD3003163690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1348 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Hamburg (ADN)—In the view of the acting chairman of Democratic Awakening, Rainer Eppelmann, the unification of the two German states will not be achieved before 1992. "The path to it is still very complicated", he told BILD newspaper (Saturday edition).

Eppelmann said the economic situation in the GDR is "difficult". He said the GDR budget for 1990 has a deficit of around 40 billion marks and there is a deficit of 60 billion in 1991. Added to this are billions of Deutschmarks in foreign debt. Expenditure on imports from the West has risen enormously. At the same time production is rapidly declining.

Eppelmann described his attitude to an amnesty for former Stasi collaborators as "mixed". It is clear to him that there is no solution which would do justice to the judicial, human, and political demands of everyone.

Minister Romberg on Unification, Europe

AU2203205890 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 16 Mar 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Minister Without Portfolio Walter Romberg by Bettina Urbanski in Berlin; date not given: "Shaping the Future For the Benefit of the Europeans"]

[Text] Actually, the 61-year-old man is a mathematician, but now he is minister without portfolio, head of the GDR delegation at the confidential intra-German talks on a monetary and economic union and, at the same time, security and disarmament expert of the Social Democratic Party (GDR)—Dr. Walter Romberg. BERLINER ZEITUNG spoke with him about his political experiences and insights.

[Urbanski] Which experiences and insights would you call particularly important for you political biography?

[Romberg] For instance, the experiences which I gained in 1950 were very important for me, when I came to the Humboldt University in Berlin for the second part of my studies. I experienced the progressive division of Berlin and of Germany very consciously. And I was among those who tried to consider the division not simply as a misfortune but as a task for German and European policy. Today for many people this certainly sounds like being a thing of the past. But the past 40 years are an essential part of our identity not only for my generation.

The year 1968 also influenced me very much. I was linked with many people in the efforts to implement a renewal in the country. Political education and motivation are strongly determined by my work in church institutions, in the church peace movements. The many meetings with Europeans and people from the Third World are important for me.

[Urbanksi] You spoke of identity—in our country it is in the danger of being thrust aside. Is it not identity that is important for a process of unification, which some day might go beyond the German framework?

[Romberg] The European development is not only a change in the political, economic, and military balances, but also the dynamism of changing cultural identity. Forces from European culture and history are coming to the foreground, which seemed to be forgotten as a result of the bipolarization. The actual question of European policy today is to find new balances—in security policy and economy—but also—closely linked with this—new forms of cultural dialogue and plurality.

At the moment, many things are being assessed too superficially, on the basis of hard facts that determine our social problems. However, the future cannot be shaped for the benefit of the Europeans, when spiritual and cultural roots are not taken into consideration.

I think that we live with immense threats, and in Europe these threats are not so much of a military nature. There is the ecological threat, the potential shift of the climate. There are basic questions concerning the economy. At the moment we see everything in an intra-German perspective or within the European framework and often forget the global problems.

[Urbanski] Which may catch up with us quickly....

[Romberg] Yes, very quickly. The economic upswing, the transition to the market economy, which we are now undergoing, is not the path to a system that solves the global problems. Thus, it would be bad if we were to measure our very specific policy—today, here, between the two German states—only by our requirements. Then all our efforts would end tragically.

[Urbanski] Unfortunately, this dimension is often lost. The I and Today are in the foreground, dominate over the past, in particular over our German past, and over the future. How can one overcome such a narrowing of the horizon, which makes the people poorer?

[Romberg] To me it seems to be extraordinarily important that the meeting of the young generation in Europe is made much more comprehensive. Only if a common European awareness develops, which in every case must include one's own history and tradition, will we be able to find a solid basis for stable new structures on our continent. This is the precondition for a coexistence in peace and security. Only then will we be able to correctly solve the tasks which are actually posed to us by the other continents and by the Third World.

[Urbanski] This is an idea, which already includes some dreams of the future, like your thoughts about a "European housing construction cooperative"....

[Romberg] At the moment we see that the economic power is increasingly concentrated on the West European side—in the EC, in particular in the FRG. On the other hand, the economic weaknesses of the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, are becoming increasingly clear. This has political consequences and also influences security policy. This results in Western ideas about NATO as the core of a European peace system. However, I would consider this a fatal development.

The important thing is that other all-European structures gain in importance, in which East and West deal with each other as partners. These are, for instance, the CSCE structures. However, their institutions would have to be developed more intensively than so far in order to make them politically effective. There are already approaches, in particular concerning the German issue—for instance, the CSCE inspection authority, which is to be established after the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of coventional armed forces. This is an element, which one can link with the tasks of the Allied military missions in Germany in order to give security policy supraregional structures one day.

[Urbanski] Could this model meet with interest at the initiated two-plus-four negotiations or is it still too early for this kind of idea?

[Romberg] Unfortunately, the changes in the specific military structures generally are a relatively slow process; mostly it lags behind the political development. It will depend on how quickly the FRG and NATO are willing to say yes to changes. This is a question of the NATO's strategic concepts. At least now it is becoming clear that even there one now starts to think about alternative security structures in Europe. It is clear that the past concepts—forward defense at the border between the two German states, short-range nuclear missiles which reach the GDR and Poland—have become absurd. In NATO there are forces which see the need for new paths. But all this is taking place much too slowly.

[Urbanski] However, new paths must be found relatively quickly, because the GDR as a NATO member or as a demilitarized zone of a unified Germany is hardly acceptable for the Soviet Union.

[Romberg] Integrating all of Germany into NATO—even if this happens in a toned-down form, through a special status for the GDR—should not be a solution. At our talks in Moscow we noticed that there are great concerns that this special status could prepare the transition to the full integration of Germany into NATO. There are enough examples in history where a demilitarized zone of a state was again occupied by the military.

[Urbanski] You mean the occupation of the Rhineland by the German troops in 1936, the experiences which were made not only by the Soviet Union with Germany's violation of treaties?

[Romberg] Certainly. For the Soviet Union a solution is only acceptable from which it can expect that it provides lasting security and is stable. The alternative is a supranational central European structure—an all-encompassing structure, so to speak—which integrates the various military contingents on German soil and cannot be rooted in alliances in the long run.

[Urbanski] This presupposes that the FRG is also released from its alliance obligations. Is this conceivable?

[Romberg] This would indeed mean that the Armed Forces on FRG territory could no longer be integrated in NATO—of course, not today but in the long run. The example of the German-French brigade, that is, the interlacing of national troop contingents, shows a possible path, which leads ahead. I know that Poland also thinks about a loose interlacing of German and Polish Armed Forces. In this way, the structures of the European armed forces could be established step by step.

[Urbanski] Bismarck once said that politics is the art of the possible. Mastering this art presupposes recognizing what is possible and then putting it into practice. Have we learned enough to do this?

[Romberg] Certainly not. But who has? It is not only a question of diplomatic skill and political knowledge. These preconditions are very important. Many things have to be caught up with in this respect. However, learning alone is not enough. There are deficits in many places, not only in our country. I mean the lack of sensitivity for cultural roots, for life in another country, for the life of another people.

[Urbanski] Sensitivity is precisely what I am missing in the way FRG politicians deal with the GDR.

[Romberg] At official meetings I noticed how difficult it is for both sides to accept the other system of values, the other conditions. On our side the readiness to think ourselves into the place of the others is relatively great. On the FRG side this readiness is less present. Because there they generally assume that we are developing toward them. One reason may be the fact that we are not the ones who are rich, we are not the ones who have the more efficient economy. This becomes clear in the confidential intra-German negotiations.

Despite these material constraints I consider it important that both parties change in order to win a new German republic.

[Urbanski] It always seems to be easier to counterarm in military, political, economic, and even intellectual terms than to eliminate existing barriers.

[Romberg] Certainly, one can erect barriers or walls quickly and dig trenches. Even if one then eliminates them or fills them up again, one realizes that they continue to be effective.

[Urbanski] We are currently experiencing this situation....

[Romberg] This is true. And one should not pretend that these walls and trenches did not exist. On the contrary, one has to think very intensively about why they came into being and what they meant. The past never is a meaningless past.

It is part of culture that one remembers, that one reconsiders the experiences that were gained, revives them and contributes them. If we forget this, we will lose our identity. We have to change, this is unavoidable. But we must contribute ourselves with our own history. Otherwise, we would be a bad member of the European family for the other Germans and for the Europeans.

Controversy Surrounds Mark Exchange Rate

2:1 Rate Recommended

LD3103152290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1413 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—It emerges from reports by the FRG mass media over the weekend that the Central Bank Council of the Bundesbank, in the presence of Federal Finance Minister Theo Waigel, has decided to recommend to the federal government a conversion of 2:1 for the introduction of monetary union. Exempt from this would be savings of up to 2,000 GDR marks which would be exchanged at 1:1.

ADN learned on Saturday from GDR members of the German-German commission of experts in preparation of a monetary union that such a proposal has so far not been discussed in any of the negotiation rounds, and would have to be resolutely rejected by the GDR.

Such a measure is in sharp contrast to what Federal Chancellor Kohl and other politicians of the Bonn coalition had promised in their election speeches on GDR territory and elsewhere before 18 March 1990.

The halving of wages and salaries proposed by the Central Bank Council of the German Bundesbank and the devaluation of savings deposits of GDR citizens took in no way account of the real economic relations in the GDR and would entail, if realized, incalculable social results.

In addition the pronouncements from Bonn and Frankfurt also contradict the agreed principle of confidentiality during the GDR/FRG experts' talks and unleash further uncertainty and confusion among the GDR populaiton.

Instead of contributing to the stabilization of the situation in the GDR, something Federal Chancellor Kohl has advocated in his talks with Prime Minister Modrow, such actions can lead to destabilization.

Concrete steps toward changing the currency could, as ADN has also learned, be agreed only as a result of bilateral GDR/FRG negotiations and should be the subject of a conjoint state treaty.

SPD Proposal

LD3103162790 Hamburg DPA in German 1506 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] East Berlin (DPA)—Markus Meckel, deputy chairman of the GDR Social Democratic Party [SPD], has strongly criticized the recommendation of the Central Bank Council for a conversion rate of 2:1 for GDR assets. If the Bonn government were to introduce such a rate in general then this is "election fraud," Meckel said today in East Berlin. Meckel also referred to possible additional strain on private budgets through expected price increases. His party, the SPD politician said, wants "1:1 plus social security".

FDGB Protests

LD0104163690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1443 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The trade unions in the GDR, in a thorough analysis of the situation connected with the announcement made by the Central Bank Council of the Bundesbank about an exchange rate of 2 to 1 on monetary union, have decided to prepare measures to oppose it on 2 April. This has been announced by Helga Mausch, chairwoman of the managing executive of the Free German Trade Unions [FDGB] in an ADN interview today. For the coming few days she has announced protest resolutions and protest demonstrations through which the trade unions will be demanding their rights. We appeal to the freely elected parliament, she stressed, to meet its enormous responsibility to the working people under market conditions. Halga Mausch described the announcement by the Bundesbank as worrying and not in line with the concerns of the peaceful revolution in the GDR. On behalf of the 8.6 million members of the 19 individual trade unions, she called for "an effective community of solidarity between trade unions in east and west."

Proposal 'Unreasonable'

LD0104133390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1216 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Christian Democratic Union [CDU] General Secretary Martin Kirchner has called the Bundesbank's proposal for converting the GDR currency "unreasonable and intolerable." He affirmed to journalists in Berlin that GDR citizens would feel cheated. He added that this was the right phrase. Only a political decision in favor of 1:1 was acceptable, Kirchner said.

Marcus Meckel, the acting Social Democratic Party [SPD] chairman, too, insisted on a conversion of 1:1. "I believe that was the election promise, a promise which must be kept," he said.

Modrow, Others View Proposal

LD0104104190 Hamburg DPA in German 0858 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—The acting prime minister of the GDR, Hans Modrow (PDS) [Party for Democratic Socialism], has now intervened in the debate about converting the GDR mark to Deutsch Marks in the course of monetary union. In connection with the latese recommendaton by the Bundesbank for a general conversion of GDR assets in accordance with 2:1 formual, Modrow appealed to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to make "a clear statement on the 1:1 exchange rate." Modrow said that before the People's Chamber elections on 18 March, the Federal Chancellor had repeatedly promised GDR citizens an exchange rate of 1:1. The outcome of the election had been the result of this promise and "no other," Modrow said in an interview with BILD newspaper (Monday edition).

The chairman of Democratic Awakening, Rainer Eppelmann, today pointed out the possible consequences of converting the GDR mark in accordance with the Central Bank Council's plans. If an exchange rate of 2:1 were put into effect "then our people will again be in West German gymnasiums," Eppelmann said in an interview with BILD.

Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Deitrcih Genscher (FDP) [Free Democratic Party] has reacted to the debate on exchange rates with harsh criticism. He was shocked at the coldness with which this "unspeakable debate" was being conducted, Genscher said today on Hesse Radio.

Meanwhile, CDU [Christian Democratic Union] General Secretary Volker Ruehe has announced that he is reckoning with the conditions on monetary and social union with the GDR being finally negotiated swiftly by the end of April or the beginning of May so that they could come into effect, if possible, by the start of the summer. At the same time, Ruehe today reaffirmed on South German Radio that the savings of small savers in the GDR would be exchanged in accordance with the 1:1 formula in the course of monetary union.

On the other hand, the SPD [Social Democratic Party] chairman, Hans-Jochen Vogel, stated on the timetable that he did not count on monetary union being realized by the summer. Vogel said in an interview with the magazine BUNTE that it was astonishing when Federal Chancellor Kohl named 1 July as the date for monetary union "without anything moving in the Bundestag." A whole series of laws would have to be amended for monetary union, and the time for this procedure is running out, Vogel said.

Lambsdorff Criticized

AU0104171990 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 28 Mar 90 p 1

[Heiner Pachmann commentary: "When the Count Grumbles..."]

[Text] When the Count grumbles, it is no joke for GDR citizens. Lambsdorff's warning at the session of the Presidium of the Free Democratic Party of Germany on Monday [26 March] against extending the 1:1 rate to salaries, wages, and pensions in case of a currency replacement, seems like a blow below the belt in the second round to our German republic. According to Lambsdorff and Economics Minister Haussmann, nothing else has ever been said. The 1:1 rate was only intended for the small savers, anyway.

Lambsdorff's and Haussmann's concern is aimed at the competitiveness of the GDR enterprises, which would be reduced if, in case of a monetary union, 1:1 wages had to be paid in Deutsche marks, because of the deficient productivity, that is, a productivity, which is not adequate to the wages. But how should payments then be made? 1:2 or 1:3? Those who earn a net salary of 900 GDR marks would then get only 450 or 300 Deutsche marks? But—the productivity of the GDR industry is not quite as bad, after all.

Concerning the proposals of how the knot could be disentangled, they stuck to the pre-election campaign noises: They developed diffuse pictures. Haussmann advocated a differentiated, flexible, and as practicable as possible an approach (as if this were not be necessary in any case), and Lambsdorff is thinking of a one-time compensation for sky-rocketing prices. Otherwise, however, they want the GDR people not to suffer any losses in wages and pensions.

What is this? When will the politicians in Bonn finally realize that the game with the GDR citizen must stop? Not to mention the fact that this has repercussions for the GDR's liberals, who are people of integrity, and, like other "sisters," have to account to the citizens here for the things cooked up on the Rhine. Thus, clarity is needed. After all, this is what the GDR citizen has also voted for.

FRG Minister Praises Proposal

LD3103162490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1532 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Galway/Hamburg (ADN)—The recommendation of the council of the Central Bank for a general exchange of GDR funds into deutschmarks on a 2:1 basis is, in the words of FRG finance Minister Theo Waigel, "a remarkably positive proposal," which meets the interests of the people of the GDR. On the fringes of the informal meeting of the EEC finance ministers and heads of national banks in Ashford Castle in Ireland, Waigel told Second German Television that the proposal has a "considerable social component," since a family of four, for example, could change 8,000 marks at 1:1. A general 1:1 exchange rate is not possible because of the lower level of production and the debts of the GDR. Moreover, there are considerable Stasi [State Security Service] funds which one does not want to exchange at 1:1 [passage omitted]

Official Doubts Media Report on Boehme

AU0104162390 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 28 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[NZ/ADN report: "Does Someone Huckster Files?"]

[Text] East Berlin—Werner Fischer, one of the three government representatives for the dissolution of the National Security Office, has expressed doubt that DER SPIEGEL has State Security [Stasi] files that incriminate Ibrahim Boehme, chairman of the Social Democratic Party. Fischer stated that even the three government representatives—apart from him, there are Colonel General Peter and Dr. Boehme of the Peasants Party—cannot "get files just like that."

The name of Ibrahim Boehme surfaced for the first time on Sunday [25 March] in the Hamburg news magazine DER SPIEGEL. "We did not have any information before," Fischer said. He himself has never had a Stasi file on Boehme in his hands.

In Fischer's view, Boehme's demand to have a body of people of integrity look at potentially existing files would be possible. The three government representatives "certainly have the authority—quite contrary to the statements or the legal view of the prosecutor general—to have the files read. Thus, we can order or authorize people to read these files."

Fischer assumes that Stasi archives are not 100-percent secure. Therefore, he has long called for having certain files destroyed, "because in view of the racing speed toward unification, there is the probability that these files might be taken over by other intelligence services."

Werner Fischer advocated a "security check." He cannot imagine "how a new People's Chamber, which has now been formed, and a new government could live with this stigma in the long run. And I think that the people in this country have the right to learn whom they elected into this body."

In Fischer's view, many interests play a role in the varied discussion about the potential Stasi past of some People's Chamber deputies. "Of course, this cannot be determined precisely. One has to state clearly for once that a number of foreign intelligence services are also working on GDR territory. Obviously, they think that now, since the Stasi has been almost dissolved, this vacuum has to be filled. Work is being done by the KGB, which, by the way, also has a lot of data on GDR citizens, the Federal Intelligence Service, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and others."

De Maiziere's Stasi Links Said Unsubstantiated

LD3003185790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1831 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Accusations that Christian Democratic Union Chairman Lothar de Maiziere was an informant for the former Ministry for State Security have not been confirmed. The President of the Consistory Council, Dr. Manfred Stolpe, Higher Church Councillor Schroeter, lawyer Dr. Gregor Gysi, a representative each from the attorney general's office and the citizens' committee as well as two employees of the archives today checked the documents at de Maiziere's personal request and with the agreement of the Government representative.

Before checking on de Maiziere, the other personages viewed the files on Gregor Gysi. It emerged from this that there was no suspicion of him having been involved.

SPD'S Boehme Views Personal Stasi Files

LD3003130890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0830 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The SPD's [Social Democratic Party] top politician, Ibrahim Boehme, who at the moment has suspended himself from his posts as party and parliamentary group chairman, had a look at his files held by the former Ministry for State Security in Berlin today. Journalists were not allowed to participate in the inspection of the files in the former Ministry for State Security complex of buildings in the Normannenstrasse. Werner Fischer, government representative for the disbanding of the Stasi, drove into the complex of building before Boehme.

In an article in the FRG news magazine DER SPIEGEL, Ibrahim Boehem had been accused of having earlier been an informal worker for the Stasi, whereupon he temporarily laid down his parliamentary posts until the matter was clarified.

No Stasi Files on Boehme Cooperation Found

LD3003133390 Hamburg DPA in German 1022 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] [No dateline as received] According to most recent information, no file cards showing Boehme to have cooperated with the Stasi have been found in the complex of buildings in the Normannenstrasse.

Boehme Claims Exoneration, Resumes Party Post

LD3003162590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1439 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Ibrahim Boehme emerged exonerated after inspecting the files today in the Stasi central office in Berlin-Lichtenberg. Next Monday, he says, he will resume his work as chairman of the party and of the parliamentary group. In accordance with a decision announced at the beginning of the week, the 45-year-old had intended to suspend himself from the two posts until the accusations that he had worked as an informer for the GDR state security service were cleared up.

Boehme's lawyer from Cologne, Dr. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Sell, qualified this and stated that today not all the files concerning his client have been produced. "Without knowledge of the complete files and documents, a judgement on the matter is not possible," he told the waiting press after the procedure, which lasted five and a half hours. He confirmed Boehme's great seriousness in "establishing clarity for himself. I think that in the next week we will be able to bring the matter to a close," von Sell said.

TV Program Alleges Stasi Had Internment Plans

LD0104164990 Hamburg DPA in German 1548 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—According to a report from the "Spiegel TV" television program the former GDR state security service intended to put away 122 members of the opposition from Leipzig alone in an internment camp. This emerges from a document dated 9 October 1989, which had been issued by the bezirk [area] office of the State Security Service in Leipzig, the magazine program reported in its edition this evening. On the list were nearly all the pastors of Leipzig churches, including the superintendent of St. Thomas Church, Johannes Richter, and the superintendent of St. Nicholas Church, Friedrich Magirius.

According to "Spiegel TV" the list is headed: "People, who are part of the political underground, to be taken away within the framework of the preventive complex." Members of the opposition on the list had been listed on files of the State Security Service for, example, being "regular non-voters", having contacts with New Forum, being "negative spokespersons", or "participants in so-called hostile-negative riotous assemblies". The magazine program referred to the fact that the list of names had obviously been drawn up because of the Leipzig demonstrations after the GDR's 40th anniversary jubilee.

According to the program, the former deputy head of the Leipzig State Security Service confirmed to "Spiegel TV" that there had been plans for members of the opposition to be interned, though only in the eventuality of war.

Similar plans were made known last week. It emerges from material in files that representatives of the citizens' committee responsible in Erfurt had found that the former Ministry of State Security had planned, and in some cases already prepared, at least 24 isolation and internment camps for "enemies of the state" and dissidents.

The information was conveyed to DPA in an abridged form.

Peoples Chamber To Meet for First Session

LD3003130790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1152 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR State Council today convened the People's Chamber, elected on 18 March 1990, to its first session on 5 April 1990 in Berlin, in line with Article 62, paragraph 1 of the GDR Constitution.

The State Council also ratified the treaty between the GDR and the Republic of Austria on the protection of indications of origin and other geographic designations of 26 January 1990.

SPD May Decide on Future Coalition with CDU

LD3003164190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1409 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—After exploratory talks with the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] leadership on Sunday, the Social Democratic Party [SPD] will decide whether it will lead to coalition talks. This was stated today by Markus Meckel at a press conference after the SPD parliamentary group session in Berlin. On Monday the party presidium and executive will decide whether there will be a coalition.

The SPD representatives made contradictory statements about a coalition with the DSU [German Social Union]. Meckel stressed cooperation with the CDU but ruled out any association with the DSU, referring to election promises. Participation by the DSU would burden the coalition. It was conceded that a new situation necessitates different decisions. [passage omitted]

CDU, SPD Exploratory Coalition Talks End

LD0104171790 Hamburg DPA in German 1458 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Excerpts] East Berlin (DPA)—The exploratory talks lasting several hours between the SPD [Social Democratic Party] and the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] ended today in East Berlin without concrete offers. The SPD delegation had not wished to make a proposal for the introduction of coalition talks.

The SPD party chairman who is dealing with business, Markus Meckel, said to the press that the responsible GDR bodies—the presidium and the parliamentary group executive—now have to decide tomorrow. He and his delegation will "describe and present" the content of the exploratory talks with the CDU, but will not make a recommendation.

Meckel and Lothar de Maiziere (CDU), however, made it clear to the press that important agreements were achieved on questions of content. This applies to the social security of the GDR citizens and a rate of conversion that has to be 1:1, and not anything different.

In reply to a question as to what recommendation they will take to the session of their committees tomorrow, Meckel and Schroeder [acting chairman of the SPD parliamentary group] said none. [passage omitted]

Meckel said an official apology from the DSU [German Social Union], who had attacked the SPD particularly hard in the election campaign, will "clearly improve the atmosphere." DSU leader Hans- Wilhelm Ebeling had said last week that he was sorry for some of the things that his party had done in their election campaign and that there are many positions common with the SPD.

After the talks with the SPD, CDU chief De Maiziere briefed the chairmen of the DSU, Ebeling; Democratic Awakening (DA), Rainer Eppelmann; and the League of Free Democrats (BFD), Rainer Ortleb. They had approved of a grand coalition with the SPD last week.

The CDU and the SPD said there are good possibilities for the two parties to cooperate in the social sphere and on currency questions. In front of the press, De Maiziere and Meckel pleaded emphatically for a conversion rate of 1:1 for wages, salaries, and pensions.

De Maiziere emphasized that there had not been talks between the GDR and Bonn about monetary union and rates of conversion after the election. The CDU and the SPD regretted the fact that GDR citizens will be greatly disconcerted again by the latest statements and proposals of the Federal bank and from Bonn. De Maiziere referred to the fact that wages and salaries in the GDR are lower than in the Federal Republic anyway. Halving them through a conversion rate of 2:1, and additionally expected price increases, cannot be accepted.

SPD Official Comments on SPD, CDU Talks

LD0104171890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1506 GMT 1 APR 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The future economic, monetary, and social union was the central topic of the second round of exploratory talks between the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] and SPD [Social Democratic Union] leaders in Berlin today. The acting chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, Richard Schroeder, reported that there was agreement that this topic can only be treated as a package. A halving of GDR salaries can not be considered. There has been agreement on the convening of the People's Chamber. There will be political statements on questions of constitutional changes and on the question of Stasi involvement by deputies. The future structure of the country was discussed, as was a regional constitution, which is urgent in connection with the approaching elections. Schroeder said the final point of the exploratory talks is the question of the parties' participation in a future coalition. It is well-known that "for the SPD a very particular problem poses difficulties here." The SPD decisionmaking bodies will be briefed about this part of the talks. Until then, the SPD does not wish to "comment on this part of the talks."

SPD Presidium Considers Coalition Negotiations

LD0204091390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1645 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The Social Democratic Party [SPD] Presidium and the parliamentary group executive met this morning in Berlin to discuss initiating formal coalition negotiations with the Christian Democratic Union. These negotiations will link up with the information talks hitherto.

"Yesterday we achieved a good rapprochement on many factual questions, but there are still some things open," Prof. Frank Terpe, deputy chairman of the parliamentary group, stated to ADN. Among them are the German Social Union [DSU] participation as well as "a matter that concerns us especially as Social Democrats, the assurance of an exchange for wages and salaries, which was given during the election campaign by the Union [CDU-CSU] [Christian Social Union]. This will continue to play a great role for us. We intend to insist on this pledge. We will see that the Bonn CDU and our CDU do their duty."

Rauls Cited on Merger of Center Parties

LD3103162990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1156 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—The merger of the NDPD [National Democratic Party of Germany] and the League of Free Democrats—the Liberals—has to be seen as a new political platform of the center, Wolfgang Rauls, chairman of the former National Democratic Party of Germany, said on Saturday at a session, convened as a party conference, in Berlin. Addressing over 6,500 participants from all the kreis and ward associations, he said that his party's basic political positions were the most important dowry. "The uncompromising realization of human rights in a constitutional state is the fundamental condition for a liberal-democratic order through which political pluralism, tolerance, and equality of all democrats is being guaranteed," Rauls said. [passage omitted]

CDU People's Chamber Group Constituted

AU0104165290 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 28 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Friedrich Eismann report: "No Lesser Task Than the Replacement of a Social Formation"]

[Excerpts] East Berlin (NZ)—Yesterday Lothar de Maiziere, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany [CDU], was elected in a secret ballot to chairman of the CDU group in the People's Chamber. At the constitutive session in the Small Festive Hall of the Council of Ministers, 82 of the 158 deputies present voted for him, knowing that this election can only be a transitional solution in order to enable the group to work until a government is formed.

In the second ballot, Guenther Krause, chairman of the Mecklenburg/Hither Pomerania CDU Land Association, was elected first deputy chairman of the CDU group. [passage omitted]

As press spokesman, Helmut Lueck told the domestic and foreign media representatives during a break in the session after the election that a political report by Lothar de Maiziere was the focal issue of the debate. The group is faced with the enormous task of replacing a social formation, which is, above all, expressed in changing the economic structure, the press spokesman said, assessing the amount of work. The importance and order of the initiatives for necessary laws were outlined yesterday. In forming the new government, the CDU will particularly insist on the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Economics, and Social Affairs, as well as on the education sector as one of the sectors that is most burdened with the problems of the past. The People's Chamber deputies decided on temporary work rules for the group, dealt with shaping parliamentary work as a whole, and discussed new Standing Orders for the People's Chamber. This also involves accommodation for parliament, its groups, committees, and the members in the necessary offices.

Furthermore, the group supported with a clear majority the statement of the CDU Presidium of 23 March concerning the slanderous accusations about State Security involvement and the demands for a general investigation of the deputies and ordered the chairman to start talks with the chairmen of the other People's Chamber groups about the explosive problems. [passage omitted]

Answering questions by journalists, CDU General Secretary Martin Kirchner answered that he supports the demand for investigating all accusations against the deputies that they engaged in State Security activities in the past. However, the rule of law demands that the People's Chamber itself, as a democratically legitimated organ, establish an investigating committee. This should be done immediately after its constitutive session, so that "peace and trust can be finally reestablished." An amnesty would certainly contain aspects of reconciliation, but it does not eliminate guilt. The rule of law is called for, which the CDU group advocates without any reservations, Kirchner said.

Democratic Awakening Youth Association Founded

AU0104161790 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 28 Mar 90 p 2

[NZ/ADN report: "Youth Association of Democratic Awakening Founded"]

[Text] East Berlin—"Young Democrats—Youth of Democratic Awakening" [Junge Demokraten—Jugend des Demokratischen Aufbruchs] is the name of a youth organization, which is close to Democratic Awakening and which has been founded recently. Michael Hahn was elected chairman.

Interested persons may turn to Michael Hahn, Haus der Demokratie, Friedrichstrasse 165, Berlin, 1080.

Former Official Schalck-Golodkowski Disappears

LD3103205390 Hamburg DPA in German 1704 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Rottach-Egern (ADN)—The former GDR foreign-currency procurer Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski apparently left his presumed hideaway in a villa in Rottach-Egern in Upper Bavaria last night. Residents reported that the 57-year-old, who is said to have rented a house on Tegernsee under a false name three weeks ago, had now disappeared. Schalck is wanted by the GDR authorities for, among other things, abuse of office.

The residents said that during recent days they had observed a lot of coming and going in front of and in the villa. Limousines and a car with GDR license plates had driven up. Today there had been numerous reporters but otherwise it was completely quiet.

Rottach's Mayor Konrad Niedermeier said that he was sure that the former chief of the GDR empire Commercial Coordination had lived for some time in the house. However, no new arrival under the name Schalck-Golodkowski had been registered.

Conversion of State Bank Begins

LD0204105390 Hamburg DPA in German 1028 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Excerpt] East Berlin (DPA)—The conversion of the banking system has begun on 2 April. The State Bank is therefore relinquishing its branches and is assuming—like the Bundesbank—the function of the supreme currency custodian. According to earlier information from President of the State Bank Horst Kaminsky, it will be independent of the government and will be committed in particular to the stability and the protection of the currency. The new Central Bank will control the economy's money supply and the liquidity of the commercial banks. It will be responsible for fixing minimum deposits for the commercial banks and is to fix the interest rates for loans. [passage omitted]

Import of Polish Press Products Suspended

LD0204092790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0804 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Leipzig (ADN)—As of 1 April, Poland has suspended the delivery of Polish press products to the GDR, the foreign trade enterprise Buchexport Leipzig reports. Buchexport has been informed by its contractual partner Ars Polona Warsaw, that "in deviation from existing contractual agreements," the prices have been considerably increased. The prices of daily newspapers would on average be ten times and the prices of magazines seven times that of the previous prices. Since the current imports have been subsidized by more than 50 percent and since, in the past also, slight increases have been made regularly, the GDR side has not been able to approve further deliveries under the announced conditions. The GERMAN POST reports that subscribers will be reimbursed a part of their subscription in due course.

Railway, Defense Ministry on Soviet Withdrawal

LD3003175190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] MAV [Hungarian State Railways] and the Ministry of Defense held a joint news conference.

Andras Meszaros, deputy chairman of MAV, stated that MAV would be able to complete the transportation of soldiers and their equipment even before the final dateline. He also stated that the withdrawal is progressing without any problems. To ensure the continuity, however, it would be necessary to speed up the reception on the Soviet side from the summer onwards, when the transporting of officers and their families will begin.

So far, 31 military transport trains have left the country, half of them carrying Army units, and half of them carrying their equipment.

Election Committee Announces Second Round Date

LD3003223890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2200 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] In preparation for the second round of parliamentary elections, the National Election Committee prepared an official statement. This will appear on the streets within days and will call on the population to cast their votes.

Similar to the first round, next Sunday [8 April] it will be possible to vote between 0600 [0700 GMT] and 1800 [1900 GMT] in the 171 individual voting districts. Voting will take place at the same place as for the first round.

The National Election Committee will not send out new notices, but is asking everyone to take with them their personal ID book [szemelyi igazolvany]. At the second round, electors will receive only one ballot, on which the candidates' names will appear.

The National Election Committee today certified the electoral records of the individual voting districts and only found some minor mistakes, usually the result of individual errors of miscalculation.

Preliminary Election Results Analyzed

AU3003154390 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Mar 90 p 1

[Andras Banki editorial]

[Text] Crowning the peaceful transition, the Hungarian voters opted for a change in the regime in free and peaceful elections. This has opened the way toward parliamentary democracy, self-management, a market economy, and Europe. A new period of modernization in Hungarian history can now begin based on our national traditions and the values of European culture. Bourgeois civilization within the framework of the holy trinity of free property, free citizens, and national independence is the main driving force of this new period.

Our nation is facing a great historical opportunity: Sitting on the ruins of a regime that has collapsed, our nation has the opportunity to fight the bitter struggle for national advancement by returning to its roots, taking its fate into its own hands, and enjoying the sympathy and support of the civilized world. Hungarian society can feel a collective sense of victory for making use of this opportunity; in practice, however, power continues to be in the hands of the intellectual elite, with a slight change of positions deriving from the change in the regime. Our silent revolution will be accomplished if the camp of the winners increases in the everyday struggle; however, this requires an equitable distribution of the burden of advancement and of the public burden among the various groups of society, and this is the first thing on which we must achieve a national consensus. Because, just as one can predict that the winners of restructuring will be the elite that will partially preserve their power, the new bourgeoisie, and the tradesmen, entrepreneurs, professional intellectuals who make up the middle class; in the same way one can predict the losers: the hundreds of thousands of people who have spent their savings, people who have been forced out of the market competition through no fault of their own, people who have become unemployed, as well as the masses of lumpen proletariat which can be easily manipulated and which represent an eternal destabilization threat. Some 3 million people can be listed in this group in Hungary. If it is true that modernization should primarily rely on bourgeois civilization and the accumulation of capital, it is similarly important to avoid the further lagging behind of the aforementioned masses, because otherwise we would be confronted by a constant danger of explosion. Therefore, we need a social policy that fulfills both requirements: quick development and the acceleration of a market economy, and at least a minimal social security. However, Hungarian society alone is unable to achieve such a balance; therefore, foreign political and economic support is essential. We can be sure that foreigners will exchange their goodwill into money only for a government that enjoys a broad popular and parliamentary basis.

Evaluating the partial results of the recent elections in view of these processes and requirements, one can conclude that we have a chance for a grand coalition with a sure parliamentary majority. Most probably, this coalition will emerge under the leadership of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], a party which is expected to increase its advantage over the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] in the second round of the parliamentary elections. This prediction is based on the fact that, in the majority of the individual electoral districts, the MDF is able to gather allies from a wider range of individuals than the SZDSZ. In the time remaining until the second round of voting, the MDF will obviously strive to come to an agreement with its "natural allies", namely, the Smallholders Party and the Christian Democrats, and, according to the rules of the game, this bloc will call upon its voters to support the most favorite candidate. Thus, we can predict the victory of a right-right-center, Christian-national center, and the question is: By what proportion? Will they get enough mandates to set up a small governing coalition and not be forced to include the liberal, bourgeois, and radical SZDSZ, something that many people consider to be "unnatural"? We will be able to answer this only when we know the final results, but, in our view, a right-right-center coalition will be able to get only a rather unstable majority in Parliament, but a majority nevertheless. (However, this also requires the participation of the majority of voters, more than 50 percent, in the second round of the elections.)

For the aforementioned reasons, the party list election results show a more favorable picture of the SZDSZ, which is expected to get more mandates for their candidates than in the individual election districts. The SZDSZ will probably try to come to an agreement with the Alliance of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] in the second round, but the SZDSZ can also count on potential supporters from the Agricultural Federation (because of the similarity of their agricultural policy), to a lesser extent from the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], and from among those who voted for the Social Democrats, who obtained poor results. The SZDSZ can already call it a success that it will be able to finalize its first round percentage in the second round.

One thing is almost certain: The MDF and the SZDSZ will be the strongest parties in the new Parliament. We have repeatedly expressed our conviction that a grand coalition is not only necessary, but also possible. We do not want to repeat the principle and ideological differences between the two political trends, differences that originate from our 20th century history, differences including the political debates and personal disputes on the peaceful transition and on the election campaign. In our view, the essential thing is that there are no unbridgeable differences in their programs. One can find points of contact between the caution of the MDF and the radicalism of the SZDSZ, points that could lead to a compromise in their views concerning the pace and methods of developing a market economy, carrying out the process of privatization, and judging the possibility of creating social security. In addition, the MDF will also need other forces to neutralize the extremist land distribution efforts of the Smallholders.

This is exactly what is expected of a grand coalition: to neutralize each other's extremism. Thus, those who have the power would shift the power center toward the middle, and the MSZP, a party forced into opposition and representing the employees' interests more firmly and—hopefully—more thoughtfully than the other parties, could also play an important role in this. The MDF must be aware of the fact that an SZDSZ with outstanding experts is more dangerous in the opposition than in the coalition. However, it is in the interest of the SZDSZ to open an emergency exit toward the MSZP, because this way, it can exercise greater influence on the right-right-center. Such a grand coalition would be adequately balanced and would lead to a strong government.

It is natural that differences and opposition between the various parties determine an election campaign; it is also necessary to have a readiness for compromise after settling and legitimizing the various positions and power relations.

Antall, Kis Interviewed on Coalition Prospects

LD3103180790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Interview with Jozsef Antall, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and Janos Kis, acting chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by chief editor Akos Mester on the "168 hours" program; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Mester] Welcome to the 168 hours studio. What really interests people at the moment is which of the two parties is able to win over the Smallholders. This matter is not so simple, because the latest news also indicates that the Smallholders could become the beneficiary of the fight just as easily as they could suffer from it. What is the state of affairs regarding your negotiations with the Smallholders? Is there anything you wish to disclose?

[Antall] First of all, I would like to point out that in the present state of the country it is very important that an Independent Smallholders' Party should exist and in my judgment, along the opposition movements, the traditional political parties could fulfill a very important role. Although they might not have put on a good show this time, generally, in the long run, it is necessary that these elements should be present in political life. I consider it very regrettable that the Social Democratic Party collapsed this way. This does not reflect very well on the emerging Hungarian political democracy that a social democratic party could not successfully get into parliament here. Looking at the European political party system, this should have taken place.

[Mester] Don't you think that as a result of this, it will be much easier for the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] to describe itself as social democratic if it has that sort of ambition?

[Antall] I do not know what the future fate of the MSZP is going to be, but obviously there are various political trends and groups within the MSZP. I consider that in this first phase, it is very important that the old political parties which were operational in the past, should remain and fulfill a policy-forming role. For they are able to mobilize masses for politics which, perhaps, were not reached by the new opposition movements. I am thinking of the older generations or even those who are the inheritors of certain political traditions. [passage omitted]

One has to ascertain that due to the traditions and political significance of the Smallholders' Party, it is an important political party, and it has to be preserved.

Well, regarding our opinion of the Smallholders' Party: I would like to point out that the Hungarian Democratic Forum, already in its founding document, has mentioned the Independent Smallholders' Party, the former National Peasant Party, or the Petoefi Party, which was its name in 1956, and also the Barankovits Christian Democratic Party as its political predecessors, thus these political trends are the real and natural allies from the point of view of the Hungarian Democratic Forum.

[Mester] So eventually and practically we get to the point that the Hungarian Democratic Forum would like to treat the Independent Smallholders Party as a potential coalition partner. Is that right?

[Antall] Yes, it is true. There is no secret in this—all the more because it is not only us who regard the Smallholders Party this way. This does not mean that there will be no political debates or arguments or even disagreements like in the question of the referendum, when the Smallholders Party was of the opposite opinion. [passage omitted]

[Mester] This is all very well, Mr Chairman, but I think it is somewhat confusing that certain local leaders of the Smallholders' Party, what is more, even some leaders in the central leadership would rather press closer to the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] as coalition partners. Am I right, Janos Kis?

[Kis] First of all, If am a bit embarrassed, because there is not a single representative of the Smallholders Party present at this table, and I think this is not my task to give a statement as to whose coalition partner could the Smallholders Party be in future.

Thus I would only like to point out two things: one is that the although Smallholders Party struggles with all the difficulties which are the teething problems of all the reformed traditional, older political, the fact cannot be disregarded that they achieved significant results in the first round of the elections. This was the only one among the traditional parties which could overtake the Hungarian Socialist Party and which has a good chance that in the second run it will increase the distance between itself and the Socialist Party. Thus, this party will, by all means, be a significant factor of the future Hungarian democracy.

My second remark is this: it was obviously disturbing for every outside observer that the Smallholders Party could not adopt a united stance regarding its election coalition as to with whom should they sign a mutual support agreement. The present situation is that there is a national agreement with the Democratic Forum and the Christian Democratic People's Party which was made by the presidium of the Smallholders' Party or by part of it—I do not see quite clearly in this matter for the time being—and in several counties, the Smallholders organizations announced that they will disregard this agreement and they signed agreements with the local groups of the Free Democrats, like in Bekes and Hajdu-Bihar County and at other places also.

I think that it is the internal affair of the Smallholders Party as to how it handles this conflict and I do not wish to make a statement in connection with this—I would only like to point out that the Alliance of Free Democrats will honor these agreements. [passage omitted]

[Antall] I think one has to mention here that this agreement came about following the news disclosed by the press that the SZDSZ and FIDESZ [Alliance of Young Democrats] signed an election alliance. According to the information of FIDESZ this did not take place on a national level, but only on a local level, although there is no doubt that FIDESZ always was closer to SZDSZ in the past period. However, I still think—and I agree with Janos Kis—that this is the internal affair of the Smallholders Party. We are only interested in this matter inasmuch as we were asked whether we consider this agreement valid. Naturally, we consider it valid, since according to the signatories of the Smallholders Party, with the exception of two, the entire presidium agreed with this unanimously so the agreement was made with a majority decision. [passage omitted]

Party Representatives Discuss Elections

LD3103211490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 31 Mar 90

[From the "168 Hours" program]

[Excerpts] The compilation which now follows will begin with the opinion of a Smallholders' Party politician, and there will be discussion, in it, of coalition plans and expectations. [passage omitted] What we shall broadcast is a range of opinions which reflects the situation the day before yesterday [March 29]. The reporters are Eszter Raday and Ferenc Vicsek.

[Begin recording] [Vicsek] Pal Dragon is deputy general secretary of the Independent Smallholders Farmworkers and Bourgeois Party. You have one more week in which to gain enough votes to obtain as many mandates as possible. What are you counting on?

[Dragon] In our calculations, we would like to obtain 65-70 mandates. Up to now we have obtained 16 mandates on the county and regional list. At present, we have 76 candidates who are standing in the individual constituencies, in readiness for further elections. The breakdown of our 76 candidates has shaped up as follows: Eleven are in first place, 24 are in second place, and 41 are in third place. The Independent Smallholders Party is aware of its weight, its strength. The Independent Smallholders Party is aware that it is the pointer on the scales. Therefore, it is in accordance with this that we are striving to politicize.

We have a program which we should like to carry through; namely, the matter of property reform, the so-called return to the conditions of 1947. We are certain that no other party has such a thing which is as precisely worked out as it is for us. We think that the coalition partners will have to accept this by all means. This is the basis of negotiations. If they do not accept this, the Independent Smallholders' Party will remain in the opposition.

[Vicsek] Perhaps I am saying something nonsensical: might the Smallholders Party perhaps split into two, following from the logic that one segment will negotiate with the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and the other segment will do so with the Alliance of Free Democrats? It appears that these two parties are ever more difficult to bring together.

[Dragon] There have been frequent attempts, in the course of its 60-year history, to tear apart the Smallholders Party. Thank God this never has come about; we remain united. However, it is necessary to examine satisfactorily every political view and guideline. These discussions do not pertain yet to a government coalition. It is a matter merely of electoral cooperation, the obtaining of joint mandates.

[Raday] Ivan Vitanyi, of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], how many people have remained on their feet after the first round?

[Vitanyi] Regarding Budapest, I know that there are 18 people, and nationally I believe that there are approximately 50-60 people who will still take part in the second round.

[Raday] From among them, there are very few who are in first place—altogether there are three people: Matyas Szuros, Gyula Horn, and Jozsef Csige.

[Vitanyi] There will be 8-10 people who take part, with a genuine chance, in the next round.

[Raday] I should like to return later to these eight people. At first let us discuss what the tactics of the others will be, what method will they pursue?

[Vitanyi] Nothing special. The principle is that everyone if possible should run in the next round, out of sportsmanship, or one could say out of respect. Therefore, if we have begun, we should do it to the end. We are not participants in any kind of game of tactics, such as withdrawing to the benefit of someone, or agreeing that at one place I shall withdraw to your benefit and at another place you will withdraw. We are not in such a situation, but from our viewpoint this would not be of value or yield result. Thus, we have no tactics of this kind.

[Raday] You have said you are not in such a situation. There really is no party which might want to enter into a coalition, a preliminary election coalition with the MSZP. But, for example, is the Patriotic Election Coalition or the Agrarian Alliance not like this either? I know your reply in connection with the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party.

[Vitanyi] I shall give my reply in connection with the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party: we are in no tactical relationship with it. Our stand in connection with the Agrarian Alliance or the Patriotic Coalition has been that people, the party organs, party members will know case by case, at the scene, where they want to support someone. And this could extend not only to the Agrarian Alliance, but to anyone else. It could happen that the members of the MSZP somewhere feel that if they are unable to bring in their own candidates, then they will find x or y, the members of any party—it could happen that they are from the Democratic Forum or the Alliance of Free Democrats—to be suitable for this. Therefore, it is their affair; there is no central directive regarding the kind of alliance which can be concluded.

[Raday] Therefore, a large number of the constituencies will participate in a game which has already been played out, in which you know who will be the losers, and you accept this defeat with your heads held high.

[Vitanyi] [passage omitted] I might add that according to our resolution, or our position, if a candidate feels that it is redundant for him to take part, or that he is tired, or does not want to, then so be it, and he should decide for himself or the competent party organs and the candidate should decide. But it is better to take part through to the end, with heads held high.

[Raday] Allow me to return to the candidates who ended up in first place in the first round. For example, in the No.6 constituency of Country Hajdu-Bihar, Matyas Szuros is in first place with 32.7 percent. He is followed by a Smallholders Party candidate with about 19 percent, and then by an MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] candidate [words indistinct] If one of the two candidates following him withdraws, to the benefit of the other, it emerges from a quick act of adding up, that they would defeat Matyas Szuros. It is the same in the other two constituencies. And I could imagine the coming about of a five-party coalition, against the HSR candidate who is in first place.

[Vitanyi] I can also imagine this. By the way, even in this case Matyas Szuros will get into parliament through the county list. It would be important and I believe it would be fair for him to get into parliament, because of what he has done, or what Gyula Horn did, too, for an honorable transition. However, we naturally subject ourselves to the election rules.

[Raday] Gabor Fodor, FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], we cannot calculate how many mandates are not yet filled, how many are left for the second rounds. Is it possible to calculate how many FIDESZ has a chance to gain?

[Fodor] The present situation is very much undecided, our candidates are contesting in several individual districts, and they have a good chance in several places, for example, Jozsef Szajer in Sopron.

[Raday] They are contesting several places but are in the first position only in three of districts.

[Fodor] Three, but in several other places where they are in second or third position we have succeeded in making agreements, for example, that the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] candidate will step down in favor of the FIDESZ. In these places FIDESZ candidates have a good chance to come in. We are expecting 15-20 or if we are lucky even over 20 parliamentary seats for FIDESZ.

[Raday] You have made an agreement with the SZDSZ. Does this mean mutual advantages for the two organizations?

[Fodor] I think we have made a very correct agreement, but on this, the actual agreement, it is perhaps worthwhile mentioning that this was an agreement of a kind where the decisive factor is what locally, the local groups are saying, what kind of relation they have with each other. So, in addition to having agreed that in the country, in several places, the FIDESZ candidates withdraw in favor of the SZDSZ candidate, or that the SZDSZ candidates withdraw in favor of the FIDESZ, there will be places in the country where they are contesting against each other, for example in Mosonmagyarovar, Erd, and other places.

[Raday] Is it because the local FIDESZ and SZDSZ candidates are not willing to stand down?

[Fodor] That is so, relations between them are so bad that they are not willing to do so, or the FIDESZ candidate has objections to the SZDSZ candidate, so it will happen that we will support the FKGP [Independent Smallholders Party] nationality and in several counties such ideas are being formulated, but I can not say anything certain above it, this is still being discussed...

[Raday] The FKGP against the SZDSZ, for example?

[Fodor] Not against the SZDSZ, but in Bekes or Szabolcs-Szatmar there is a good relation between FIDESZ and the FKGP, and very likely an agreement between them will be made. And there will be places where we will support the MDF, against the SZDSZ, for example in Baranya, it can be expected. I can't say anything certain as yet, but that is what it looks like.

[Raday] What is the reason for this?

[Fodor] It is because at a local level the relations between the SZDSZ and FIDESZ are very bad, while relations with the MDF are excellent.

[Raday] There is, however, a district which is very well-known, where Jozsef Szajer is taking the first place against Imre Pozsgay and an MDF candidate, and as far as I know the MDF is for example not going to support Jozsef Szajer.

[Fodor] That is so, this is our information as well. The SZDSZ candidate offered to withdraw in favour of Szajer, so according to the situation as it is at present in the second rounds Jozsef Szajer, Imre Pozsgay, and the MDF candidate will take part. We would consider it a confidence building decision towards us, if the MDF did not field their candidate, we would consider it a gallant gesture, and useful. So far we did not get such a gesture.

[Raday] Is there any other party, except the MSZP, with which you do not make any form of agreement for the second rounds?

[Fodor] Among the parties who got in, with the exception of the MSZP, we do not exclude any others, so the FIDESZ is open to all organizations, though the most comprehensive agreement we have made was with the SZDSZ.

[Raday] I imagine that the extent of the commitment to political values will determine alliances, the natural allies will withdraw in favor of each other? If you are stepping down at the expense of the SZDSZ, to the benefit of some other organization, that is contrary to the interests of both organizations.

[Fodor] Yes, this is a very important question, and in the context of this I find it very important to underline that we are continuing to be of the opinion that for us the SZDSZ is the nearest, and natural ally. But independently of this, I find it also very important to emphasize again, what we were trying to stress in our electoral campaign, that FIDESZ wishes to appear as a political organization in the political life. There could be occasions when we take an opposite view to that of the SZDSZ and also criticize them, as we did during the past weeks and months, therefore we have come to a fairly comprehensive agreement with the SZDSZ, at the same time we are able to cooperate in some form with other organizations. We are trying to show, and this is the actual situation too, that there is mutual political value identity with the SZDSZ, but there is no organizational identity. And we find certain political values in other organisations as well which we feel worthy of support, for example, in the FKGP and the MDF.

[Vicsek] Dr Mikios Hasznos, leader of the Electoral Office of the KDNP [Christian Democratic Peoples' Party], how many representatives will you have in the parliament? And how many mandates of those have you already gained?

[Hasznos] We are counting on about 20 representatives, eight candidates got in from the regional lists, about two to three representatives we are expecting after the second rounds. This, with some better organization and more political activity, we could even have doubled, but unfortunately we did not succeed in carrying out coalition negotiations at such a level, primarily with the MDF or the FKGP, than FIDESZ and SZDSZ could conduct, where individual interests did not dominate. Out of some party discipline and interests they could take tactical steps. Now, returning to the question, about eight of our representatives are already in, two to three will come in individual districts, and also we are counting on an another eight to ten from the national list. But the negotiations between the KDNP, the FKGP, and the MDF are still at the level of discussions and at the level of specific electoral districts it has only reached the stage that the MDF said they will not instruct their candidates to withdraw, in certain cases. Therefore the KDNP leadership also declared that they will not instruct anyone to stand down.

[Vicsek] What will the Christian center-right course mean in the Hungary of the 1990s? You are shaking your head.

[Hasznos] I was shaking my head about the center-right—the right, because this is always relative. Therefore it is after an earlier 40 years of party-state, so this politics will certainly seems rightwing.

This politics means that we would like to influence the internal political life of Hungary as a restraining force against radicalism. Thus, from the side of Christian ideology, human decency, and human solidarity, not always living under the magical influence of numbers, not always considering that if now I carry out such and such a decision this will mean so many thousand of dollars plus or minus, but it will also have to be looked at whom does this decision affect, how far does it serve the spirit of society. Because even the world's most rational decision is very difficult to carry out against society's wishes.

[Vicsek] That is why these debates are so difficult, because, if we are looking at West European ideas, what you are saying is rather left-wing.

[Hasznos] That is so. [passage omitted] We Christian Democrats are saying that the European culture, the European Christian ideology and the European ideology of state, and European economy are those which we find acceptable for us. Our side is one side which wants europe, but there is a political force in this country which is looking further from Europe, and is wishing to transfer here, without modifications, the models which proved successful on the other side of the ocean. And these political forces deny that there could be a Hungarian road, a national road, they deny that there could be a Hungarian road, a national road, they are saying why should we be experimenting here, trying to invent things, there is a working system, we must bring it here, as is. [passage omitted] [end recording]

MDF, FKP, Christian Party Form Coalition

LD3003170990 Budapest MTI in English 1647 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 30 (MTI)—The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] has concluded an election agreement for the second round of the parliamentary elections with the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKP] and the Christian Democratic People's Party. The agreement was announced on Friday in a joint communique.

The three parties call on their voters to participate in the second round of the elections, and to cast their votes for the candidate of the alliance in a stronger position. Those who do not have a candidate of their own party in the second round should vote for the MP candidate of the alliance still in the running.

Party Leaders Air Electoral Alliance Issues

LD3003212290 Budapest MTI in English 2015 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 30 (MTI)—Leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Independent Smallholders' Party and the Christian Democratic People's Party discussed the electoral alliance in interviews with MTI.

The conditions for the power rotation system of the political forces should be created in Hungary. It is thus important to set up political groups and alliances which can be considered as factors of stabilization in the multi-party system, said Jozef Antall, president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [HDF—MDF].

Mr Antall said these three parties were natural allies of each other also in the past, and they can count on membership in, and support from, the European democratic parties (edu). The HDF would also liked to reduce the tension accompanying the elections which has come about in the past days, but it upholds its position that a relatively homogeneous government would be more viable than a cabinet consisting of members who argue with each other and have difficulties cooperating. Naturally, a political situation can come about which requires a broader coalition than that of the parties in this electoral alliance. However, according to the HDF view, this can be considered only in a serious crisis situation, in the interest of the country.

We did not conclude a coalition, but an electoral alliance, which is in force until the day of the April 8 elections, said Sandor Bejczy, national party director of the Independent Smallholders' Party. Mr Bejczy was of the opinion that the number of mandates for his party will considerably increase with this agreement.

Tibor Fuzessy, vice-president of the Christian Democratic People's Party, said the agreement serves the interest of all three participating parties.

Smallholders Party Leader Denies Coalition Pact

LD3003205190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Excerpts] The national general secretary [title as received] of the Independent Smallholders Party has expressed his inability to comprehend the fact that Gyorgy Balogh has made an electoral pact with the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the Christian Democratic People's Party, in the name of his party. Istvan Prepeliczay, in reply to a question from the news program, said that Gyorgy Balogh quite simply did not have the right to do this and the national leadership of the Smallholders Party does not want to take a stance on the matter. It is leaving electoral coalitions up to its local, district organizations. [passage omitted]

It is a fact, however, that the Hungarian People's Party Presidium has called on its sympathisers to support the MDF, the Smallholders' Party, and the Christian Democratic People's Party in the second round.

Pozsgay Not To Run in Second Election

LD3103183390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] The deadline for announcing if somebody does not wish to run in the second round of the elections was 1200 today. The first real sensation arrived from Sopron, from where Lajos Soproni-Horvath reports:

[Soproni-Horvath] In Sopron, the representative of the Hungarian Socialist Party appeared one minute before midday to announce that the individual candidate of his party, Imre Pozsgay, does not wish to stand in the second round, although a meeting was announced for 1100, where the four parties still in the contest had to give a statement about their intention.

The Sopron group of SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] announced earlier that its candidate, Dr Miklos Arszin, stands down in order that the sympathizers of the party could support in unison Dr Jozsef Szajer, who was the winner of FIDESZ [Alliance of Young Democrats] in the first round.

Thus, in the second round, it will be decided between Dr Laszlo Karpati and Dr Jozsef Szajer, who will be the member of parliament for Sopron. The former is the candidate of MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]; the latter is that of FIDESZ.

Explains Resignation of Candidacy

LD0104200990 Budapest MTI in English 1855 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 1 (MTI)—As reported yesterday, Imre Pozsgay, parliamentary candidate of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP—MSZP], has withdrawn in his individual constituency of Sopron.

In an interview with the political magazine THE WEEK of Hungarian television on Sunday evening, Pozsgay, who also tops HSP's national list and has made its way into parliament through the Bacs-Kiskun county regional list, said his party's presidium had not consented to his entering the run-off amid the present conditions and circumstances.

"I have not got the means to cope with people who want to defeat me by using political blackmail, violating electoral ethics, spreading belittling rumours deeply insulting me and distorting my statements. I do not wish to take part in this battle in such a way. Instead, I choose to admit the defeat: My method is turning my defeats into victories," Pozsgay said.

Social Democratic Party Reportedly Suspends Head

LD3003221390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] I have just this minute received this news in connection with party matters here at home. According to this, I quote the statement: The national supervisory committee of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party is to suspend Anna Petrasovits from all her party posts as of 2 April. It is to start an investigation against her. At a meeting today, the national party leadership of the Social Democratic Party decided with a vote of 15 to five, to offer its resignation to the national board of the party.

This news was received from MTI.

Petrasovits on Party

LD3103230290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Interview with Social Democratic Party President Anna Petrasovits by correspondent P. Boronits on the "168 Hours" program; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Boronits] I am asking Anna Petrasovits to consider two defeats, to talk first about the MSZDP [Social Democratic Party] and then about yourself.

[Petrasovits] I think you must not overdramatize the situation. After the GDR elections it became clear that East Europe and East Central Europe today is voting for parties in which they can see the guarantee that the communist system cannot by any means or any route return. That the process is irreversible, no form of reversal is possible.

[Boronits] Did you not guarantee this?

[Pertrasovits] We also guarantee it, but our words did not reach the Hungarian electorate sufficiently. The Social Democrats are traditionally anti-Bolsheviks, but still in the public conscience it lives that the traitors among the Social Democrats delivered the Social Democrats in those days into the clutches of the communists. The story never mentions that the majority of the Social

Democrats, the two-thirds of them, resisted, and in the eyes of the people, social democracy is something similar, something red like communism. Although I think the difference between the two movements is like between fire and water.

[Boronits] How is it that your words did not reach the electorate?

[Petrasovits] There are several reasons, several components. The fact that in Central East Europe the former communist parties appealed with the slogans of social democracy also meant that the public information system, as far as possible kept away the new parties which gave voice to social democracy, which have really grown out of the civic society.

[Boronits] One of my acquaintences said that if in 1989 a party put up a sign that the MSZDP would not start a campaign, it would still get a minimum of 10 percent. And he said it looked as if you did everything possible to spoil this 10 percent, indeed succeeded in getting below four percent.

[Petrasovits] You see it very well. I fully agree with this. For example, the last two of our leaflets, I think in the political sense, style, and human approach, were simply appalling. When I saw it I had to control myself very much not to collapse at once. Almost every act of the campaign took away a percentage, from, I would not think of 10 percent, but from 6-8 pecent, which we thought of.

[Boronits] After the party let us turn to you personally.

[Petrasovits] I have taken over this party after a year of quarrels and bickerings. After this my main concern was to keep this team together at any cost, even if there are conflicts and internal misunderstandings. I think it was a mistake that I had been tolerant for too long toward certain people and groups, perhaps I should have taken a much firmer stand, although I was always thinking, and we were thinking, that this team must at any cost, by any means, get to the elections. Another mistake I made was when we did not replace the press officer, since it was obvious that a political party could not operate without a professional press editor.

[Boronits] Many people have conflicting views about your personality, you frequently and deliberately mentioned Anna Kethly, and also looked toward Margaret Thatcher, and were trying to suggest as if these two famous politicians personalities were combined in you.

[Petrasovits] We did not try to do this. I was objecting strongly and I am objecting now that I should be associated with any woman politician. I feel I have enough inner strength, political determination, commitment to social democracy to show who is Anna Petrasovits.

[Boronits] When I was coming to you today, I was asked: why do I want an interview with you, since you have already resigned. Are you considering the idea of resignation, are you thinking of finishing your political career?

[Petrasovits] That is very sweet, because it was already spread that I had committed suicide. Now, it seems, it was spread that I have resigned. But neither of them are true. What I mean is, I cannot do it now to the Social Democratic Party to run away from the hard work of the future months, years. So resignation on my part did not come into consideration.

Alleged Party Moves Denied

LD3103130190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1200 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] The Social Democratic Party of Hungary has issued a communique denying that the party leadership had offered its resignation or that Chairman Anna Petrasovits had been suspended from all her party functions. The statement points out that the national presidium, which is the only body authorized to do this, will only evaluate the showing of the Social Democrats at the elections on 1 April. The document states that certain elements of the party leadership's internal debates came to light in connection with yesterday's meeting [30 March]. Furthermore, the person who gave the news, (Vilmos Heiszler), was not even present at the meeting.

Anti-Hungarian Slanders, Demands Continue

LD3003201990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] While the interim parliament discusses the Tirgu Mures events, new anti-Hungarian slanders and demands appeared in Romania. Our correspondent, Peter Marvanyi, reports:

[Marvanyi] Obviously, it is no accident that one of the Bucharest papers, belonging to the peasant party at that, published the open letter of 158 Romanians of Maros County. They write, inter alia, that on 15 March the Hungarians celebrated the death of 40,000 Romanians, deaths that occurred in 1848. They also wrote that the driver of the Trabant in Tirgu Mures was not only Hungarian but a Hungarian citizen. What is more, they also came up with a new idea that the Hungarians would otherwise have occcupied the town hall.

Among their demands was the idea that every name, sign, and street sign should only be in Romanian; the minorities should be able to learn in the vernacular only in elementary and junior schools, and in the university they should only learn it as a foreign language. Separate schools should not be set up by any means, however. Moreover, in Maros County, the majors and their deputies should only be Romanians and since the local committee of the Unity Council could not intervene during the events in Tirgu Mures, power should be taken over by the military.

I stress that the timing is not accidental for this is the first time the interim National Unity Council has held its session since the events. This morning it has listened to the report of the government committee sent to Tirgu Mures and the abovementioned letter is addressed to this very committee.

This report did not contain many concrete things or novelties; the theme regarding outside danger and internal extremists kept cropping up again. The enquiry regarding the events is not completed yet but two more working committees were formed, one of them is to help the prosecution to find those responsible and the other will try to influence the press in the interest of more objective information. As to what this means is not quite clear. Since there are some who accuse the press for spreading unchecked rumors and others say that it does not illustrate objectively enough the bloodshed carried out by the Hungarians.

Incidentally, Karoly Kiraly, the council's vice-chairman is also present at the session. Over the past few days a rumor has spread in Bucharest that he disappeared; he only went to a spa for a few days' rest. Geza Domokos and Laszlo Tokes are also there. Today, one of the papers accused all three of them of chauvinism. According to his original plan, Tokes would have delivered his speech this morning, however, at the time of my report he has not been given leave to speak.

Horn on Current Relations With Romania

LD0104154990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0630 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Interview with Foreign Minister Gyula Horn on the "World Clock" program by unidentified reporter; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] This week there were a few more sane manifestations coming out of Bucharest, but there were incidents also. I am asking the Hungarian foreign minister: Is there some sort of hot line between the Hungarian and Romanian foreign ministries? Is there some sort of work relationship?

[Horn] Tension has not decreased significantly. Here and there the situation has become somewhat more favorable, however, the nationalist wave is still continuing. Demands regarding a greater Romania have strengthened, which means not only that the nationalists over there are demanding to have back Bessarabia too but they wish to draw the new Romanian border along the line of the Tisza [Hungary's second biggest river].

Regarding relations with the Romanian Foreign Ministry, they are only indirect. They very rarely reply to our messages and letters, we do not experience any kind of progress what so ever.

[Reporter] Beyond the borders, in Bucharest, but unfortunately, also in Prague, opinions are often voiced that certain Hungarian manifestations also stir up nationalism beyond the borders.

[Horn] I refute this categorically. There are no such manifestations in Hungary neither on behalf of the parties, nor the government. Nationalist or extremist voices can be heard occasionally on behalf of small groups, but these are insignificent.

[Reporter] Besides the anti-Hungarian words and manifestations occuring also in Czechoslovakia, what is the opinion of the Hungarian foreign minister about the concrete Prague plans regarding the introduction of possible travel restrictions, visa obligations, etc?

[Horn] Regarding the latest developments, the introduction of a visa obligation was postponed eventually, or it was taken off the agenda. As is known, economic restrictions have already been implemented and they are planned to be introduced. I understand that every state protects its own economic intersts, however, I would consider it very regrettable that in this day and age, in 1990, when we are doing everything to neutralize borders and to reduce their dividing role, economic or any other measures are brought which point in the opposite direction.

Nemeth Sends Letter to World Jewish Federation

LD3103100390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0500 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] The Hungarian premier has sent a letter to the chairman of the World Jewish Congress and assured him that the obstacles in the matter of the transportation of Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union have been removed. One such obstacle had been the general director of Malev [Hungarian airline], who has since been replaced. According to the letter from Miklos Nemeth, the decision by General Director Jahoda contradicted the intentions and policy of the Hungarian Government.

Budapest, Pretoria Representation Offices To Open

LD3003222990 Budapest MTI in English 2207 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 31 (MTI)—The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Hungary and the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of South Africa have agreed to shortly open, reciprocally, permanent representations (interest representation offices) in Budapest and Pretoria.

Several circumstances press for the creation of institutional relations between the two countries. About 20,000 Hungarians live in the Republic of South Africa, and thousands of Hungarian citizens have applied in the past weeks—in spite of the warning information issued by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry—to accept work in the

Republic of South Africa. It must be ensured that these citizens be able, if need be, to turn to representatives of the Hungarian Government.

EC Grants Restructuring Loan

LD3003183490 Budapest MTI in English 1325 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Brussels, March 30 (MTI)—The documents of the $1,000 million loan granted to promote restructuring in Hungary by the European Community were signed at the EC's headquarters in Brussels on March 30.

The first, $440 million tranche of the loan worth 870 million European currency units is to reach the National Bank of Hungary in two weeks' time to furnish a direct international financial background for the change in government.

The documents of the credit transaction, unrivalled in the EC's history, were signed on behalf of the EC commission by deputy chairman responsible for financial affairs, Henning Christophersen, and Karel Van Miert, commission member in charge of the service which organized the transactions. On Hungary's part, they were initialled by Laszlo Bekesi, minister of finance, and Dr Ferenc Bartha, president of the National Bank.

Mr Christophersen said Hungary was the first non-member country to receive such a loan from the commission, which wishes to promote economic restructuring and reform in the country.

Karel van Miert, Belgian member of the commission, pointed out that the Belgian finance minister was the official initiator of the credit operation.

Laszlo Bekesi expressed his gratitude for the loan, and Dr Ferenc Bartha outlined in brief the country's economic position and assured the partners of Hungary's intention to remain a reliable debtor.

Italian Foreign Minister Arrives for Meetings

LD3003230590 Budapest MTI in English 2153 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 30 (MTI)—Gianni de Michelis, foreign minister of the Italian Republic, arrived in Budapest on Friday evening for a working visit, at the invitation of Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn. Shortly after his arrival, Mr De Michelis began talks with his host.

According to MTI's information, the foreign ministerial conference focused on four current international political issues.

The foreign ministers first exchanged views on the Bratislava summit scheduled for April 8-9, to be attended by state and governmental leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Invitations were also extended to Austrian and Italian politicians.

The Italian side attaches major importance to the Bratislava meeting, as it holds it to be a forum at which leaders of the central European states can hold thorough debate on the developments in the region, and on the development of European integration in the broader perspective. The heightened Italian interest is also indicated by the fact that Italian diplomacy would like to focus the interest of the various common market forums on the developments of the central European region in a greater degree than so far.

In connection with the Bratislava meeting, Mr Horn raised, in a very firm manner, that one of the delicate problems of the central European region is the situation of Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries. The Hungarian foreign minister called his guest's attention to the fact that the West contributes to solving this problem practically with words only, yet it remains passive when it should raise its voice against concrete issues. For instance, such a situation came about regarding the chauvinistic actions carried out against the Hungarians in Translyvania, during the bloody events in Trigu Mures. It would be particularly expected that such prestigious organizations of European integration as, for instance, the European communities, and the Council of Europe, which have placed the protection of human rights on their banner, to protest against such atrocities. The fact that the situation of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia is becoming increasingly more delicate is an unfavourable development.

According to the Hungarian foreign minister's position, the Bratislava summit planned for April has significance if the gunuine, threatening problems of the region are also discussed. There would hardly be any point to the Hungarian participation if the Bratislava summit would not discuss the political practice that afflicts the Hungarians. In spite of this, Hungary is ready to consider its participation at the meeting in case the forum is to discuss not merely general issues, but will also deal with concrete practical problems, namely the rights of the minorities.

The foreign ministers also discussed the standing of the Open Skies conference. In this context, both sides stressed it is important for the conference to lead to success, as this would give a boost also to the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe.

Foreign Minister De Michelis particularly stressed the importance of the Italian-Austrian-Hungarian-Yugoslav four-sided cooperation. Hungary has accepted the role of coordinator in this cooperation. According to Mr De Michelis, it would be very important for this coordinating activity to be fully enforced in the Hungarian transition after the elections. Foreign ministers of the concerned countries are to next exchange views on issues of the four-sided cooperation in Vienna on May 20.

Discussions were also held about the issue of cooperation within the CMEA. The Hungarian foreign minister was of the opinion that it is almost impossible to reform the CMEA organization. In the past years, Hungarian diplomacy has made various proposals on numerous occasions for the reform of the CMEA, however, there was practically no reaction to the motions. In view of this, only two possibilities arise: either to begin a radical reform, cooperating with the countries that accept this, or to dissolve the CMEA cooperation.

In the evening, Mr De Michelis met with leaders of the Hungarian political parties at a gala dinner hosted in his honour by the Italian Embassy in Budapest.

Commentary Views Lithuanian-Soviet Situation

AU0204104390 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Mar 90 p 1

[Leon Bojko commentary]

[Text] The question of Lithuanian independence arouses great emotions in Poland with full understanding given to the rights and aspirations of the Lithuanian nation.

What is more important, the right of all Soviet republics for independence and full sovereignty is recognized by Moscow (but obviously not by everyone). It is recognized in practice and not just in theory. However, the way the nations and republics go about exercising this right cannot be a matter of total indifference to Moscow.

For Moscow, the way that Lithuania has chosen to exercise its right is a disaster. Although, at the same time, it is quite obvious that there exists a need to dismantle the empire and reconstruct relations between nations on new principles.

The reformers in Moscow want a civilized, peaceful, and lawful perestroyka.

The attempt to change the Soviet Union from a party state into a state that will be subject to the rule of law is an undertaking of the utmost difficulty. In the party this process has many enemies.

According to the reformers, a peaceful perestroyka within the law, gives everyone, including other Baltic nations, a great opportunity. Independence is possible and feasible within the ongoing attempts to create a new form of agreement that would be applicable throughout the Soviet Union. In this context, the term "Finlandization" has been used in relation to the Baltic Republics.

The Lithuanian declaration of independence has put the reform groups in a difficult situation. All those who are against perestroyka, let alone against what has happened in Lithuania, have been given more ammunition.

There have been increasing demands to use force, to introduce a state of emergency or presidential decree, in Lithuania. We know what sort of tragedy the implementation of any of these would provoke. It would be a catastrophe not just for the Lithuanians, but for the whole process of perestroyka in the Soviet Union.

For the time being, Gorbachev has very limited room for maneuvering. Lithuania has proclaimed independence and the Congress of Peoples Deputies has stated that the decisions taken by the Lithuanian Parliament are unlawful. Lithuania is demanding that Moscow begin talks with the representatives of a sovereign and independent state. Gorbachev is willing to talk, but with representatives of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. He is ready to talk about everything, including the extent of Lithuanian sovereignty; namely, a republic that is still within the framework of the Soviet Union.

At the present moment there is precious little room for political maneuvering between Lithuania and Moscow. Somebody will have to give way and that initial step will be extremely difficult for whoever takes it first.

The application of "extreme" solutions in Lithuania would mean a return to the old policies, and not just in relation to one nation. Polish public opinion would react negatively and unequivocally to any such moves, and would interpret them as signalling the abandonment of current Soviet policy, of which its internal policy is just one aspect.

Warsaw Radio Reports Lithuanian Situation

LD3103111690 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1005 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Worrisome reports came in from Lithuania last night. Maria Wiernickowska reports.

[Begin Wiernickowska recording] During the night, 50 soldiers strengthened protection—as their commander put it—of the Press House. The papers, practically ready at the time, appeared as normal at kiosks in the morning. The question is: What will happen to the press in two days' time? The Press House, where the majority of the printed word comes from, is the third building—after the prosecutor's office and the Party Historical Institute, which is in fact the archive of most recent history—to have been occupied by troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry.

Gorbachev promises that he will not use force, as long as he is not given serious reasons for doing so, was the explanation given to me a few hours ago by Kazimieras Motieka, number two in the Lithuanian state; but because everything is developing calmly, attempts are being made to destroy us in a different way, he said. This is an attempt to smash us without the troops, was the assessment of the situation by (?an) eminent lawyer after Moscow sent its own prosecutor here. If it comes to the use of force, Gorbachev will then say: it's not us; it's the prosecutor who had to protect the law in the republic. For the time being, Moscow is taking small steps. Observers talk of a repeat of the Baku scenario without the blood. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Sejm Speaker Kozakiewicz Concludes Belgian Visit

LD2803201190 Warsaw PAP in English 1910 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Brussels, March 28—On the last day of his visit to Belgium, Sejm (lower house) Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz met today with Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Peter Corterier and was received by King of the Belgians Baudouin at one-and-half hour audience.

The talk in the parliamentary assembly concerned, among other things, the problem of Soviet troops' presence in Poland, the future of the Warsaw Treaty, and cooperation between the NATO assembly and the Polish parliament, already initiated.

Corterier opined that there is still a great deal of prejudice on both sides, that the old concept of the enemy is still alive. In his opinion, participation of Polish parliamentarians in seminars organized by the NATO assembly might help overcome these prejudices.

He also tried to appease Polish fears connected with the ambiguous stand of Bonn on the Polish western border arguing that "Germany has changed."

"We met with great sympathy everywhere," Mikolaj Kozakiewicz summed up the visit. "I was surprised at the great knowledge of our realities on the part of our interlocutors."

"I was struck," he continued, "by numerous reservations to Balcerowicz's plan and by fears about the future of Polish agriculture. I must also underline political and courteous initiative by leader of the House of Representatives Charles Ferdinand Nothomb who made representatives of all parties work out a draft resolution on Poland.

"The draft contains support for our efforts to alleviate the debt problem, gain membership in the Council of Europe and association with the EC as well as guarantees for borders," Mikolaj Kozakiewicz stated.

Government Stance on 4-Plus-2 Talks Gets Support

Chief Spanish Diplomat Gives Support

LD3103143590 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1200 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Spain supports Poland's participation in the four-plus-two conference, our country's membership in the Council of Europe, and also Poland's signing of an agreement on associations with the EEC, the head of Spanish diplomacy, Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez said at a news conference in Warsaw. He also said Spain will earmark $200 million [as heard] of easy credit for the expansion of bilateral trade with Poland.

Soviet Ambassador Conveys Backing

LD3103202290 Warsaw PAP in English 1939 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 31—Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki here today received Soviet Ambassador to Poland Vladimir Brovikov, who conveyed to him a reply from President Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov to Mazowiecki's letter in which the Soviet leaders support Poland's participation in the part of the "2 Plus 4" conference relating to matters which pertain to this country.

Foreign Ministry Vows To Oppose Terrorism

LD3103142890 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1400 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] In connection with the attack carried out in Beirut yesterday on the married couple Bogdan and Ewa Serkis, the Foreign Affairs Ministry has strongly condemned this act of terrorism. In a published declaration, it was stressed that Poland will make every effort to oppose terrorism. Abroad, and particularly in places of potential danger, the ministry has taken steps aimed at ensuring greater protection of its establishments and other offices and centers in which Polish representatives are employed.

SdRP Head Protests 'Distortion' of War History

LD3103181390 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Leszek Miller, general secretary of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], has ascertained that FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed expectations in a statement made in London of a Polish apology. In Kohl's opinion, it is our nation which conducted an armed invasion on the Third Reich and was the perpetrator of the misfortunes which befell its citizens. The SdRP protests in the strongest terms against this type of historical distortion. It decidedly opposes the placing of victims, criminals, aggressors, and those invaded on the same plane. The building of new relations between Poles and Germans should not begin either with the falsification of history, or with the suspicion that our nation suffers from a lack of memory, states the declaration.

Mazowiecki on German Unification

LD3103203990 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Our reporter has mentioned here that during the meeting of the Citizens' Committee, the issue of German unification was also discussed. This report can be extended. I shall quote Premier Mazowiecki who said that the great issue facing us, and which has united Poles living in Poland and all over the world, concerns Poland's participation in the unification of Germany. We have had some success in this respect. However, it will not be either simple or easy to bring this matter to a final solution. The premier said that the future constitution of the united German state should contain a statement that this state would not have any territorial claims on anyone. It certainly is an internal matter of the Germans' but it also is a matter of security for their neighbors, Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki said.

Walesa Interview on Solidarity's Political Power

PM0204092690 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 27 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Lech Walesa, chairman of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity, by POLITYKA reporters Jerzy Baczynski and Marian Turski on 11 January; place not given]

[Text] [POLITYKA] A year ago in an interview with POLITYKA you said that at least 30 years would have to pass before the power system could change in Poland. This was shortly after your televised meeting with Alfred Miodowicz, when the initial preparations for the roundtable debate suffered a temporary setback. At that time you encouraged the government to work out a compromise with Solidarity. Now Solidarity is in power. Were you also surprised by the speed of the changes in Poland?

[Walesa] I maintain even today that 30 years is not too long a period for a real, definitive abandonment of the old system. We have not won the battle yet. If we follow the path that we are suggesting, the system is almost unreformable, and certainly it would be extremely difficult to reform. Each change brings with it new difficulties, especially economic difficulties: The further you go into the woods, the more trees there are. We believe today that we have the power—and we are very happy about it. Well, what of it? Our predecessors also had the power—and look how quickly they lost it. The new power system must become gradually more stable, establish its economic foundations, and replace its the old personnel... It is as if we were in charge of a massive flywheel, which used to turn to the left but which we now want to turn to the right. For the time being all we have done is stop it; it is going to be very difficult to get it moving again—but in the opposite direction.

[POLITYKA] But it was you who decided that Solidarity should assume responsibility for governing the country. Do you still consider that decision correct?.

[Walesa] I still believe that the decision was incorrect in terms of logical and practical calculations, but nevertheless inevitable. If we treated politics only as a game, it would not be worth our while to accept power. We had no personnel, no programs; we were simply unprepared. In the West the transfer of power is a very smooth operation: They have their shadow cabinets and everything else they need. We were forced to act by circumstances.

[POLITYKA] Jaroslaw Kaczynski [TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC chief editor] disclosed recently that when, during a session of the National Executive Commission [KKW]—I think it was 8 June—he raised the question of Solidarity's seeking to form a new coalition and replace the government, this resulted in an argument in which he was opposed by, among others, Bronislaw Geremek and—to a lesser extent—Jacek Kuron...

[Walesa] There were many opponents of this idea, but after the presidential elections a mistake was made when the post of premier was entrusted to General Kiszczak. I have much respect for General Kiszczak, and I even saw him in the role of president, but only if there was just one general at the top: either the one or the other. We could not agree to have two generals there. The public would not have accepted it. My idea was different: to keep the roundtable agreements in force and prepare for free elections over the next four years. This did not work out: I seldom do what I want—mostly I do what I must. The reaction from the public was as follows: We voted for you, so you should be the ones to assume power.

[POLITYKA] In this connection could you tell us whether, in your opinion, the roundtable agreements are still in force?

[Walesa] They are in force, but they must be interpreted differently. Even the Holy Bible was interpreted differently a thousand years ago, then differently again five hundred years ago, and is again interpreted differently today. When we sat together at the roundtable debate the situation was different, and so were our options. Now we have moved forward as regards the chances of the reforms, the public's expectations, and the economic circumstances. Let me say this again: I am concerned with practicalities. Yesterday, for example, I came under fierce attack during a shipyard meeting. I was charged with having a house and a car, and with being able to afford many things that others cannot have, especially the younger generation. This should be taken into consideration. No one should ignore or treat lightly the moods and the expectations of the people: not I, nor anyone else. Consequently the roundtable debate is still important as a concept of an agreement and compact between different forces, made for the sake of reforming Poland. We now have new political, generational, and economic configurations; but we still need an agreement—except that it must be an agreement between the forces which count today.

[POLITYKA] To put it more precisely, which decisions made in the roundtable agreement should be kept, and which now belong to the realm of history?

[Walesa] Today different people would have sat down to the roundtable conference, because the political configuration of forces has changed. But the concept of the roundtable conference must be preserved: the idea that it is vitally necessary for all forces to reach agreement.

[POLITYKA] Over the past 200 years all the changes of our political system have been accompanied by terror, revanchism, and extraordinary tribunals. We understand that you wanted to avoid all that. Do you still believe that it is possible to carry out a peaceful, non-violent revolution ?

[Walesa] So far we have been successful. I do not know how things will go in the future. I would like to avoid a reckoning and an issuing of verdicts on the past 40 years. I would like to see that period closed. But how can this be done if the party is launching its own defense? This party carries a great burden of responsibility for the past. I would like to close this period without humiliating anyone. It should be dealt with by historians and no one else. But let some new people come forward now: people with credibility who would turn a new page for the Polish left so that it would be no longer be associated with the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] and that whole period. A strong left wing camp is needed in Poland because things would be dreadful with the right wing camp alone.

[POLITYKA] Is Lech Walesa advocating a strong left wing party?

[Walesa] I have been saying this for a long time: Things will be really bad without a left wing camp. It is not a good position if you stand on one leg only. We need socialists, social democrats, and even radical parties in Poland as much as we need Christian or national parties. I would like to build such a left wing orientation. If Fiszbach or, say, someone who takes a similar position, creates a left wing party of this type in Poland, then people will say: This is all right; he does not need to be a believer; he supports the left wing orientation, which wanted an agreement, and has no guilty conscience. So far I have kept the fight against the party in check, waiting to see how it would change after its congress.

[POLITYKA] Did you say all this to Rakowski?

[Walesa] No. Wise people should read my meaning... I personally like Rakowski: He has leadership qualities and alot of self-assurance, but he must understand that he is disliked. Our meeting has demonstrated this clearly: I am being criticized for having met with Rakowski.

[POLITYKA] Would this indicate that the new left wing camp—that is, whatever is set up after the PZPR is disbanded—should obtain a license from Lech Walesa?

[Walesa] If they still adhere to their PZPR past, it will be difficult to cooperate with them. If they distance themselves from it, they will be able to build up a new position for themselves and restore their credibility. Just as Solidarity has built up its present position. Even though people are already beginning to blame us for various things, they are not doing it too strongly. I really appreciate what Rakowski has done, but I am also attacked for certain things that did not come out well regardless of all the good things that I have done... This is just people's way of thinking...

[POLITYKA] Do you agree with this way of thinking?

[Walesa] You are quite right, it should not be so, but it is so nevertheless.

[POLITYKA] Do you see yourself in the left wing camp?

[Walesa] I do not feel my place is on the left, but I very much dislike this Polish wavering: One moment we look to the East, the next to the West. One moment we insist that society as a whole has adopted the left wing, socialist position, and the next moment this turns out to have been wrong and we take a big leap to the right. I would like to put an end to it. In other words: Let us be ourselves. The Polish public entertains quite a few left wing notions: Truly, it does, and these leftist notions should be given a chance. So that there should be a left wing camp, a center group, and a right wing camp in our society, so that they will not try to bring one another to their knees...

[POLITYKA] Where do you place yourself?

[Walesa] As soon as a proper balance of political forces is created in Poland I will... escape into my private life. For the time being I would like to see us gain our balance.

[POLITYKA] What about the Solidarity union? Where do you place it? On the left or the right?

[Walesa] No, no, the union should remain a trade union, and left or right orientations should be handled by the parties and similar bodies. The trouble is that at the moment the parliamentary system is not very strong... The party is blocking all my movements.

[POLITYKA] Do you mean the PZPR?

[Walesa] Yes. I cannot make my next move without the party making its move first. The place and the role of the future left will depend on this. For the time being I have to fight off attacks from the right. So that they do not overwhelm the left altogether, so that some balance is maintained... I would like to see both the left and the right permitted to act in carefully measured doses. The weaker movement should be assisted in case it becomes dominated by its opponents. This is why I said that an unclear situation in the party was blocking my moves, because unless the left consolidates its positions firmly we will veer strongly to the right. If the party's left wing fails to achieve this, then Solidarity's left wing will have to assume its role. This is why I say that I am waiting for the party's move.

[POLITYKA] Why do you stress so strongly that you are waiting for it?

[Walesa] Because I want parties to be parties, and I want the trade union to restrict its activity to trade union matters exclusively: to making claims and demands.

[POLITYKA] Would you prefer to be in the position of the National Trade Union Alliance [OPZZ] now?

[Walesa] Today I would. All the same, if I were an OPZZ man, I would still support the government, because we can never improve the country's situation unless we rearrange the economy. I hope that we can sort out our internal, union matters before our Solidarity congress in April.

[POLITYKA] You declared publicly that you were not working on an expansion of the union, because that would be inadvisable in the present circumstances. This is quite startling, is it not?

[Walesa] It is a very simple philosophy: not to build too strong a union until firm economic decisions are made and their results begin to appear—or we will destroy ourselves. However, on the other hand, a strong but prudent union could make the pressure for reforms much more effective. In this way I come round to my original thought: When the party makes its move, the union can limit the range and scope of its activity.

[POLITYKA] Have we understood your thesis correctly: that the emergent left should partly take over and assume the defense of the working people's interests?

[Walesa] Yes, you have.

[POLITYKA] Do you perceive the Solidarity union as a part of the left? In Britain, for example, the trade unions are largely reinforcing the Labor Party ranks.

[Walesa] No, I would not want that here. I would not want the trade unions to stage strikes in support of the interests of a political party.

[POLITYKA] So what should Solidarity represent in the end? What place do you see for it?

[Walesa] For the moment Solidarity is a reform-promoting movement and it will remain so for a long time. A reform-promoting movement that stands in confrontation with existing political parties. When the party cleanses itself, so to speak, the confrontation period will come to an end.

[POLITYKA] A year ago you expected to see Solidarity grow in numbers much more than it has; you thought that the influx of members would be much greater.

[Walesa] No. Logical thinking tells us to build up the economy first, and a strong trade union movement—which would make claims and formulate demands—later. This is why I would like you to note that whenever I have gone on a promotional tour, it was to assist the Sejm and Senate election campaign and not to build up the union. In any case, how would we have benefited today from having ten million members in the union if our first and most pressing objective is to achieve a complete restructuring of the Polish economy? Such major enterprises as large factories, steelworks, or shipyards should be broken up into smaller units. Would a large and powerful trade union permit this? According to my own blueprint for Poland's economy, we should find partners with foreign capital to handle those giant enterprises set up by the socialist system. Half of these giants will collapse, and the other half will survive. Something like 60 percent, however, of Poland's economy should be represented by small enterprises, such as bakeries, butchers, television repairs, locksmiths, and so on. The new economic model will require a new type of trade union, with small structures numbering several persons per individual union cell. 40 percent of Poles will stay in the old model...

[POLITYKA] Your words seem to confirm the hypothesis that the Solidarity union somehow cannot find a place for itself in the new reality.

[Walesa] If I were Jurczyk, or Rulewski, I would find such a place straight away.

[POLITYKA] What answers do you give when, during your meetings with the public—such as yesterday's meeting at the shipyard—you are confronted with complaints that we have Western-type prices and Eastern-type pay?

[Walesa] Of course, I hear such complaints every day. I answer as follows: I am just as angry as you are; you are absolutely right, but tell us how to change this state of affairs. I tell them: The public demands that our borders be opened—but what do they say when a rich uncle from the States comes to visit them with his wad of greenbacks? He earns nearly a hundred dollars a day there, whereas life here costs him only one or two bucks a day. So what is the solution? You too could be paid as much as people are paid in the West, but where do we find the money for it today? So what do you want us to do? Start a civil war? And I tell them: The economic system should force us to work more effectively, not as we are used to working. Will this do the trick? I have been persuaded that it would and that we could already see the first results in three months or so. Of course, it will not be the same as in the States, but there will be a visible improvement in the economy. So we must steel ourselves to endure things in the next few months. I keep telling the government in general and Balcerowicz in particular: If this does not work, I will go back to the shipyard, leap over the fence again, and start everything anew from square one. You can start choosing a new premier and new ministers so I can appoint them... But for the time being those demagogues who are booing out there can tell us how to do things differently."

[POLITYKA] When you were in Britain you said that no one in Poland cares about capitalism or socialism today. What they seek is an effective and efficient socioeconomic system. How do you envisage a further evolution of the system?

[Walesa] ...At present all we have done is erect the scaffolding in Poland. We do not yet know what color the building will be, we do not yet know what we are doing. This is the present situation...

[POLITYKA] But I would like to cite the opinion of a rank and file Solidarity member—the opinion of an economist and intellectual, presented at a Warsaw University's Solidarity meeting. According to the academic in question, the strategic objective for the Balcerowicz team is not just to establish a market economy in Poland, nor even to introduce a mixed economy, but to establish a capitalist economy. This thesis was intended not even as a political and ideological accusation, but as a call for a clear realization that—to quote—the government in its present composition; that is, with the Balcerowicz team responsible for the economy, is one whose objective is to do away with all the structures and mechanisms of a socialist nature and to restore capitalism in Poland. What do you think of it?

[Walesa] I would even say that this man is right. But in my opinion this strategy could represent a real threat in the forties, when the level of social consciousness was low. But today no one will be duped as easily as that—especially not the younger generation. Today we must think in terms appropriate to the end of the twentieth century. People have computers and can quickly calculate on them what is to their disadvantage in both capitalism and socialism, and what is to their advantage—and common sense will prevail. The worst time for us is now, during the transition period, when it is very easy to disseminate demagogic slogans... I think the man you cited just now does not know today's younger generation. I think even Balcerowicz does not know them, whereas I spent 25 years of my life working at the grassroots level. I think people will pursue what is to their advantage. A man will run a service store with his wife and son, and they will all calculate their costs and profits. This will be the nature of the capitalist system here. I am convinced that the majority of enterprises in Poland will be small-scale businesses. I hope it will not be the kind of 18th or 19th century capitalism, with its giant, inhuman industries of that period, which we fear so much.

[POLITYKA] Let us now consider the immediate future. Presumably a new class will emerge: production organizers and the owners of the means of production. Let us call a spade a spade: It will be a new class of capitalists. It will most likely be composed one-third of owners of foreign capital; one-third of domestic manufacturers, craftsmen, urban and rural producers, commercial dealers and... profiteers; and the remaining third of the incumbents of the old and new nomenklatura system. How do you see it?

[Walesa] You are probably right. The problem is that there is no other way. I set my hopes on what I have already discussed here: on the fact that today, in the computer age, people will be able to work out for themselves what is to their advantage and what is to their disadvantage.

[POLITYKA] Some people say—and you have confirmed this yourself—that the transition to the new system and the implementation of the reform can only be effected if we apply "strong-arm techniques." The name of Lech Walesa is immediately invoked, carrying with it an image of a man of destiny with the magnitude of a Marshal Pilsudski...

[Walesa] ...God forbid...

[POLITYKA] Here is an excerpt from a letter typical of many we receive here at POLITYKA: "In his capacity as a one-man, extra-constitutional focus of political power, Lech Walesa's role is akin to that which was once the prerogative of the [PZPR] Central Committee." How do you feel in this role?

[Walesa] Extremely uncomfortable. It does not please me. I feel tired and I do not want to play this role. Such a role is contrary to my nature... Gentlemen, why else would a man refuse to accept the function of premier? In my case, there was even a majority vote proposing me for premier, but I simply did not want it. Do you think I was afraid? I was not! It was because I believed I ought to keep back as a reservist...

At the moment I want to persuade the public—just as I myself was persuaded—that we must be patient and bear up under the hardships. If this attitude turns out to be wrong, we will fight together again. There is one thing I want to stress here: Even if it turns out that the present government has taken too much from the public—in withdrawn subsidies, for example—I am certain that this government will not squander the money. At the right time it will ask the public what they think this money should be spent on. Perhaps it will give it back to people directly in the form of a bonus monthly wage, or several bonus monthly wages. The public should place its trust in the government. Gentlemen, please write and tell the people that this government will not defraud a single cent and that if it did take away too much, it will return it all scrupulously one day. It is very likely that it has taken too much now, but this is inevitable if we are to implement reforms, stabilize prices, and hitch up to the Western economic system. Otherwise our goods would enter Western markets at half price. The public should understand this if it really wants to put our economy on its feet again.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for talking to us.

Newspaper Discusses Role, Future of Miltia

PM3003154690 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 10 Feb 90 p 6

[Marek Luty article: "Back to Society"]

[Text] For some time now we have been reading articles that assess the state of public safety and order in Poland and the effectiveness of militia work. After many years the barrier of silence has been broken. The wave of contributions has included both critical and objective articles and a heap of abuse and libelous material belying press ethics. My attempts to find among these articles the voice of the Civic Militia [MO] officers who work directly on the militia-citizen front have proved futile. The press spokesman of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] and the MO Main Headquarters are also reticent on the subject. Consequently, instead of a discussion—or perhaps a dialogue—we have a monologue about the militia conducted over their heads.

This is why I would like to present a few reflections on the subject of the functioning of the militia force in Poland, based on the stormy discussions taking place within our community. The fundamental problem in these discussions is concern for the efficient functioning of the crime fighting and prevention apparatus and for the introduction of institutional changes which would prevent the use of the policing apparatus for other purposes.

We are now facing two interrelated phenomena. On the one hand there is the condition of collapse in detection and investigative work of basic level MO bodies, and on the other a total lack of confidence in, and denial of, the results of the militia's work on the part of the general public. We may disagree with this denial and consider it unfair. But we cannot alter the fact that the majority of the public are very critical of the organization and the results of the militia's work.

This is why there is growing pressure and increasing expectations, both from the public and the officers themselves, for reforms in the militia.

Reflections on the future operation and organization of the law and order bodies include the following demands: to depoliticize the sector (Lieutenant-General Z. Trzcinski, chief commander of the MO, believes that the term "departisanize" would be more appropriate here); to separate the Militia from the Security Service; to reduce staffing at the top by transferring men and resources to basic-level units; to increase pay; and so on.

Why We Associate the Militia With the Authorities

The demands listed above are undoubtedly justified, but at times they are too superficial and too generalized. For example, no one will make me believe that a member or sympathizer of any given political party can become a totally apolitical person on the strength of a legislative act and that his world view and political orientation will have no effect whatsoever on his work.

Reducing the number of officers at the central levels of the MSW and the MO Main Headquarters and transferring them to basic-level units would in effect be a short-term propaganda move.

With all due respect to my colleagues in more exalted positions, I must judge their usefulness for work conducted directly in the field insufficient. And I would prefer not to discuss pay raises at all.

Bringing the militia closer to the public and improving its credibility are, in my opinion, the pivotal points and the primary objectives of the necessary institutional changes. The whole post-war period was devoted to a policy of methodically increasing the secrecy surrounding the law and order bodies and setting them above and against the public. How else are we to interpret the fact that until 1983 the fundamental regulatory act governing the scope of the work and operation of the Civic Militia consisted of a little-known decree of 22 December 1955 on the organization and scope of operations of the MO? (For the benefit of those not versed in the finer points of the legal terminology, let me explain that decrees are passed by the Council of State and not by parliament.) This means that during almost the entire lifetime of the Polish People's Republic the militia were to all intents and purposes exempt from any form of public control. I shall leave aside here the symbolic supervision by the people's councils, since the extent and effects of this supervision were negligible and practically illusory.

The only effective apparatus which controlled the work of the militia was that of Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] organizational structures.

Large numbers of misdemeanors, crimes, and instances of serious and organized misappropriation of public property committed by people whose connections and membership guaranteed them complete impunity were regularly covered up in the name of "higher political reasons."

Gradually the public order bodies became transformed into yet another link which duplicated the operation of state administration. The militia began to concern itself with the legality of trade operations (alongside the State Trade Inspectorate), the observance of sanitary regulations (alongside the Hygiene and Epidemiological Inspectorate), tax regulations (alongside the Treasury Chambers), and so on, and so forth. At present the militia replaces, relieves, or assists more than 30 various state institutions in their work (including the Post Office in the delivery of court and prosecutors' summonses).

This omnipotence created the illusion that the militia were everywhere and regarded everything as their business, but at the same time their duty to detect crime and safeguard citizens' safety was relegated to the position of just another of their many basic tasks and not even a crucially important one.

Let us add here that the authorities frequently came up with all kinds of rather unfortunate ideas and frequently reversed their previously announced decisions. But public discontent always came to rest with the militia as the executor of these decisions. People began to identify this firmly with the authorities, and this identification concerned first and foremost all that was bad and incompetent within the authorities.

The Image of a Militiaman

Another result of the alienation and secrecy which surrounded the work of the MO were the public ideas about officers' pay, perks, and influence. Right to this day the view prevails of on-the-spot provision of housing, preferential car allocation, special stores carrying goods at reduced prices, high earnings, total impunity, and so on.

The popular image of a militiaman has been built up on the basis of invective, whispered propaganda, hearsay, and isolated incidents, and these combined to project a standard picture of a brutal and aggressive individual, a dim alcoholic who revels in abusing his powers and is totally corrupt. This model serves as a focus for the universal hostility and public resistance to the authorities, their errors, and their arrogance.

This deep-rooted, often virtually subconscious identification of the militia with the now abolished social order is the reason why militia officers are automatically classified as belonging to the category of suspects or enemies. This is why the demagogic insults fired at the militia by editor E. Skalski—who talks about "fat bulls who lounge about in militia stations and are too lazy to come out into the field"—or the crude lampoons by J. Fedorowicz elicit more eager public response than rational arguments citing the catastrophic shortages of manpower and technical resources. It is always easier to believe in someone's ill will than in his genuine inability to act effectively.

We must fight to win public approval of our work and our profession—and this is not because we are annoyed by the insults and invectives. Without such public approval it is simply impossible to carry out our regular work or make it effective. And the lack of effectiveness of militia work causes the crime rate to snowball. Unless the intervening officers can count on active assistance and support from citizens, criminals will rule unchallenged in our streets.

However, neither the Sejm nor the Senate can decree that from the moment a State Police is set up we must all fall in love with that institution. The process of restoring public confidence in the law and order forces is going to be a lengthy business. The most important thing is to provide the kind of structural framework which would on the one hand guarantee full public control over the work of of the public order bodies and on the other give the officers a realization of their serving role in relation to a certain regional or local community with which they must be able to identify.

A Vote of Acceptance for the Commander

I believe that the bodies entrusted with maintenance of public order should operate in a dual subordination system. In addition to a maintained structure of internal hierarchy, the work of the local units should be subject to continuing appraisal by parish, district, municipal, and voivodship people's councils. An annual vote of confidence in the head of the local militia organization would provide for an assessment of the levels of order and safety in the relevant region.

Several other requirements would follow from the dual subordination system set up for the militia.

—The only criterion for assessing the work of militia officers would be their results in the field of ensuring public peace and order. At present the assessment of the work of an officer or a unit as a whole amounts to a mechanical adding-up of several dozen formal indicators—for example, the number of persons fined; the number of cases forwarded to misdemeanor courts; or the number of persons whose documents were checked—which makes the reporting procedure system in the Polish militia one of the most complex and cumbersome in the world.

—Middle- and basic-level militia units must be given much greater independence and freedom of action. The present system of the sector's operation, which has become virtually fossilized over the years, amounts to scrupulous and detailed supervision of the work of every cell in the country in accordance with the rigid patterns and procedures, which takes no notice of the natural differences and varying specifics of the particular units. This system stifles initiative and leads to situations where many heads of units do not want to, cannot, or do not know how to make independent decisions and are reduced to awaiting guidelines from above.

—The work of local militia bodies should be financed in part from the local budgets. This would make it possible to employ more militiamen in areas where crime is particularly high, or increase pay in those cities where vacancies in other sectors accompanied by attractive pay cause an outflow of manpower from MO units. The fact that, when assessing the militia's work and its effectiveness, councillors would also have to take into account the proportional level of this effectiveness and its ratio to the level of outlay invested in it, would also constitute an important psychological consideration.

—In view of the introduction of the new, independent public supervision system, the inspection and supervisory functions assumed by central-level militia units could be reduced. The inflated reporting procedures and hyperbureaucratic system of supervision have resulted in some 50 percent of the officers in the operational directorates of the MO Headquarters (Prevention, Investigation, and Criminal) being permanently or periodically involved in the inspection of the subordinate units instead of dealing only with coordination of and assistance in the operations at the lower levels.

The guiding principle of the proposed changes is of a uniform nature. The public have to be persuaded that the law and order officers are working for their good rather than against them. The public must be fully informed both about the militia's successes and about its difficulties. For their part, officers must be aware that they have ceased to act in the interests of the state and must begin instead to act in the interests of the citizens and in defense of their rights.

Today the rank and file officers perceive the militia as an inert mechanism that does not keep pace with the development of events. We anxiously await the announced reforms in the MO; those introduced so far have brought results opposite to what was expected. Let me just mention here that it was the dissolution of the MO District Headquarters in connection with the 1975 change in the number of voivodships which resulted in the destruction of a system of efficiently and effectively functioning units.

Although the 1983 reform restored the former structure (with certain modifications), in practical terms it incapacitated the militia by removing this term from the names of the former district, municipal, and voivodship headquarters. That reform largely obliterated the differences between the work of the Security Service [SB] and the MO, which in practice meant that the militia were involved in the implementation of tasks which previously had belonged exclusively to the SB.

I should also list here such "invaluable" reform initiatives as the compulsory surrender of a number of militia vehicles and telephones or the setting up of model farms in Suwalki and in the Bieszczady region through the efforts of the internal affairs sector.

The vehicles and telephones were handed over to "the public." It was also in the name of public interest that officers installed telephone networks in Krakow and in Warsaw.

Actions of this kind by the leadership of the sector were regarded as bordering on the subversive.

No one can persuade me that employment of several hundred MO and MSW officers in the fields of a state agricultural farm produced any tangible effect in improving order and safety.

The expansion of the telephone network has brought political glamor to certain persons, but at the same time it damaged their standing in the eyes of the officers who have to continue using the sector's old and dilapidated switchboards and who have no vehicles in which to chase escaping criminals.

Reform's Empty Gestures

This is why we are now watching the current reform actions of the MSW with much anxiety and concern.

Our anxiety is due to the fact that there are no MO officers from basic-level units among the persons who review the draft changes. I believe that no one knows the intricacies and the highly specialized nature of this service better than those working on the ground.

Nor is the speed of the reform especially staggering. Deputy Premier Balcerowicz managed to prepare a package of acts designed to entirely change the economy in just one month. In the presence of a snowballing crime rate and a growing crisis within the MO, the MSW is still not producing any sensible plan, while at the same time issuing warnings through its press spokesman that you cannot hurry a reform in the militia force.

On the contrary, we must hurry! The spontaneous process of forming new trade unions, the unrest and anxiety in the militia community, and the forcing of personnel changes are all manifestations of a decline in the standing of the central MO authorities in the eyes of the rank and file employees. And I doubt that I need to convince anyone of the importance of the position of superior officers in a paramilitary organization such as the MO.

I am inclined to regard the demonstration staged by our colleagues from Gdansk and Piekary Slaskie as a kind of vote of no confidence against the continuing procrastination and inertia manifested by the sector in matters of vital importance to officers. How else can they behave, knowing that we are all served a diet of makeshift illusory activity, evasiveness, and false information. The sector's reform actions so far resemble nothing so much as whipping a mass of soap bubbles into even more foam—an activity which is both senseless and futile.

I hereby call for the launching of a concrete and realistic open debate on the future and organization of the institutions guarding public safety and order in the Polish Republic. Let us hear from officers in substations and regional stations, from the Regional Internal Affairs Offices [RUSW], and from all those who stand in the front line.

Major Marek Luty holds the function of Commander at a Warsaw Civic Militia Station (ul. Jezuicka 1/3), and was a delegate to the 11th PZPR Congress.

Government Spokesman Holds News Conference

LD3003180190 Warsaw PAP in English 1527 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 30—We do not plan another Polish declaration on harms done to Germans by Poles, said Government Spokeswoman Malgorzata Niezabitowska at her press conference here today commenting on FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl's statement made in Cambridge on Thursday [29 March].

Although we admit that there were harms inflicted on Germans by the Polish side, they are in no comparison to those done by Germans to Poles, she added.

Following Visit to U.S.

Niezabitowska underlined the significance of premier Mazowiecki's visit to the U.S. in the political and economic aspects as well as for Polish-Polonian contacts.

It provided a chance to present our road from totalitarianism to democracy and the current Polish reason of state, she stated.

She pointed out that similar goals were attached to the premier's short visit to Canada.

Treaty on Polish Western Border

Although President Bush declined to directly support the Polish initiative on signing a treaty on Poland's western border before the unification of Germany, he showed understanding for the project, the spokeswoman stated.

Troop Reductions in Eastern and Western Europe

During the talks in the U.S., in no way was the support for the Polish postulate to be included in the two-plus-four talks conditioned on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, Malgorzata Niezabitowska stated.

Assuming that the initiative for the reciprocal reduction of American and Soviet troops in Europe to 195,000 is implemented, we would like 57,000 Soviet soldiers who make a logistic base for Soviet troops in the GDR, to leave Poland, she said.

Vilnius-Moscow Talks To Be Held in Warsaw

Although the Polish Government has not established official relations with the Lithuanian authorities, Poland is ready to render good will services for both sides, Niezabitowska stated. So far neither Moscow nor Vilnius have turned to Poland for that, she added.

Forced Guests

Talks are under way with a U.N. high official for refugees and we hope for a humanitarian way-out from the situation, the spokeswoman commented on the presence in Poland of a group of refugees from Asia and Arab states refused to enter Sweden.

The Polish Government assigned 10 billion zloties from the immediate assistance for the refugees.

Soviet Jews Are Not Commodity

We do not treat Jewish emigrants from the USSR as a commodity, Niezabitowska replied to the question on Premier Mazowiecki's declaration on Polish humanitarian aid for Jews emigrating from the USSR.

Guided by the U.N. conventions, the Polish Government attaches great importance to respecting human rights. The initiative on the Polish assistance is not directed against the sovereign right of the Palestinian nation to self-determination. During their temporary stay in Poland, none of the Soviet Jews will be forced to choose a concrete country of settlement, the spokeswoman said.

Full Transfer of Profits From Poland in Five Years

Commenting on the present restrictions on transfer of profits gained from investment of, for instance, American capital in Poland, Malgorzata Niezabitowska stated that according to the agreement signed during the government delegation's visit to the U.S. a possibility for a full transfer of such profits will be provided as of 1995.

Prices Stabilization

We are approaching stabilization of prices and that at a good pace, stated Undersecretary of State in the Finance Ministry Wojciech Misiag present at the conference.

Following a drop in production in the first months of 1990, the increasing number of enterprises signal some growth of their output. The government has repaid the credit drawn in the beginning of the year and assigned for the operation of the sphere financed from the state budget, Misiag siad.

There is some deficit still in local budgets. April will be crucial for Balcerowicz's programme, he added.

Economy in IMF Mission's Appraisal

There are no threats. Such is the shortest conclusion of the IMF mission's visit which worked out a survey of the Polish economy stemming from the adjustment programme settlements, Misiag stated.

If we do not assist Poland now and her reforms as well, how are we going to look ourselves in the face? After all Poland has chosen our system, these words by former U.S. Undersecretary of State Whitehead quoted by Niezabitowska corresponded with the above statement.

Polish Debts

We did not ask the U.S. for a new aid but for assistance in reducing our debts, Niezabitowska stated. IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus promised to send a special letter on the matter to Poland's creditors.

Security Service in Hotels

The commission appointed by the minister of home market to deal with bugging in 29 hotels in Poland revealed that the Security Service (SB) had separate rooms in 28 of them, Niezbitowska said. In 25 hotels the rooms have already been vacated.

In 22 hotels tapping devices were not found but the commission thought that they must have been in 10 of the hotels as special installations indicated that, the spokeswoman continued.

In the hotels the security service decided about employment of some personnel, about directing guests to chosen rooms. It was completely illegal activity, she stated.

Hotel directors have been obliged to immediately notify the prosecutor's offices about such cases. The commission suggested that the security service should be entirely removed from all hotels and surveillance of guests, except sanctioned by the prosecutor's office, stopped, Niezbitowska said.

Mazowiecki to Visit Madrid

Malgorzata Niezbitowska announced that Premier Mazowiecki has been invited to pay a visit to Spain but the date has not been made public yet.

Katyn Group Demonstrates at Soviet Embassy

LD3003184290 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1719 GMT 30 Mar 90

["Appeal" read to Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Brovikov by unidentified speaker in Bucharest on 30 March]

[Text] [Announcer] A demonstration was held today at the Soviet embassy.

[Unidentified speaker] We are handing the ambassador a letter addressed to President Mikhail Gorbachev, in which we make this appeal:

Mr. President, the 50th anniversary of the crime committed in 1940 by the organs of the Soviet authorities, the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs], against more than 15,000 defenseless Polish prisoners-of-war incarcerated in the Kozielsk, Ostaszkow, and Starobielsk camps is approaching.

Today, in these historic days for Europe, we appeal to you to reveal all the circumstances of the Katyn drama. Not even the maximum redress for Katyn can constitute redress for the two other Katyns, undiscovered and hitherto unknown. Knowing the sensitivity of the Soviet authorities to matters of Red Army soldiers' cemeteries in Poland, and respect for them, we also point out to you that there is one such cemetery in the center of Warsaw, covering more than 30 hectares. It is respected. We demand, therefore, the immediate setting aside of one square kilometer—on the same principles—at the place where our officers were murdered at Katyn and that it be handed over to Polish society. This ground will become a place of remembrance for our murdered fellow countrymen and the majesty of this death should put an end to all reckonings and settling of scores.

[signed] the Katyn Committee and all supporting organizations. [crowd chants: Katyn! Katyn! Katyn!]

[Second unidentified speaker] Maybe someone will come out?

[Third unidentified speaker] We have handed it over and that is it.

[First unidentified speaker] Ladies and gentlemen, we have handed over the petition. The petition has been read out. (?I have given it to the press). We will publish it. It does not matter to us that the ambassador has not said anything. We have no influence over that. [crowd chants: Katyn! Katyn!]

Independence Rally Demands 'Debolshevization'

LD0104183990 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1743 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] A political rally was organized in Gdansk by the Polish Independence Party [Polska Partia Niepodleglosciowa]. The participants in the rally were informed that the party has decided to switch to open activity and to announce its program.

Its activists have declared struggle for the full independence of Poland, both political independence from the Soviet Union and economic independence from the West. They demanded the debolshevization [debolszewizacja] of Poland and rejected the program of Leszek Balcerowicz, accusing the present government of not having a popular mandate for power. This view was supported by Andrzej Gwiazda.

TU Members Demonstrate in Bucharest 1 Apr

AU0104141290 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1000 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Today, several thousands of people, organized within the Trade Union Federation of Research and Design Workers and the Free Trade Union of Workers at the National Institute of Thermal Engines, organized a demonstration in Bucharest's Unity Square to express solidarity with the proclamation of the Brotherhood [Fratia] Trade Union Confederation. On this occasion, a declaration was adopted, which listed a number of urgent demands to ensure the democratization of trade union activity, the resolute defense of the rights and economic and social interests of employees, the elimination of communist-type habits and methods that belonged to the General Union of the Romanian Trade Unions and the Free Trade Unions' activity, the consolidation of truly free trade union movements, starting from the bottom to the top, and the defense of the integrity of our independent state Romania.

3,000 Reported at 'Anti-Government' Rally

AU0104141790 Paris AFP in English 1117 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Bucharest, April 1 (AFP)—Some 3,000 people marched through Bucharest Sunday [1 April] shouting anti-government and anti-communist slogans, correspondents reported. The demonstrators who had earlier attended a rally organised by the "Brotherhood of Free Trade Unions" marched towards the headquarters of the interim government. They were joined on the way by students from the "Organisation of December 21"—a group which fought on the barricades against Mr. Ceausescu's elite Securitate troops at the beginning of the December uprising. The demonstrators shouted "down with Iliescu"—the country's president Ion Iliescu—"down with communism", "out with the Nomenklatura" and "long live Timisoara".

The government and the ruling National Salvation Front council on Saturday held commemorative ceremonies in various parts of Bucharest to mark the 100th day since the start of the "revolution". But attendance never exceeded a few hundred people.

'About 4,000' Denounce 'Communist Nomenclatura'

AU0104181090 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1700 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Today at noon, about 4,000 demonstrators gathered in Bucharest's Victory Square and demanded the democratization of political life. They protested against communist nomenclatura and against former activists and Securitate workers.

The demonstration started in the morning in Unity Square, where people demonstrated for the defense of economic and social interests of employees; the demonstration concluded at the Free Romanian Television Headquarters.

'Faster Democratization' Demanded

AU0104182290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1749 GMT 1 Apr 90

["Demonstration"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharst, ROMPRES, 1/4/1990—A demonstration organized by the Independent Trade Union Confederation "Fratia" [Brotherhood], the "Group for Social Dialogue" and other organizations staged a demonstration in the Unity Square in Bucharest on Sunday. The several thousand demonstrators stated for a faster democratization of the political and economic life and chanted anti-government and anti-neocommunism slogans.

Troops Seal Off Government Building

AU0104185290 Paris AFP in English 1717 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Bucharest, April 1 (AFP)—Up to 4,000 people booed Romanian leader Ion Iliescu in an anti-government and anti-communist demonstration outside the headquarters of the interim government and at state television here Sunday. The protest came a day after government and ruling National Salvation Front officials held commemorative ceremonies marking the 100th day of the start of the Romanian revolution. But attendance for the officially-sponsored event was sparse. The demonstrators also marched to Mr. Iliescu's private home on Aviators Boulevard shouting their anger at the country's new leader. The group later joined the demonstration outside the television headquarters that had been sealed off by security forces. The rally started off with a small demonstration organised by the "Brotherhood of free trade unions" which criticized the official UGSR trade union and passed outside the headquarters of the National Liberal Party. "You are absolutely right to boo communism which dishonoured our country," party leader Radu Campeanu told the crowd. The National Liberal Party Saturday elected Mr. Campeanu its secretary-general and candidate in the May 20 presidential election.

The demonstration then swelled to include students from the "Organisation of December 21"—a group which fought against Nicolae Ceausescu's elite Securitate troops at the beginning of the December uprising. They shouted "down with Iliescu," "down with communism," "out with the nomenklatura" and "long live Timisoara," the western city where the uprising began.

The government headquarters was sealed off by 17 armoured troop carriers as well as a double file of armed police and soldiers.

Outside the television headquarters demonstrators shouted "return television to the people" and "the army is with us." They criticized the head of the national television network for being responsible for broadcasting "the government's official lies." Protestors were also seen sitting on armoured vehicles without opposition from the military. Some participants demanded to be admitted to television studios to address television viewers directly.

Organizers of the rallies called for a further demonstration Monday outside the education ministry to press for a solution to staffing problems.

Meanwhile, the daily ADEVARUL slammed a government decision to cut the circulation of the three main daily papers in Bucharest by 20 per cent as "unprecedented economic censorship." The papers concerned are ROMANIA LIBERA, ADEVARUL and TINERETUL LIBER. The government said the move was aimed at "protecting papers of parties campaigning" in the runup to the May 20 general and presidential election after the number of papers has hit 900 nationwide. ROMANIA LIBERA has a circulation of 1.5 million copies, compared to one million for ADEVARUL and 700,000 for TINERETUL LIBER. ADEVARUL succeeded the Romanian communist party daily SCINTEIA following Mr. Ceausescu's ouster on December 22.

V. Romaneasca Protests Transylvania Situation

AU0104145690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1907 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 31/3/1990—During a meeting, the members of the Bucharest branch of the "Vatra Romaneasca" union were informed of the situation in Transylvania. Learning of the continuation of a state of tension in a number of counties, the participants adopted a letter of protest expressing their concern and asking central and local bodies of state power to take steps to discourage actions whereby the physicial and moral integrity of all the residents of those ancient lands is not observed.

The Bucharest branch of the "Vatra Romaneasca" union expresses its energetic protest against any attempt on the part of mass media in this country and abroad to present information items on political and sociocultural events in Romania, more particularly, on inter-ethnic troubles in Transylvania, in a unilateral, distorted manner.

In conclusion, the letter of protest calls on the government to take measures to strengthen customs checks at all border points and to control foreigners' movement in this country.

Ceausescu's Brother Andruta Goes on Trial

AU0204094790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0906 GMT 2 Apr 90

["Justice: Another Trial in Bucharest"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 2/4/1990—The trial of former General Nicolae Andruta Ceausescu has began in Bucharest in the morning of April 2.

The defendant is charged with abetting genocide, killing seven persons, attempting murder as well as with possessing weapons and ammunition without authorization.

PNUC Discusses Agenda Items, 17 Decree-Laws

AU3003163990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1443 GMT 30 Mar 90

["PNUC Session"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/3/1990—Speaking on the first item of the agenda, Ion Minzatu, chairman of the commission appointed by the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council] Executive Bureau to investigate the incidents in the city of Tirgu Mures and in the surrounding area in the latter half of March, briefed the session.

Showing that the commission had still a long way to go to know all the sources behind the events that took place in that zone, in the city of Tirgu Mures more particularly, the speaker said that the commission managed to set the two sides in dialogue within a very short time. The sides—the "Vatra Romaneasca" Union and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania—with large delegations comprising authorised and responsible representatives—agreed on the extinction of the conflict and the restoration of calm and mutual confidence.

The events were discussed as well as the rights that the Romanian revolution brought to the minorities. It was admitted that there had been achievements, and the causes but particularly the events were discussed as they really were, with a sense of responsibility yet without mincing words. Eventually, the sides decided that a synthesis group be formed to analyse all the points on which they had agreed along with those on which they had not in order to come to a common platform.

Two subcommissions were formed, said the speaker. One for the press which is the sole source of data and information for the mass media, and another the task of which is to assist the General Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of the Interior with surveys and intimations to prosecute the culprits for what happened in that zone.

The County Council of Young Mures Residents was set up including Romanian and Hungarians who "requested to act as moderators, as catalysts of the sides engaged in dialogue to help ease tension."

"A positive factor Tuesday was the statement of the PNUC president, Mr. Iliescu," the speaker went on. "Both sides decided not to heed extremist influences any more—no matter where they come from, inside or outside." Mr. Minzatu also told the session that he had had a dialogue with the National Peasant Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the National Liberal Party.

They all agreed with a sense of responsibility that it was a national cause which they must serve, irrespective of their political beliefs.

After Mr. Minzatu briefed the session on the work of the governmental commission, the National Christian and Democratic Peasant Party's [NPPCD] representative tried to start a discussion on the national question in light of the events in Tirgu Mures. He said he doubted the competence of the governmental commission there. At the insistent request of the session's chairman who said it was pointless to discuss a subject that was not fully known yet, the NPPCD representative dropped the matter.

Other PNUC members also intervened, with some of them requiring that work get under way according to the agenda, and others calling for a start of the debate on the national question. An invitation that the PNUC president made to Mr. Attila Verestoy to speak in the name of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] was objected to by the union's president, Mr. Geza Domokos, who said that Mr. Verestoy could speak only in the name of the PNUC Commission for Nationalities, but not of the HDUR whose conclusions were not final yet.

Eventually it was agreed that the national question be discussed by the council in its next session after the final conclusions of the governmental commission that has been working in Tirgu Mures with good results are known next week.

Passing to the analysis of the 17 decrees-laws and decrees which under item 2 of the agenda are put before the PNUC for approval, on the first of them which defines "the activities for which the government can make decisions" a greater decentralization was demanded to further relieve the law-making body of some of its tasks. The amended decree-law was approved by the PNUC with a majority of votes, the amendments being aimed to observe the principle of the separation of powers in the state.

Roman Addresses PNUC Session

AU3003175690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1636 GMT 30 Mar 90

["PNUC Session"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/3/1990—I assume responsibility for those I work with in the government, said the Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman in answer to a question he was asked in the 30 March session of the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council]. He showed that Mr. Ion Patan who is regarded as compromised by some PNUC members since he was in Ceausescu's nomenklatura held an interim position in the Finance Ministry but that he had been on the side of the revolution since its beginning and that he was a competent man.

Mr. Petre Roman agreed that Mr. Patan's activity be put under the scrutiny of the PNUC Economic Commission.

On the activity of Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, the prime minister said that neither national defence nor interior affairs were his concerns as it was said during the session. Those were matters to which the prime minister attended to.

Since Mr. Voican was seen with mistrust, the prime minister said, also his activity should be discussed by a PNUC commission. However, he reminded that one of the latest activities of Mr. Voican-Voiculescu was connected with the governmental commission in Tirgu Mures the performance of which was praised by Mr. Ion Minzatu earlier in today's session.

Mr. Petre Roman ended by saying that whenever there were doubts about any minister, his activity could be discussed by a commission, in a civilized manner.

Interesting proposals were made during the talks on the draft decree-law on higher interests granted by savings banks.

The Savings Bank President, Mr. Nicolae Eremia, explained that the interest level in the draft had been thoroughly substantiated and was to a great extent, correlated with that of the interest the state charges on housing construction, which dropped to four from eight per cent in the previous period. He also said that the approval by the PNUC of the rises in the draft would bring citizens and additional two billion lei in a single year, which virtually annuls the profits of that organization. The rise in Savings Bank interest above the planned level is not economically justified, at least for the time being, as it would bear negatively on money circulation.

After almost three hours the PNUC members decided to postpone voting on that normative act until the Savings Banks and the National Bank clarified the interest-granting technique on the amounts deposited to buy cars and to have dwellings erected.

The Provisional National Unity Council gave priority to the talks on a draft-law-representing the eighth items in the agenda, which refers to measures to raise the wages of the working personnel in the Romanian radio and television. The PNUC members unanimously voted for the respective decree.

Adjourns Until 11 Apr

AU3003204790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2005 GMT 30 Mar 90

["PNUC Session"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/3/1990—We have inherited an interest-rate system that has no logic, said Decebal Udrea, governor of the National Bank, during the March 30 session of the Provisional National Unity Council [PNUC] where talks were conducted on a decree on the interest paid by savings banks and banks. In

Romania, he said, the bank pays the saving bank 3.55 per cent for the money drawn from the population while, given the terms of the new decree, the savings bank pays the population an average interest of 3.50 per cent. In its turn, the bank offers the respective money to enterprises and institutions and, according to the new plans, to the private sectors which it tries to stimulate—at an average interest of 3.62 per cent. The mechanism envisaged was so conceived as not to change the entire system of interest charges in the economy and not to lower production costs, all the more so as there is a wish to encourage free initiative.

The debates on that normative act were interrupted and will be resumed in two weeks' time.

After another two hours of debates the law on state child benefits—a result of requests made by a number of social segments who were given back the income supplements abusively abrogated in the years of dictatorship—was also voted. The law was adopted with an amendment suggested by Mr. Ion Iliescu according to which state child benefits will not be changed in the case of the social segments whose incomes have already been raised this year.

A proposal made by the National Peasant Party representative to the effect that benefits should be granted until the age of 18 was objected to as in some cases both the mother and the child may receive benefits.

Although several speakers stated for the "withdrawal" or "elimination" of the draft decree on retail sales in convertible currency in "Comturist" units within the Ministry of Tourism, since, they said, it would mean the monopoly of that ministry, the PNUC approved it in its original form. In support of this decree-law, the PNUC president said it was unacceptable to give up the hard currency Romania can cash in from people willing to buy the products they need. However, it was suggested that units to sell products for convertible currency should be created in other forms, too, more particularly in the network of the Ministry of the National Economy or the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which is to make the object of another decree-law.

At the request of representatives of the Association of Former Political Detainess and other PNUC members, the draft decree on giving indemnity to persons who suffered from their opposition to the dictatorship after 6 March 1945 was almost fully reformulated.

With the amendments made during the debate which concern mainly the specific conditions and the amount of money payable to the persons who suffered during the communist regime, the draft law was passed with one vote against and four abstentions.

After an almost 12 hour-debate, the Provisional National Unity Council adjourned its meeting with two items of the agenda being deferred to the next session due Wednesday 11 April.

New Cultural Review LUMEA DE MIINE

AU3003095790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0811 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/3/1990—A new review, "LUMEA DE MIINE" [The World of Tomorrow], a bimonthly of the Romania-France cultural cooperation has been put out, in a fine layout.

"For Romania, tomorrow begins today," shows the editorial. "The dialogue with the world at large has recommenced."

Ion Biberi, Jean-Louis Courriol, Petru Cretia, Michel Deguy, Stefan Augustin Doinas, Anton Dumitriu, Jean Pierre Faye, Pierre Oster, Virgil Tanase and Ion Vianu are on the honorary committee of the new publication. A few titles arrest the attention: "The Fall of a Tyrant. Let Us Help the Romanian People, a People We Are Kindred to By Language and History." (Pierre de Boisdeffre); "Romania Lived in a Strait Jacket" (interview with Vladimir Tismaneanu); "Operation Villages Roumains" (Doina Uricariu), "The Cult of the Young Dead" (Dr. George Anca).

* Ambiguities of Timisoara Trial Cited

90BA0008C Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 16 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Octavian Paler article: "Trials"]

[Text] Unfortunately, we started out with the left foot along the path of establishing true justice after decades of the reign of lawlessness. The first and most important trial held after the revolution, Ceausescu's trial, was—as is known (for reasons I will not discuss here)—a sham because it was rushed. Although the verdict was just, the trial resembled other trials dictated by Ceausescu, rather than by the justice that we wanted to install when the Romanian people in their despair went down into the streets and swept away the dictatorship. Because of it we were deprived of a model judgment to which we were entitled after such a long nightmare. And more importantly, we were deprived of a chance to sit in judgment of ourselves in that trial, to consider the entire depth of the evil, and to better understand what in our being and our flaws forced us to accept everything we did accept. But it was not to be. Circumstances, or perhaps military reasons determined otherwise. We did not see a Romanian Nuremberg, as we wanted. Other trials followed afterward. More expectations and more disillusions. And more than anything else, there was perplexity. There is continual talk of genocide; but why is the genocide reduced to only one week out of decades in which the dictatorship violated our national being? Why are the investigations and questioning, and in general, all the debates of those trials limited to the crimes committed between 15-22 December? Were the thousands and tens of thousands of Romanians who rotted in jails, on the Canal, or in other places stigmatized by crime not part of the genocide? The old people who froze to death or died for lack of medicine; the babies who died in unheated maternity hospitals; the sick people who paid with their lives for the dictatorship's disregard for the health of the Romanian people, and the unending number of victims of chronic malnutrition, stress, fear, and despair, that was not genocide? The appropriation and degradation of traditions, the destruction of churches, the mockery made of patriotism, the corruption of public morality, the destruction of institutions, the corruption of characters, and the stifling of Romanian values in every area, under a systematic campaign designed to suppress the intelligences that might have benefited the country, were these not many elements of the genocide? And so many other components of the most frightening attempt to rob us of our nationality in the name of a demagogic nationalism, to North-Koreanize us, to falsify our national identity, to isolate Romania from history and from Europe, and to turn us, in the words of a known Romanian philosopher, from a people into a population, was that not genocide? But the court that tried the first four of Ceausescu's accolites avoided—with incomprehensible care—referring to the overall significance of the idea of genocide. Why? In order not to have to judge the entire totalitarian system? It did not permit the defendants to speak every time they got ready to make some revelation and guided the questioning so that the discussion could be shifted from the political area into the strictly penal realm. Everyone agrees, at least in principle, that the spectrum of communism should no longer haunt Romania and that 40 years of being the guinea pigs for a terrifying utopia is enough, but that was not mentioned at the trial. Neither was the fact that the totalitarianism brought us not only to economic, social, and moral bankruptcy, but also on the brink of losing our national identity and the sense of our place in the world and in history.

Neither is the current trial in Timisoara without its perplexing aspects. One after the other, the Securitate officers in the defendants' box claimed innocence, allowing themselves even to joke during questioning as if certain that they cannot be accused of more crimes than angels could. And, as if they had not been specialists in engineering fear and repression, but victims, they refer to Ceausescu as the "odious dictator," like everybody else, without batting an eye. Moreover, in view of the fact that the figures released for publication by the government concerning the number of secret police troops are not convincing and that there are concrete proofs that at least some of the functionaries of the old repressive regime are still in their jobs, we were entitled to expect sensational revelations at the Timisoara trial. But such revelations are still not forthcoming. Is that because the proofs that the court needs have been destroyed? Or is it that not everything has yet been said about the bloody miracle of the Romanian revolution? Whatever the reason, this being the fourth trial striking for the court's care to avoid a profound political judgment, it is too much to believe it all a coincidence. It seems clear to me that the judicial branch intends to rule only on crimes committed during a limited period of time, rather than on the system that led to those crimes. We are thus in danger of becoming accustomed to the thought that the entire responsibility for everything that occurred in Romania in the past quarter of a century rests with just one malevolent family and that two primitive minds alone held in their grip 23 million Romanians. Aside from a feeling of frustration, this raises some other questions, too. Does the judicial branch want these trials to be limited so as not to have to accuse the communist system? Why? Does it believe that the Timisoara massacre can be understood without tackling the roots of the evil of the totalitarian regime? Does it not think that the question of who shot into the demonstrators in Timisoara will be completely answered only when another question is fully clarified, namely: Why was there shooting? And if we also take into account the fact that totalitarianism is a disease of history from which we must not only remove but also heal ourselves, because such diseases leave serious marks, it is clear that the courts' errors in these trials are not mere errors of justice.

However, we noted some progress. We no longer hear in Timisoara that embarrassing and misplaced, if not downrighting revolting style of the previous two trials, of peppering the questioning with ironies of a doubtful taste that are always out of place in a court of law, and even more so when a tragedy is involved. The defendants are no longer addressed in the second person singular, something that was not in the proper spirit of a court of law, not to mention the fact that no one is guilty before his guilt has been proven strictly in accordance with the law. From this viewpoint, we have nothing to impute to the Timisoara trial panel.

* Voican Responds to Criminal Charges

90BA0002A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 11 Mar 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Letter by Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican"]

[Text] As I stated in the text published by you in issue No. 14093 of 2 March 1990, I will put at your disposal material proving that the penal trial to which I was subjected in 1985 was a pretext used by the Securitate in order to investigate me. I was accused of committing certain common law offenses so as not to have to apply article 166 paragraph 1 of the penal code, in accordance with instructions not to put on penal trial for political reasons persons that may become dissidents.

Unfortunately, since I do not have as rapid access to archives as your diligent reporters, the publication of these documents will have to be delayed. I have applied (letter No. 430, 2 March 1990 to the Ministry of National Defense) for photocopies of the documents showing that I was followed and put under observation and finally arrested and sentenced in 1985. I need these documents to be able to answer a libelous attack that appeared in ROMANIA LIBERA No. 14090 of 27 February 1990, which falsely accused me of being a mere common law felon.

Until that time, I want to emphasize that, had those zealous reporters not been only after facts to my disadvantage, reporting only parts of the truth, they would have noticed that in the same penal file No. 7747/1985 of District Court No. 1 there was also a report by the General Prosecutor's Office, No. 119/10.10.1985, which, aside from chapters I and II dealing with the two common law offenses held against me, also features a chapter III, "on seizing from the accused certain books, manuscripts, and xeroxed printed material."

The latter reveals the real reason for the entire trial—the nature of my interests and my writings. Over 1,000 books and about 1,800 book photocopies were confiscated at the time of my arrest, along with hundreds of manuscript or typewritten pages, hundreds of documentary files, photographs, diagrams, etc.

The same file also includes an expert report in nine pages by the Council of Culture and Socialist Education, which was ignored and omitted by your persevering researchers because it was in my favor. That report showed that, following that favorable opinion, it was suggested that "a penal trial should not be pursued and the material should be returned."

In view of the fact that I do not now have the necessary proof, I will not discuss in detail the common law offenses for which I was sentenced. Anyone not biased against me will notice that such a trite file should not have come to the attention of the Prosecutor General and that the detainee would not have been questioned by the IGM [General Militia Inspectorate].

More explicitely, I was arrested on 16 July 1985 and held at the IGM, where the investigation lasted about five days, after which I was questioned at the Securitate directorate for penal investigations (VIth Directorate); to that I want to add that on 18 October 1985 I was sentenced at the first trial (the sentence you were kind enough to reproduce in your newspaper), and that my appeal was turned down on 20 December 1985. Nevertheless, my questioning continued until 17 January 1986; even after the appeal I still remained for one other month under the same arrest, something that otherwise never happens. Is it not significant that when I was finally transferred to the Bucharest penitentiary (Alexandriei Road), I was sent to Section V—the special section in which were held prisoners sentenced to death, foreigners, and "political" prisoners that were not recognized as such? The regime of that section was indeed "special"—meaning there were cells and severe isolation.

Although I had a short sentence, I was entitled to receive one package every five months, just like those sentenced to over 10 years. All those who were ever imprisoned are familiar with the draconian regime of that special section. I enclose a copy of my record which shows that I was held only in "the Vth."

Had I been a mere "swindler" who pinched a few lei or falsified some accounts, as your newspaper insinuated, not even dignifying me with the status of "petty thief," would I have been indicted by the Prosecutor General, questioned by the IGM for seven months (including one month after the appeal), and served the rest of my sentence in the cells of the sinister, special Vth Section?

For the time being, so much about my being a common law felon (by the way, your title was anachronistic and thus incorrect; at the time of the account I was not deputy prime minister, and hence it was not as such that I became implicated in them. In reality, other people were tasked with staging it....) To make the article an obvious personal attack and to use every possible argument against me, the author also referred to the fact that I was sometimes armed.

I want to take this opportunity to also reply to the ROMANIA LIBERA note No. 14094 of 3 March 1990 which joined the same libelous campaign with a glaring lie. In connection with my carrying a weapon, I hereby want to inform you that I am in possession of arms permit No. 010094/1.19.1990 of which I enclose a photocopy. In accordance with decree No. 367/1971 article 9 paragraph C, persons who hold a state position are authorized to carry arms. I enclose a copy of a certificate issued along this line (since I am aware of the shortage of space, it is up to you whether to reproduce these documents in your paper). I want to add that I do not have bodyguards for my personal safety.

As for the assertion of Mr. R.C. Hagiu, I enclose three texts that I will ask you to reproduce in full.

(Editorial note: Space does not allow us to publish the three texts, which are signed by representatives of the Holy Synod Office: Mr. Nicolae Stoicescu, minister of religious affairs; I.P.S. Antonie, archbishop of Transylvania; and I.P.S. Nicolae, the bishop of Banat. All three protest the assertion of Mr. R.S. Hagiu that Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican allegedly attended the last meeting of the Holy Synod "with a gun in his lap," which they described as a "false and biased statement." The original documents were returned to Mr. Gelu Voican.)

Any commentary is superfluous; please save my originals, contrary to editorial custom, so that I can use them as proof in the penal trial that I intend to file against this serious press violation.

* Army Representatives Discuss 'Urgent Objectives'

90BA0002B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 13 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Ion Stoica article: "So Far We're Moving in a Circle"]

[Text] The meeting in Bucharest yesterday of the first national conference of Army representatives led to a conclusion which we are persuaded currently reflects the mood among the Army ranks. Namely, there was consensus on the most urgent objectives—unity, democratization, and stability—and disagreement on the ways and means by which these objectives can and must be attained. This confrontation also caused a certain tension, punctuated by high notes or periods of calm, which would not have had too much of an effect on the discussions and especially on their conclusion if the discussions had not been appreciably channeled toward marginal issues, mostly material demands. But let us not get ahead of ourselves....

The meeting enjoyed several favorable conditions. First of all there was the audience at the Ministry of National Defense with the minister, Brigadier General Victor Stanculescu, who also met twice before with members of the Initiative Group and with the prime minister, meetings which served as the basis for yesterday's conference. Secondly, the participants were aware of the Appeal of the above-mentioned group and of the Appeal signed by the Action Committee for Military Stability, documents which reflected the individual positions of those attending and of others, or the positions of their units. Along the same line there was the opening speech delivered by Brig. Gen. Stanculescu, in which he described the meeting as representative of the Army because it gathered delegates from all the corps and levels and defined its purpose: to examine the strategy of rebuilding the Army and the manner in which democratic institutions can function in the Army without causing instability and harming unity. The analysis was required to be clear and to seek to avoid improvisations and dilettantism and to be followed up by actions aimed at structural and mentality changes.

The question is: Were those favorable conditions efficiently explored and used? As far as we are concerned, we think that that was not the case fully, and that the discussions did not always handle directly the problems on which the achievement of the proposed objectives depend. It may not be too much to state that the situation created gave the impression that the discussions were turning in a circle. That was due, first of all, to organizational problems. As some speakers noted, the number of those who attended was too low considering the importance of the discussion, and the argument that the hall was too small for a greater audience was not convincing. There were also some references to the undemocratic manner in which some of the delegates were designated. Not all the delegates had been elected by vote. In another context, it seemed that not all the speakers quite understood the purpose of the meeting which should have centered on finding appropriate and democratic means of achieving two major categories of objectives: enabling the Army to function normally and implementing a process of modernization in keeping with both real needs and resources and international trends.

We must also note that while discussing the democratization of the Army, some speakers stressed that such a process must proceed without affecting the principle of a unified Army leadership and must aim at reestablishing confidence in the military hierarchy and among officers of the same rank. This actually was the point around which disagreement began. As the Initiative Group stated from the very start, the process of democratization cannot proceed and be completed without "purging" the Army of cadres who generated and maintain instability because of their hesitant, if not outright hostile attitude during the revolution, and without clarifying the role and place of the Army in the Revolution. The failure to clarify these issues undermined and continues to undermine the command function. Some measures were indeed announced and carried out. Most of the announcements concerned the retirement of certain officers who had been reactivated and even promoted during the Revolution. Some unit commanders were also removed. However, in some situations there has been no progress; one acute problem along this line concerns the former minister of defense, General Nicolae Militaru. One of the representatives of the Initiative Group, Major Octavian Chiriac, presented data concerning that case. Many Army cadres believe that his appointment at the head of the Army was done without a legal decree, as a case of force majeure, and by someone who was not at the time president of the state. There is no known legal act by which he was reactivated. Moreover, after leaving the national defense portfolio, Gen. Militaru was not retired to the reserves in accordance with Army requests. However, he is obviously not the only example of delaying solutions, something that highlights the lack of action toward beginning a real democratization of the Army. Thus, the wish has been expressed but the factors concerned are slow in embarking on the democratization road; some obstacles persist, giving the impression that the spirit of initiative and action at certain command levels is not in line with the trend of the Revolution.

The high interest in the problems discussed was also highlighted by the fact that initially 209 people registered to take the floor. That means that, counting the three minutes allowed every speaker, 627 minutes would have been required. Without a break. By the end of the meeting, 31 Army representatives took the floor. It seemed that that would have to be the end, although not all the issues had been exhausted. But, no. The defense minister announced that Mr. Ion Iliescu, chairman of the Provisional National Unity Council was coming to the meeting. He was welcomed with applause and asked to speak. He made a speech. There was no chanting. That happened a few minutes earlier, when General Guse spoke, who, we learned, two weeks ago became commander of the Buzau garrison. At the end, the audience stood up and applauded again. Were those mere reminiscences, mere reflexes that have not yet been eliminated in the short period since the Revolution? To be quite frank, they reminded us of meetings with "the aktiv" from the sad old times. But, perhaps in this case, too, it is fit to note that in the meantime, we're moving in a circle....

* Vatra Romaneasca Views Hungarian Minority

27000008A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Radu Ceontea, provisional president of the Vatra Romaneasca Union, by Liliana Stoicescu; place and date not given]

[Text] [ROMANIA LIBERA] It is said that the Vatra Romaneasca [Romanian Hearth] Union was established in response to another organization. Is this true?

[Ceontea] In the first days after the Revolution, when the fishers in troubled waters became so active, it was necessary—out of duty to the painful past of the Romanians in Transylvania—that an organization be set up to ensure vigilance. We set it up because we were not certain that the decisions made by the provisional government regarding our fate would be the most intelligent ones. Although the Hungarian language newspapers call us chauvinists, green Romanians , hydras, Ceausescuists, and extremists, the people in the Vatra Romaneasca Union do not recognize themselves in this portrait. We have not shouted slogans, we have not carried the placards which you have invented. And we did not establish ourselves—because the Romanian Hearth has always existed—without being an organization. We have not provoked anyone—we have been provoked. We are not reactionaries, but we are reacting.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Please enumerate some of the actions which you would call provocations.

[Ceontea] We were surprised when the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania appeared with documents set up as early as Christmas 1989. What political group was already prepared on 25 December? What organization presented its demands so quickly? This orchestrated "spontaneity" surprised us, the people who were setting up the Vatra Romaneasaca Union, and we felt the need to check some memories of former minority masters of [the past] hundreds of years. But if the past seems too remote there is the period between 1940 and 1945, not to mention the Autonomous Hungarian Regime—the Stalinist gift of Dr. Petru Groza to the Hungarian minority. In cities in Harghita where not a bullet was fired, Romanian commanders of security and militia units were savagely killed—decapitated, hanged, burnt to death. In the enterprises and institutions, leadership cadres were fired for ethnic reasons. The Hungarian intellectuals are fighting for separatism in the schools at all levels—from kindergarten to the universities. A hostile attitude to the languages of the Romanian state occupies a special place. There is an insistent demand that Romanian should not be the language of instruction for any subject in the Hungarian classes and that the Romanian language exam for graduates should be eliminated for minorities—which has been accepted. Also, they are asking that polytechnical, juridical, economic, and medical-pharmaceutical faculties in which subjects are taught only in the Hungarian language be established (in addition to the Hungarian language university which trains teaching cadres). We are indignant at the claim for recognition of the status of "forced domicile" for those who were sent to counties other than their native counties. In Covasna and Harghita counties, abuses were committed against some Romanians who were sent there after graduation or who found jobs there in the past 20-25 years. They were obliged to leave their homes and their jobs to return to their native counties. Who is preventing a Romanian from Romania from establishing residence in any county he desires—in his own country?

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Why do you believe that the demand for an autonomous school system necessarily means hostility to the Romanian language?

[Ceontea] Pastor Laszlo Tokes stated, in a Hungarian-language broadcast on Free Romanian TV, that the Romanian language was a "means for constraining the minorities." Are any comments necessary?! At a time when throughout the world—and now the world is open to us—the first exam which every citizen must take to get a job and to achieve a normal social status is an examination of his knowledge of his state of adoption, in our country, they are insolently demanding that students from the ranks of the national minorities be exempt from the graduation exam in the Romanian language.

We do not know if all national minorities want to have a real linguistic handicap in this manner, but I belive that , more and more often, representatives of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania are proceeding on the basis of egoism, offending others, becoming representatives of an "elite" minority, and lately, not recognizing a natural and constitutionally established status—the status of a minority. As you know, they asked for the establishment of a complete university with 24 faculties, starting with the Hungarian language, history, geography, law, polytechnical studies, medicine, pharmacy, economic sciences, and ending with physical education, with Hungarian as the language of instruction. Where in the world is there such an institution under socio-historic conditions similar to those of Romania? Vatra Romaneasca Union does not organize education—but if it is a matter of responding in the name of our organization, please note that since education for the national minorities is established by law, the restoration of something which has led to a state of dissatisfaction should only occur if is certain that it will be economical and efficient. This pertains to education in the mother tongue for every pupil whose ethnic origin is not Romanian. It was no different up to now. The only difference was the fact that the number of classes approved was insufficient.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] You do not accept the need for a restricted university—then how do you train teachers for schools in the mother language?

[Ceontea] In higher education there will have to be faculties for training teaching cadres for teaching national minorities and those for conserving and developing their ethnic identity. However, it is rather hard to understand the need for Hungarian teaching which would train engineers, judges, prosecutors, geologists, and veterinarians and also serve the general interests of the development of the country, especially now during the serious situation after the dictatorship. Couldn't this plan for training cadres be interpreted as being necessary for another state system—or for another state?

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Don't you have serious arguments against the physical separation of the bilingual schools?

[Ceontea] Children of different ethnic origins have nothing to lose by spending their childhood learning and living together in common school buildings; this would be one of the many possible solutions which would promote good understanding among the citizens of a future free and democratic Romania. Their future social integration will not take place in the separate buildings of factories and institutions!

[ROMANIA LIBERA] The decentralization of the national economy presupposes by definition a substantial coefficient of local economy. What is the point beyond which this autonomy begins to become an abuse?

[Ceontea] When, under the guise of decentralization there is an attempt to decimate the strength of a nation, then it is more necessary than ever that the strength of our nation be directed toward the fundamental interests of recovery. The point at which, in the case of the Hungarian minority, one might see—and if this is true it would be serious—a lack of loyalty to the Romanian state of law.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Why are you alarmed at the idea of a Hungarian Autonomous Region in the zones in which the Hungarian minority is in the majority?

[Ceontea] Let me tell you that I am not a fearful type: I will greet its establishment with enthusiasm and so will the entire Vatra Romaneasca Union if the Romanian Government—provisional or not—should have the weakness and lack of responsibility to grant such a thing.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] It has been said that the Autonomous Hungarian Region represented only an administrative formality. In what way do you think that the interests of the Romanians in the respective zone would be offended?

[Ceontea] I cannot answer in one sentence, but I might dare to imagine the overwhelming sensation of Romanians that they live in a foreign country. Romanians should feel as if they are in Romania even if they live in Harghita or Covasna counties. Hungarians who live in these counties must understand that it is morally necessary to accept the fact that they live in Romania and they must not condemn history for this. They must not fight with history and must be kind enough to ensure the same protection for the Romanian minorities in these localities as the laws of our state and Romanians in general have given them. I believe that it would be an interesting experience for you to collect testimonies from old people in the completely Romanian villages of the former Hungarian Autonomous Region to have an idea of the state of affairs at that time. On this occasion it would not be a bad idea for you to take a public opinion poll so that you will have a realistic picture based on direct contact.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania states that there is a similarity between the colonization by the Russians in Bessarabia and the forced assimilation of Hungarians by the Romanians, which took place in Transylvania during the dictatorship. What do you think about this?

[Ceontea] Matters of internal nationality policy—especially in regard to the Hungarian minority which has been featured in our press—cannot be compared to foreign policy issues. In addition, the Vatra Romaneasca Union would be interested in receiving at its headquarters in Tirgu Mures even a small group of Hungarians denationalized during the time of the dictatorship and would support their nationalization—certainly with a view to their integration into the social, economic, and political life of the country.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] What is Vatra Romaneasca's view about the representation of minorities in the central and local leadership?

[Ceontea] As a public organization, the Vatra Romaneasca Union gives the Romanian Government latitude in finding the best position—on the basis of the experiences of some prestigious democracies. As far as I know, in Hungary, each national minority is represented in the parliament by only one person each. Some of the proposals of the representatives of the Hungarian minority which appeared in the press, which should be remembered, are the following: In localities in which Romanians are in the majority, representation should be based on parity and in those in which Romanians are in the minority, representation should be based on proportionality! So this is democracy.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] As a result of these disputes, waged, in particular, through the local press, has a special state of mind been created in Mures County?

[Ceontea] It certainly has been created. Prior to 22 December, we lived together normally, a "better life" had to come through respect for the law and loyalty to the leadership of the country and not according to the law of the field. It is hard to say how long there will be manifestations of resentment. Lucidity can be found, on both sides, but, especially, on the part of those who considered themselves to be more wronged than everyone in the old regime! In light of the specific historial situation of Transylvania and thinking about the future, whether they want to or not, the Hungarians will have to live side by side with the Romanians; they will recognize the authority of the Romanian state and will not love Transylvania so much as to forget to love all Romania; and in the capital of the country, they will not love only the Parliament building!

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Do you want to have a dialog with the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania?

[Ceontea] Certain conditions would have to be accepted. The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania must recognize the Vatra Romaneasca Union and its platform; it must acknowledge its own extremist errors after the Revolution, for example, reviewing its demand that a complete Hungarian-language university be set up in Romania; it must dissasociate itself from the bestial crimes in Harghita and Covasna and the guilty parties should be handed over to the Romanian authorities; its slander against our organization must be retracted.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] What is the attitude of the government in respect to the problems which you have raised?
[Ceontea] At the present time, we are happy that Bucharest is viewing Transylvania fairly and that the Provisional National Unity Council is beginning to understand that the Hungarian minority wanted to set itself up as an "Hungarian people in Romania", on the basis of its status as an elite minority among the other 13 and was acting accordingly.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] In your opinion what is the characteristic element in the demands of the Hungarian minority?
[Ceontea] After almost 1,000 years of foreign domination over Transylvania it is quite hard for them to forget the behavior of their masters. These aberrant demands, for which they have been spiritedly traveling around Bucharest, knocking on doors, behind which—albeit temporarily—there is power, call for the restoration RIGHT AWAY, not of the rights which they have had, which they have, and which they will have—expanded in accordance with the new democratic rule of Romania—but of "special" rights, not specific to minorities. They seek the rights which are specific to communities with a federative statute, like those in the Swiss Federation, to which they often refer. All comparisons are improper since it is a matter of different historical situations. Perhaps if we had the same neighbors as Switzerland we would be able to discuss the issue in different terms. In any case, the Vatra Romaneasca Union—as a public organization—is not able to grant rights or to suspend rights. We are only taking a position which we believe that the overwhelming majority of Romanians support: Romania is not a multinational state, but a national and unitary state, in which different percentages of minorities live. No minority has the right to have favors merely because of the fact that its ancestors were oppressors for centuries!

* Goals of German Democratic Forum Listed

27000009A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
11 Mar 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Nikolaus Kleininger, vice president of the German Democratic Forum in Romania, and Robert Schwartz, member of the Forum's leadership council, by Al. Pintea; place and date not given: "What Is the German Democratic Forum in Romania and What Does It Propose?"—first paragraph is ADEVARUL introduction]

[Text] Less than a week after the December Revolution, on 28 December 1989, the German Democratic Forum of Romania, an association for Romanian citizens of German nationality, was created.

[Kleininger] The purpose of our association is to carry on political, social, economic, and cultural activity for the preservation of the national and cultural identity of the German minority in Romania, in the framework of the provisions of the Constitution of Romania and of the international law on minorities and on the basis of its own program and statute. The Forum promotes the aspirations of the ethnic German community for a future worth living in a free and democratic Romania. According to its program and statute, the Forum represents the interests of the German population in Romania before the state authorities, alongside other organizations—unions, parties, etc.—in the country and abroad. Our association maintains relations, in particular, with Germans in Romania who are linked by a common language, common traditions, and family ties. And there is another important detail: The German Democratic Forum in Romania is not a political party and its members are free to belong to any political party they desire."

[ADEVARUL] What is the status of the Germany minority in Romania today?

[Kleininger] First of all, it must be said that the German minority of Romania has had, and I might say still has, an endangered existence; for many specific reasons it has a situation which is completely different from that of other minorities. In 1938, there were 900,000 Germans in Romania. For this minority, the defeat of Nazi Germany meant their identification, en masse, with fascism, a fact which resulted in their evacuation from their homes, the almost total expropriation of their property in 1945 and in 1949, their forced deportation to the USSR and the Baragan, and other things. When the Ceausescu dictatorship in its homogenization policy introduced a process of indirect denationalization, the German minority, degraded to the point of being an object of foreign trade, began a massive emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany. As a result the existence of the German minority in Romania is endangered today. In 1977, the German minority numbered 350,000 persons while today, there are only 230,000, a large number of whom want to emigrate. [ADEVARUL] What does the German Democratic Forum in Romania propose?

[Schwartz] Now, when freedom of travel is guaranteed to them just like it is to every Romanian citizen and when many Germans, whose families are far away, are thinking about joining them in a state which is currently more developed economically and more stable politically, the Germans who remain in the country need special measures for stabilization, protection, and preservation, so that our community will survive. In this situation, the Forum acts to guarantee the status of a German national minority. In the second place, freedom of travel in both directions and the possibility of contacting relatives abroad should be guaranteed. I can say that in a memo sent to the Provisional National Unity Council, we pointed out that the declaration of general principles on equality of rights of all citizens of the country, free use of the mother tongue, free exercise of personal initiative, and many other things are not sufficient to increase confidence in the future of this minority. Decisions made at any level on the basis of the majority principle, apparently democratic decisions, cannot be allowed if they are detrimental to a minority as a whole.

[ADEVARUL] What concrete measures are you thinking of?

[Schwartz] For example, specialized cadres from our minority would once again occupy appropriate positions in the state apparatus, in the government; the acceptance of investment projects of enterprises from the West, especially those of persons who want to repatriate, and the acceptance of the desire of these people to hire the Germans in the country, on a priority basis; the real acceptance of the right to free association in every field, including association on ethnic bases; teaching of the German language and German culture, with financial and material support from the state, wherever there is a desire for this; acceptance of the German names for localities and streets in the Banat and Transylvania; the approval of a special program for resettling German families in the residences of relatives who want to emigrate; the immediate allocation of housing and jobs to persons who return to the country, since there are already such cases; and the continuation of economic and cultural relations with German-speaking areas in Europe.

* Expressions of Anti-Semitism Deplored

90BA0008B Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Mar 90 p 2

[Radu F. Alexandru article]

[Text] Too little was done in a climate as generous as the one established by the ceausescu [lower case as published] dictatorship, when antisemitism (just like the policy against the other coinhabiting nationalities) was implemented in all its splendor as party and state policies such as: the gradual elimination of Jews (with very few exceptions) from leadership positions; closing down the doors of central institutions like the press, radio, television, foreign trade, diplomacy, etc. to all members of that community; encouraging by promotion the "patriots" who distinguished themselves in the battle against the Jewish peril, which were the merits par excellence of the presidential couple. Were the Romanian people so resistant to the foul policy practiced by the dictator for 25 years? If YES, and I am convinced that that is the real answer, then the devastation of the Oradea synagogue is a syndrome that must be carefully examined.

Let us then proceed from the fact that all the "hot" days that succeeded each other (in perfectly cyclical order) beginning with 12 January are elements of a much bigger scenario, aimed at one thing: to compromise the revolution and hurl the country into chaos. This objective, which is not the easiest anyway, is all the more difficult since it goes against the will of a people that have just been freed from the nightmare of a sinister dictatorship and are thus more thirsty than ever for stability and quiet. So what are the means by which this huge community can be manipulated? A "substitute identity." The respective group or party no longer assumes a leading posture as a guiding institution with a declared program accepted by the majority. No, it goes into hiding, infiltrates the people, speaks in their name, reveals to them the hidden meaning of a world that its listeners don't understand, and constantly uncovers terrible threats to which they are exposed; it thus manages to gradually indoctrinate individuals with the conviction that only "united" can they stand up to the "peril." This is how the only weapon that currently can deal destructive blows to the society is assembled, namely the "crowds." The idea is to keep the crowds in a state of overexcitement; bombard it with inflammatory slogans, some of which reflect real problems of those mobilized in good faith, but most of which are designed to incite; and thus, with diabolical patience, to bring the burning match closer and closer to the powder keg. The only problem is that, in view of the social and professional diversity of microgroups and interests, how does one gather the crowds in a common cause? The classical solution is still infallible: Throughout mankind's history, whenever the chauvinist, anti-semitic slogan was invoked, it proved to be the most efficient.

For example, you publish a series of "urgently topical" articles unmasking the tragedy of orphans torn away from the warmth of orphanages by Israelis who think that they can "buy" the love of innocent children for a few thousand dollars. Although you know very well—just like the whole world shocked to watch on television reports about those "camps"—from what kind of life those children were rescued; although you are fully aware that it was not a favor done to those Israelis, but that any foreigner could adopt Romanian children, provided they had not been claimed by Romanian families, who were crowded beyond capacity into sinister orphanages; and although you know that what occurred was not some dirty transaction between the respective Israelis and some venal clerk ready to sell his soul, but agreements signed by the Romanian state through our embassies in those countries. You know all that and, although you end each article with the promise "to be continued," you never think of providing the due clarifications. From the stirring "Whose Are Our Children?" to "ritual murder" it is only one step.

Major issues, which have to do with "principles," must also be approached in an original manner. The current leitmotif is democracy. A whole nation lived through long years of darkness only with the hope that some day it will enjoy the blessings of a free life. In the name of democracy, which we are only now in the process of learning, most of us would today be willing to make any sacrifice. The slightest attempt to diminish or interfere with it appears and is criminal. Precisely against this background of unquenched aspirations we heard voices which, alert as ever, came up with the idea of testing the "authenticity" of democracy. Asked whether fascist groups of emigres can participate in the free elections in Romania, Mr. Liviu Petrina, one of the leaders of the National Christian and Democratic Peasant Party [NCDPP] replied without the slightest hesitation: "Yes, if there is democracy, it must be for everyone." In every civilized country with old traditions of democracy, neo-Nazi movements are banned and their members are brought to court for their dangerous antisocial activities. Nevertheless, Mr. Petrina demands the participation of such fascist groups in the elections as the most revealing proof of the democracy we desire. Should I ignore the view of this original statesman as a stupidity unworthy of being taken seriously? That may be an idea, except that Mr. Pavel Suian, who as it happens (?) is a member of the leadership of that same party, during his electoral tour of several West European countries, nonchalantly stated that "he was not in favor of granting special rights to the Hungarian population because it was not true that the respective population was completely deprived of rights under the ceausescu [lower case as published] dictatorship." This position seems to me all the more serious since Mr. Suian—a former higher ranking activist of the rcp [lower case as published, Romanian Communist Party] Central Committee until 22 December 1989—was close to the source of the arbitrary policy of the old regime against all the coinhabiting nationalities. Of course, one question is unavoidable: Are these leaders speaking in the name of that party's members, or is this a program they are trying to impose against the real interests of any honest person?....

One argument that was never absent from antisemitic efforts to demonstrate their legitimacy, was "history:" distorted, mutilated, and invariably interpreted as a proof of eternal betrayal and of the everlasting damage that Jews did to the countries in which they were accepted. If for 45 years our country, as well as the other countries that fell under the Yalta agreement, suffered under the "red terror," who else could have been to blame if not...? The answer does not even have to be spoken. One such model of historical treatment was perfectly illustrated by an article published in DREPTATEA—the newspaper of the NCDPP—of 16 February 1990. In his peremptory article "I Accuse," Mr. D. Stoic established a justifiable relationship between the Nazi nightmare and the communist nightmare, after which—the premises being true—he came to a totally surprising conclusion: a) The six million physical victims lost by the Jewish people in the Holocaust were little compared to the 20 million psychological victims that the Romanian people sacrificed year after year to the Communist dictatorship; b) the ones to blame for the (emotional) genocide of the Romanian people were first and foremost Ana Pauker, Walter Roman, Silviu Brucan, A. Toma, and S. Toma (the mention of Teohari Georgescu in the same breath as the above was undoubtedly a printing error). I do not for a moment intend to budge Mr. Stoic from his position, but I must nevertheless call his attention to the fact that, while the 23 million victims—the current size of our population—were able to rise in December 1989 to regain their right to a free life, I doubt that the "other" six millions still have any option....

I have cited only a few pieces of the puzzle that is taking shape; unfortunately we could easily carry on this list. Thus, in an atmosphere in which the contours are still dimly traced; in which yesterday's "certitude" is brutally compromised by today's "revelation;" in which people continue to ask a multitude of questions and to receive few answers, an "enemy" is gradually identified and held up for the public to hate: the Jews. I want to stress that this is not a general option but the pattern of a subtle but consistent pressure. Do the ones who exercise this pressure really think that the elimination of a tiny community (approximately 20,000 people with an average age of about 60) would eliminate evil from our society? No, categorically not. But they do know that the "crowds" must be brought to the highest possible "pitch;" like a fever, once this is attained, it can transform the crowds into a tool much easier to manipulate than if people were allowed to think "cooly;" and that those who today destroy a synagogue, tomorrow may be induced to do the same to any other religious house. Then, books, people, institutions, or governmental buildings can as well be turned into "targets" to be destroyed.

Having just escaped from what seemed to be endless suffering and being in a period of convalescence that has to heal deep wounds, what Romania now needs more than anything else is peace.

* Position of Hungarian Union Detailed

90BA0009A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Geza Domokos, chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, by Liliana Stoicescu and Delia Verdes; place and date not given]

[Text] [ROMANIA LIBERA] Why do the Hungarians view themselves as the most persecuted minority under the old regime?

[Domokos] During those decades, particularly in the last one, the Hungarians suffered the heaviest losses: In 1973 the policy of national homogenization was raised to the level of a state policy, and the strategy that was adopted was aimed at forcibly denying people their nationality. The Hungarian minority, being the largest and the most aware of its national entity, was viewed as the most undesirable and the most dangerous for the country.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Please give us some examples of actions aimed at forcible nationality deprivation.

[Domokos] First and foremost, all command positions were made Romanian, while we were pushed to the fringes of political, cultural, and economic life. Secondly, I don't need to explain to a Romanian the value of the school for preserving a national existence. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Romanians of Transylvania were saved by two institutions: the church and the school. This was the heaviest blow dealt to us: As of 1959, Romanian sections were established in Hungarian schools and the Bolyay University was merged with the Babes University. Initially, the idea had some logical points and sounded attractive: Children would thus get to know each other better and become friends. In time, however, these schools began to lose their Hungarian classes. Romanians were appointed first as deputy principals and later as principals, and cultural activities and teachers' staff discussions were carried out in Romanian. When parents tried to appeal to inspectorates—because the curriculum was featuring fewer and fewer Hungarian classes—the Securitate got involved. Thus, these schools, many of them secular, found themselves in the situation of being tolerated in their own educational precincts.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] What was wrong with having Romanian principals? What did they do to assimilate Hungarian children?

[Domokos] In spite of the official line, some principals did try to find some accommodation. Others, however, believed that by acting against the Hungarians and restricting their rights they were fulfilling a historic mission in the interests of their nation. In many Hungarian schools, aside from Romanian language and literature and Romanian geography and history, other classes, too, were taught in Romanian, such as biology, math, physics, and chemistry, under the pretext that the children were thus better prepared for the university. Another excuse was a shortage of Hungarian teachers, when in reality the latter were either assigned to Romanian schools, or found it difficult, if not impossible, to get a university education.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] As you know, a considerable number of Hungarian elementary and high schools continued to exist. In mixed schools in which Hungarians were the majority, cultural activities and staff meetings continued to be held in Hungarian, in spite of instructions. In areas with large Hungarian minorities, Hungarian teachers were clearly in the majority and the ratio principle was automatically observed. Why is ethnic assimilation claimed so dramatically on the basis of education, when in reality that policy was ineffective and never advanced beyond the trial stage?

[Domokos] The areas in which the Hungarian majority was obvious are not relevant, with the exception of high schools and vocational schools. The dictatorship was altogether ineffective, in the sense that there was resistance to it, and in fact, the process of forced assimilation did not yield the desired effect because the Hungarians have a highly developed ethnic consciousness. As far as the future was concerned, however, this ethnic identity would have been eradicated within 30 years.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Don't you think that the progressive deterioration of the entire educational system was one of the important objectives of the Communist regime, and that a comparative study would clearly verify that the destruction was not limited to minority schools?

[Domokos] All of us have come out of the dictatorship with traumas and losses. You are right about the deterioration of the Romanian school. But there is a difference between the malfunction of a system and the destruction that occurred in the Hungarian educational network.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] How do you justify demands for an autonomous school network with your own curriculum and inspectorates? How then can brotherhood and friendship be ensured if the children of Transylvania are separated from kindergarden to university?

[Domokos] We had that kind of educational system. We're talking about returning to certain structures that the dictatorship had destroyed. We're not demanding anything new. We're asking for the natural continuation of an experience that was both logical and efficient. Schools have their own spirit, their tradition. These mixed schools were amorphous, neither Romanian, nor Hungarian. The healthiest thing is for each one of us to organize our schools and culture according to our respective traditions. Moreover, what right do the Romanian teachers have to oppose separation on the grounds of democracy? It is not right that one's situation should depend on someone else's attitude. They must give up the idea of supremacy and this attitude of paternalism. I think that we don't need to consult and certainly not get the approval of Romanian teachers and parents to dismantle the mixed schools. I ask you: Were the Hungarian parents, teachers, and students consulted when the dictatorship introduced Romanian sections in their schools?

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Will this autonomous educational system not create structures that will not recognize the Romanian language? Will we need interpreters to communicate in public institutions? Or should the Romanian population learn Hungarian?

[Domokos] In Romania it is practically impossible not to speak Romanian. If a national test were carried out we would have a pleasant suprise. However, speaking Romanian should be a free option, it should not be imposed. Modern people want to be able to speak several languages; linguistic isolation in a Hungarian 'ghetto' would be disastruous. At this time of opening toward Europe it would be absolutely grotesque for anyone to want to shut themselves off in a national shell. But it is not up to the state to think for individuals and their communities. Each person must have freedom of choice. A person who wants to live in a wider world will learn the state language. Those who don't need to particularly, should not learn it.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] If special high schools—health or economy oriented—and technical, law, and economic university departments are established, how will the graduates of Hungarian schools become integrated in the economy of the Romanian state? Of course, I don't mean the departments that train teachers for Hungarian schools; no one disputes the legitimacy of a University.

[Domokos] No? I'm glad to hear that. Not even Vatra Romaneasca? [The Romanian Hearth, a nationalist organization]

[ROMANIA LIBERA] No.

[Domokos] I don't agree... I think you should ask 40-50 year old Hungarians how they fit in. They received an excellent education in their mother tongue and never had any problem exercizing their professions.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Do you think that Hungarian intellectuals are justified in demanding that jobs be guaranteed for ethnic Hungarians in their native counties on the grounds that they don't speak Romanian or that in other counties they may become assimilated?

[Domokos] I think that the idea of assigning people will be given up. Jobs should be secured by competition. Every person should be free to choose where he wants to work, but the argument that 'we speak only Hungarian' is not acceptable.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Because of the imperial edicts that forbade serfs to settle in cities, the population of the major Transylvanian cities became predominantly Hungarian. In recent decades the process of industrialization led to an exodus of the rural population toward the cities. In view of that, don't you think that the so-called forced assimilation, or "Romanian colonization," of which the Hungarian press talks, was simply one of the consequences of the industrialization?

[Domokos] If we consider the issue in all its complexity, there was a natural process of migration from the country to cities. However, some elements of force were introduced in this process. It was Ceausescu's dream of a purely national Romania. Moldavia was consciously left less industrialized as a demographic resource. Changing the ethnic composition was a national strategy; that was a widely known secret. Why do we accept that the Russians were colonized in Bessarabia but not that a similar phenomenon occurred in Transylvania?

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Are you identifying Ceausescu's policy with the wishes of the Romanian people?

[Domokos] There is a difference between the official policy which operated through the party and state apparatus and the reaction of the population. Nevertheless, people did not totally escape the effects of the anti-Hungarian propaganda. National feelings were manipulated. Ceausescu used the myth of foreign threat; he knew that public opinion was very sensitive to the idea that the Hungarians wanted Transylvania.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] What will happen with people who moved to Transylvania 25-30 years ago? Are you aware that some Romanians feel threatened?

[Domokos] The policy of Romanization existed. That is a fait accompli. There are Romanians who came from various parts of the country and have become accustomed to a certain situation. The Hungarian character of these areas will necessarily deepen as a result of decentralization, which is one of the essential conditions of democracy. For example, the anniversary of the 1848 revolution is an occasion when wreaths are laid at Hungarian monuments marking that event and when Hungarian speaking crowds gather in town squares. That may create tension, but Hungarians were no less afraid of Paunescu's meetings! I am an optimist by nature; after the Revolution I thought that we will all soon become free of this inherited syndrome and that tensions will be resolved. But historic traumas are far deeper. I forgot about the interests of many Romanians who had been favored by this system: They were overwhelmingly in control of counties, the Army, the militia, and the party. That category of people found themselves in an unexpected situation. However, it would make me unhappy to think that honest people, who know our customs, and even speak Hungarian, should be put at a disadvantage for being Romanians. That would be unbearable for me. The problem of the Romanian minorities in counties with a Hungarian majority, like Covasna and Harghita, will become very intricate if they don't understand that this privileged status must change. I shudder to think of unemployment; that will inevitably acquire a national coloring.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Speaking of decentralization, were you by any chance thinking of a new Autonomous Region?

[Domokos] I cannot accept the idea of isolation along ethnic lines. I do not think that a sanitary belt should be established around these counties. Secondly, in its time, the Magyar Autonomous Region was a formality. It was widely used for propaganda purposes. It was in fact not real. To eliminate the suspicions that exist, an exact analysis should be made of the demographic changes that occurred since 1918, when the Hungarians were declared a minority. Foreign observers may be indicated. The entire history of Transylvania should be reviewed; the anti-Romanian atrocities of the fall of 1940 were intensively played up, but no one ever mentioned the anti-Hungarian atrocities of the fall of 1944.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] In view of the fact that there are no studies and statistics reflecting the situation in all its complexity, do you still want the minorities law to appear before the elections?

[Domokos] Why not? If it is a pertinent, realistic, and democratic law.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Don't you think that only a stable government and a representative Parliament can make vital decisions on a national issue?

[Domokos] This is the core of the drama: The government is not committing itself. I have the impression that it is afraid, incapacitated by its lack of legitimacy. Aware of the fact that the problem is sensitive, the government—perhaps also thinking of the elections—is avoiding even discussing it.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] If the problem is delicate, then a hasty solution may involve yet another improvisation. Don't you think that you are exerting pressure?

[Domokos] There is no connection. Many ethnic problems have been resolved at a local level, without tension. The process was bogged down where there were objections of principle, namely in Tirgu Mures.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Do you wish to talk to Vatra Romaneasca?

[Domokos] It is only normal to have talks with all those who want to promote democracy and who want us to find our place in the European Community. We have had such meetings with various parties and organizations and—proceeding from the willingness to accept even compromises—we offered to meet with Vatra Romaneasca on Saturday 17 March in Bucharest, when we hope to become acquainted, to compare our programs, and to examine together how we view our path toward Europe. Ideally, these discussions should be free of prejudice and preestablished rigid positions. We are open.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Does the equality of rights that you demand on behalf of the minorities include recognition of another 12 official languages or so in Romania?

[Domokos] In principle, yes. In those areas where the minority population requests it in accordance with the idea of local autonomy.

* Cluj Democratic Party Leader Interviewed

90BA0004A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 13, 14 Mar 90

[Interview with Virgil Andrei Vita, representative of the Cluj Democratic Party and spokesman of the group of center democratic parties, by Cornelia Simionescu; place and date not given]

[13 Mar pp 1, 2]

[Text] [ROMANIA LIBERA] Mr. Vita, let us begin our talk by mentioning that you are a theater director and that you are...how old?

[Vita] I am 33. The age of Alexander the Great and Jesus Christ. Last fall I was actually thinking: What will be the significance of that age in my existence? Will anything happen? And I am happy that it did.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Intuition?

[Vita] For years I was passionately interested in politics, especially foreign affairs. I was interested in everything that was happening in the world. As for the situation in our country, by virtue of my profession, as well as my intrinsic nature, I developed wide social contacts that allowed me what today is known as a direct link to our interests and realities.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] What did Doina Cornea mean for you and for the people of Cluj?

[Vita] Like for everybody else, she was a symbol. A sign that fear can be overcome. A symbol that was absolutely necessary to us.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Your voice has gained a certain resonance in the country's parliament.

[Vita] I hope to be followed by a choir. But the choir is still passive. I am convinced that there are many valuable resources; before, we were all involved in politics, longingly thinking of capitalism, of the Western world. Intellectuals and workers had a good grasp of things. Now, however, when the time has come to apply what we thought, to realize our dreams (because we were a nation of dreamers in that darkness; we were free to think), now we're in the waiting mode.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Do you think we will manage to free ourselves from prejudices and approximate the precise meaning of politics in our days?

[Vita] Through the revolution we won our right to freedom without any communism. In those first days, I was promulgating political propaganda among my fellow townspeople; many of them were workers and I realized that they would understand. I am against Mr. Brucan's theory and his elitism, which is a sort of perpetuum mobile. It is unacceptable not to take into consideration the real interests of the people one leads because democracy is a system that does take into account, at every step, the precise and real interests of everyone. The first democracy lessons were practical ones, on the spot, while there was still shooting in the streets of Cluj. We began talking in the middle of the night, establishing the principles of democratic debate: We will take turns speaking, presenting arguments, bringing out ideas, without excuses, searching for the logical solution. That's the rule of the game, because democracy is a superb and elegant social game. At one point we said to ourselves: In fact, we are in some ways a democracy party because that's what we have been discussing for the past several hours. So let us establish a democractic party now that we are allowed to!

[ROMANIA LIBERA] In the name of what ideal?

[Vita] I say about myself that I suffer from a beautiful, benign disease: constructivism. To have something to work with, one must first have a dream. But it must be a passionate dream, otherwise there's nothing to fulfill. Today I want to scream when I hear in Parliament how speeches are limited to three minutes, how they must be condensed and offer a solution. When are we going to discuss the direction we are following? When will the turn come of issues of essence and general policy? We are not a government, we don't have to come up with solutions. Our role is to legislate. On 25 January, if I recall correctly, the then National Salvation Front [NSF] for the first time summoned the newly established parties to consult them on the electoral law. With his nasty attitude toward parties, Mr. Tocaciu clearly told us: 'You should know that we can issue this law without you.' So it seemed that we had been gathered only for the sake of appearances. No doubt this approach was meant to be discouraging. We had been so eager for that first meeting, hoping that the time had come for contacts, for mergers, since democracy does not have 50 faces but just a few nuances.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Can a more original nuance be possible?

[Vita] Democracy is by definition original, there is no need to make it more original than it is. We said that belief in an ideal, technocratic, and elitist society was a utopia. A utopia with which we are fed up. People cannot be divided into intelligent and stupid. We have the same kind of brain, the same computer up there, and the same emotions. What sets us apart is the level of information we have stored, and small differences—not of structure, but of performance. I have verified this truth thousands of times in practice. If you don't believe in people's common sense and don't respect them for their humanity, there's nothing left! You end up manipulating them. Mr. Iliescu and I needle each other and have fights on this subject. He is a political adversary (if he can be considered a political adversary, because at the personal level we get along very well; he is a man to exchange ideas with). I keep saying to him: 'Mr. Iliescu, any method of manipulation is terrible, because we have become hypersensitive to any attempt to distort or manipulate information. We must talk; the truth is demanded, we cannot hide.' There is concern about that pinch of salt, which is also encouraged by certain laws, including the law on police prerogatives, which is completely undemocratic as a matter of principle. There is, of course, potential danger. Somebody was asking me: How would you like it if your wife or child were attacked? God forbid, the thought terrifies me, but I am even more terrified by the thought of coming out with an undemocratic law which may have unforeseeable repercussions. Unfortunately, we are our worst enemies. I said so at a parliamentary meeting, too: We are struggling against a rather well concealed political adversary which we are identifying with the NSF. But there is no real political force called NSF. To begin with, President Iliescu and Mr. Roman do not belong to that movement. Mr. Iliescu has clearly stated in public that he no longer belongs to any political group and that he is politically neutral. The same goes for Mr. Roman. I think it is a mistake to equate NSF with Iliescu and Roman, as is being chanted. There is no connection.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] You cannot say that there is no connection, because Mr. Iliescu was the one who promoted the idea of the NSF as a political movement (not to say party).

[Vita] I think that Mr. Iliescu repaired his mistake by denying the idea of a party of leaders. After all, what was the NSF? A sort of parliament, not a party. Now it has become what its name indicates: a political group trying to get organized, not to be confused with the state apparatus. Perhaps in practice things are not quite like that, but the main idea remains: Messr. Iliescu and Roman have disassociated themselves from it....

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Let us go back to the topic of the democratic parties. What prompted you to pursue this unity of forces?

[Vita] It was actually something spontaneous. We were sort of sitting on the same side of the table and had the same reactions, expressing practically the same platforms. So during the recess of the 27 January meeting we decided to meet right away to act together, because we felt that something was afoot (speaking of 28 January). We were all young, we thought the same, and we proceeded from the common sense of the nation. What we reasoned together was: There are two forces now that are preparing for a dangerous political war—the NSF and the traditional parties. Practically speaking, the Peasant Party. We thought that we should become the third force in the middle, forming ourselves in a group struggling to establish real democracy and at the same time, struggling for the country's political stability.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] You were concerned about the danger to democracy? Did you see something reprehensible in the 28 January demonstration?

[Vita] We condemned the reaction that came after it, the counteroffensive, not the first part; the manipulation that dislocated an avalanche which I don't know who can stop now. Since then a very ugly idea took hold, namely that every political party had some bad intentions against the rest of us. That is a very ill conceived idea, because it assumes that there can be a solution without parties. In other words, that we could go on without parties. That solution is called communism. God protect us!

Editorial note: the discussion proceeded from Mr. Iliescu's statement at a televised meeting of the Provisional National Unity Council [PNUC] that he was not the NSF president, having only chaired that body's representatives in court. According to the list published by ADEVARUL (18 February), which reported the data recorded at the Bucharest Municipal Court (and fed into the computer), it emerged that the NSF president was nevertheless Mr. Iliescu. No comment!

[14 Mar pp 1, 2]

[Text] [ROMANIA LIBERA] Nonetheless, don't you think there are too many parties?

[Vita] There is, of course, this conceit of ours, exacerbated by so many years of Communist totalitarianism, which explains the formation of so many parties. In time things will settle, because indeed, there cannot be so many political identities. There can be four or five, at the most six. The electoral campaign will allow us to find out exactly who the candidates are and what they want; for whom we vote. However, the campaign must begin by organizing the parties, except that that unseen force (the traces lead to the upper echelons) still does not allow party financing. The million that Mr. Roman promised was not a million (here, take it and go play craps with it!), but a state subsidy, the mechanism of which, we thought at the time, was known throughout the country. But we were wrong, it was not known. When the state gives a subsidy to a party, the money is put in the bank and you cannot touch it except to pay the telephone, having to show the bill; you cannot pay any other per diem than the legal one, which is 18 lei. In other words, you are entitled only to running expenses. Any democracy in the world finances its being, i.e., the parties, which are public institutions, not toys. We didn't have money to print material, not even identity cards. We printed our platform ourselves, that is by the goodwill of people who had access to xerox machines at work. We made a reasonable proposal: Out of the net profit of two billion lei from enterprises which until recently worked exclusively for the benefit of one party—the Communist Party—let one twelfth be earmarked for the 50 parties. That would have been sufficient; in any event, there was no comparison with the enormous figure (I won't spell it out) that the Front spent, the PNUC (as mixed up as it was) since the revolution to this day [as published]. Because the Front, having for a time confused itself with the state apparatus, had created political capital for itself, too.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] As a center bloc, will you not take any step right or left, as political flexibility may, after all, require?

[Vita] The center position actually expresses our center constructivism. From the very beginning we were in favor of dialogue and solutions. In fact, our group induced the establishment of the PNUC on 1 February. Not in this form; we had proposed a different form, but constructive as we are, we agreed to the final document. At one point, the haggling, that 'fifty-fifty' principle turned out to be a mistake, because the question immediately arose: If 50 percent are the parties and 50 percent the former NSF which separated itself as a party, who was that 50 percent? County representatives! But what is their political identity? A parliament is a legislative body that channels policies through the diverse parties. What is a party? A group of people who have a certain vision of the future, a scenario, a path, and the most valid sum total of proposals is the one for which the majority votes. That is politics, that is a parliament. This basic idea has to be explained. We are not a government. The government is elected by the parliament and is the executive branch. It implements the laws approved by the parliament.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] With which of the more representative Western democratic parties would you compare yourselves?

[Vita] Social democracy, which centers on the average individual, is currently the fashionable current in Europe. The stage of trusts and big land ownership is one of the dead periods of capitalism. The basis now is a system of social securities capable of guaranteeing a compulsory minimum. Our platform clearly stipulates that the new society we want to build (new in comparison with what was) must ensure a dignified living standard and an obligatory minimum for all the categories. There is no point in putting a ceiling on the top, because income will be regulated by gradual income tax.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] What do you think of the old and new reverberations of the class struggle?

[Vita] To manipulate and control people, communism exacerbated as much as possible suspicion, mistrust of all kinds, hatred, cowardice, egoism, fear, self-promotion, chauvinism, and incompetence (by downgrading the idea of quality). These defects are alive in us and we see them fully externalized even now, when, in the absence of classes, the struggle seems pointless. Paradoxically, we are stubbornly searching for enemies while ignoring the fact that the main enemy of the democracy to which we aspire is mistrust of our fellowmen and lack of respect for them. Why are we not rejoicing now, less than three months after the revolution? Where are our dreams? We should recall what the French, the Germans, and the Italians did after the war. After five years of fighting to seize the criminals, they didn't erase tension and mistrust. Our situation could be simpler if we knew who the criminals were. We don't need scapegoats—the big goat was terminated in short order—but to rid people of fear you must give them truth and certitude.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Some hostility emerged between Romanians and Hungarians after the revolution. How do you explain that?

[Vita] I can explain it objectively, because I am half Hungarian (on my mother's side) and half Romanian (on my father's side). The scenario is the following: The Hungarians want to regain their rights to culture and national existence of which they were completely deprived, something that for some Romanians—themselves no longer used to demanding rights—appears to be an inordinate request. Extremist voices are heard on both sides because the intolerance of some of us elicits aggression from some of them. The Hungarians of Transylvania are not separatists, even if it were for no other reason than that a mixed nation was born there, made up of mixed families specific of that area. All they want is to exist, to have the right to be educated, and to read in their own language. I think that love (Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare) will further help to overcome national boundaries. That will be the best mediator. And we cannot say that love is manipulation....

Details of LCY CC Session Noted

LD3003182390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0921 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 30 Mar (TANJUG)—[passage omitted] Dr. Nijaz Durakovic, president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina League of Communists [LC] Central Committee Presidium, said Petar Skundric's speech was not in the spirit of the 29 March agreement reached at the session of the League of Communist's of Yugoslavia [LCY] Central Committee Presidium, and added that he expected a correct interpretation of the discussion from that meeting. So, it looks now as if those having different views, Durkovic specified, have republican or provincial leanings and that, if they do not accept Skundric's proposals, the Central Committee Presidium, the Central Committee, and even the LCY would cease to exist. Bearing in mind the stakes involved, who will dare to doubt these proposals, he asked.

It follows that those not accepting the policy of fait accompli and demanding that this session be postponed, are not Yugoslav oriented. Both the LCY and the beheaded Central Committee are in a delicate situation from which I do not believe they will find an easy way out because regardless of the quorum, there are no representatives of three LCY parts here today, and the fourth is not complete. If the Slovene LC did exempt itself, still there are two LCY parts missing, and also the majority of members from some organizations did not come. According to the LC members from Bosnia-Hercegovina, this is no longer a LCY Central Committee that would testify to the all-Yugoslav character of our organization.

Although we learned three days ago that the LC members from Croatia will not attend the session, the Bosnia-Hercegovina LC Central Committee Presidium decided to attend it and offer maximum goodwill and cooperation aimed at the preservation and development of the Yugoslav Communist orientation and to try to find a way out of the impasse created after the break off of the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress. Proceeding from new principles and relations on which LCY activity should be grounded, we in the LCY have significantly harmonized stands about important issues that would form a sound basis for the resumption of the extraordinary congress or the convocation of a new one.

Noting that since the break off of the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress events were moving rapidly, so that today we find ourselves in a completely new historical situation, Durkovic stressed that the old LCY cannot reaffirm itself anymore, which might be good, and that we should preservere the orientation for a new Yugoslav Communist organization grounded in new foundations and significantly new principles of internal communication. Nevertheless, he added, traces of old practices and imposition of stands are still present. This Central Committee is more central than committee, he added.

Durakovic then, in repeating that Skundric did not interprete correctly all proposals put forward at the LCY Central Committee Presidium's 29 March session, said that there were initiatives to postone today's session so that it is better prepared or that the session is closed to the public so "that we do not lose face in front of the people again." The resignation of the LCY Central Committee Presidium was demanded, not for personal reasons, but because, after the break off of the congress, it proved itself to be inefficient, as well as because of the sharp criticism from municipal committee and LC members addressed toward it. It was proposed, Durakovic said, that a working group, consisting of one representative of each republican and provincial organization and of the LCY organization in the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and supplemented by six members working on the material proposed for today's session—which was supposed to pave the way for the resumption of the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress or the convocation of a new LCY congress—be formed.

It was further demanded that decisions at today's session be reached by consensus, in keeping with the new democratic course within the LCY, and finally, that the role and the future of the Central Committee itself be scrutinized.

There were 12 proposals in all, and all were rejected by the vote of an incomplete, and to a certain degree illegitimate, LCY Central Committee Presidium. This principle of decision making is accepted in principle, Durakovic explained, but is out of place when an incomplete presidium uses it and when the LCY finds itslf in an extraordinary situation.

Durakovic thus proposed that today's session be considered a consultative-working one and that decisions not be reached or adopted today, but that an agreement on how to find a way out of the situation be reached. According to him, all proposals should be noted, and a working group, which would clasify and forward the proposals to the leaders of the republican and provincial LCs that directions for future activity can be outlined, should be formed.

I feel that I should say right at the beginning, on behalf of the working group that prepared the draft document on the transformation of the party and the fate of the congress, Ivan Brigic said, that this session has begun in a strange way. In the name of accountability for the LCY itself, for its communist, Yugosalv orientation, I have to say that we cannot work in this way. On whose behalf was Skundric speaking at the beginning of the session, on behalf of the working Presidium, the LCY Central Committee Presidium, or in his own name, Brigic asked.

Skundric has the right to present his own views, but it should not be acccepted that he should present proposals at the beginning of the session on the method of work, the method of establishing a quorum. This is a dangerous precedent for the LCY. Let us not play with democracy, and I can say that all the work that has been done, and the way in which it was done, on the draft document on the LCY's transformation was done in a democratic manner and atmosphere in order to create conditions for the continuation of our congress, Brigic stressed.

He proposed in conclusion that the LCY Central Committee Presidium should first state its position on of all Sundric's proposals before the debate on the agenda begins.

Borislav Mikelic was the only member of the Croat LC Central Committee attending today's session. He made this known at the start of the discussion, saying that he had come at his own initiative, on behalf of the Petrinje municipal organization, which like some other municipal organizations did not share the stance of the Croat LC Central Committee that it should not attend today's session. I was not at the session of the Croat LC when it adopted that decision, Mikelic said.

He noted that after the interruption of the congress the opportunity was lost to immediately convene the Central Committee session at which all the consequences could have been evaluated. He supported the stance of Durakovic that it would not be good to adopt any decisions with a reduced complement before hearing that Pancevski will say. I am therefore in favor of comradely negotiations and the adoption of conclusions at the end and not at the beginning of the session, because this would "close the discussion."

Mikelic stressed in conclusion: "When I joined the LCY, I did not join the parties of individual republican and provincial LCs."

Responding to the criticism addressed to him, Petar Skundric stressed in a short rejoinder that the essence of his proposals was that work should continue with the present complement and that the discussion should only be about the fate of the congress.

I only mentioned statutory issues to inform this Central Committee of the facts. The comrades from the Slovene LC have left this LCY and the Croat Central Committee decided that its members would not take part in today's session.

I also presented all proposals with complete accountability and not with the intention of imposing decisions or conclusions on anyone, Skundric said.

Dobrivoje Vidic holds that Skundric does not deserve to be criticized for explaining the situation facing the LC. He proposed that after Milan Pancevski's report, the present Cental Committee members begin a discussion.

Milan Pancevski recalled in this part of the discussion that, precisely by the mandate of the congress, the LCY Central Committee Presidium worked intensively on creating presupositions for its resumption. the 29 March Presidium session considered many issues. We believe that two months and 10 days after the recess of the congress, a Central Committee should hold a session, Pancevski said, and noted that different opinions about this were expressed. The LCY Central Committee should contribute to the resolution of the controversial issues, and its Presidium is obliged to inform the former if it cannot find a solution, he stressed.

We believed, Pancevski said, that the Central Committee should pass its view about whether a Central Committee session should be held, that the Central Committee should confirm the character of the session and quorum, and answer the question of whether the session should be public or behind closed doors. The majority held that, as up to now, it should be open to the public.

No one has the right, Pancevski recalled, to decide about the resignation of the LCY Central Committee Presidium and the Central Committee itself on behalf of the Central Committee. The Central Comittee should pass its judgement about this too, he added, and said that Skundric interpreted correctly assessments made by the Presidium. Pancevski supports the proposal that the Central Committee today consider only the issue of resuming the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress. [passage omitted: Filip Vukovic wants today's session to be consultative-working one; Nikola Jovanovic thinks the session should determine the date for the third plenary session of the congress]

Bogdan Trifunovic said that he does not see any possibility of imposing proposals or solutions. The situation in the country is very serious; differences in attitudes to many important questions are large, and it is therefore essential that we should quietly and seriously discuss all this. I believe that this Central Committee has the right to meet in such a situation to evaluate that situation and to agree on how to preserve the LCY as a Yugoslav organization, naturally with all the necessary changes in its organization and work. [passage omitted in which he says the only reason for deferring the plenum was failure to reach agreement on the date]

Trifunovic stressed that no decisions should be adopted today on behalf of others, but that it would be very dangerous if we were to push aside all that we have achieved so far in reaching agreement on the continuation of the work of the 14th LCY Congress. I therefore believe that we should hold this session today, that we should listen to the speech of LCY Central Committee Presidium President Milan Pancevski, that we should asses the situation, and that we agree on the continuation of the work of the 14th LCY Congress and invite all delegates to take part in its work. After Trifunovic's speech, LCY Central Committee Presidium President Milan Pancevski spoke.

Chairman Petar Skundric then put to a vote the proposal that the LCY Central Committee should hold the session convened for today with its present composition and with only one point on the agenda—questions and proposals in connection with the interruption and resumption of the work of the Extraordinary 14th LCY

Congress. The majority of the 87 LCY Central Committee members present voted in favor of the proposal; 11 members voted against. [passage omitted]

Borislav Mikelic asked to speak and reiterated that the session should be treated as consultative—not as the 31st LCY Central Committee Plenum. [passage omitted]

Those who do not want a Yugoslav party, Sreten Djuric told the session, should not destroy what we want. "Comrades from Bosnia, go if you do not belong to [word indistinct]," Djuric said, after which murmuring could be heard throughout the hall.

Najaz Durakovic replied and noted that four LCY Central Committee Presidium members proposed that the session is only a consultative-working one, and that the working Presidium "did not bother to answer." I do not blackmail anyone. I have the right to put forward proposals, Skundric said. Durakovic added that there is no consultative meeting, which broadly means, "Who wants to leave, can do so." If this session is not consultative and if these are "democratic" attitudes toward all proposals, then the session is over for me. "I do not want to be in your way," Durakovic concluded.

After these words, Chairman Petar Skundric asked everyone not to leave the session and announced a half-hour break, in the course of which, as he put it, the LCY Central Committee Presidium will consider its views about all proposals and adopt a stand about what should be done next.

Following a one-hour break in which the Presidium met, Chairman Skundric informed the Central Committee members present of the Presidium's stand that today's plenum should be of a consultative working nature.

Momir Bulatovic then asked to speak and put forward the stances of the Montenegrin LC Central Committee on the interruption and possibilities of resuming the congress. In the Montenegrin LC Central Committee, the shock of the interruption of the congress quickly passed. Moreover, it was later assessed that the interruption had its positive side because it speeded up some necessary changes in the LC itself in the conditions of a multiparty democracy.

He proposed that in this situation it would be most acceptable for all parts of the LC if the 15th LCY Congress is convened on the basis of a new program document and with an amended statute. [passage omitted: Bulatovic urges unity; Bulatovic says a Yugoslav orientation prevails in the Montenegrin LC; the third plenary session should contain solutions that have arisen out of the work of the LCY Central Committee Presidium; Dragutin Kosovac explains why LCY Central Committee members from Bosnia-Hercegovina will leave the plenum, which they do after Kosovac's explanation]

I resolutely oppose the view that the Central Committee and its Presidium are no longer the legitimate leader of the LCY. We do not have any other Central Committee, Stevan Mirkovic said. Those who are left in it should complete the job and attract all forces wanting the LCY to continue its work, he holds.

Bickering in the republican leadership has resulted in many people having a much worse opinion about the LCY than it deserves, Mirkovic assesses. Programs of the republican organizations agree about all important issues, he believes. This, although it sounds paradoxical under the present circumstances, testifies to cohesion, Mirkovic said. He recalled that it was the Communists who initiated democratic reforms in our society. I do not allow others to lay claim to that now, he stressed.

Mirkovic noted that the interrupted 14th congress almost harmonized all key documents and he proposed that the congress resume its work.

After Mirkovic spoke, Petar Skundric informed the present members that, apart from the agreement about consultative-working character of today's gathering, the Central Committee Presidium agreed in the course of the break to determine today how to call for the continuation of the congress. [passage omitted in which Bulatovic defends his speech at this session; Mihajlo Milojevic favors the continuation of the congress; Dobrivoje Vidic says everyone has the duty to create the conditions for continuing the congress; Tomislav Radovic says the LC has a great chance of succeeding and that there is no reason to indefinitely postpone continuing the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress; Nedeljko Sipovac is in favor of resuming the broken-off congress; Dusan Ckrebic supports the document of the LCY Central Committee Presidium prepared for today's session and presses for the continuation of the 14th congress; Sinisa Batalo does the same]

We must address the members, were the first words of Petar Simic. We are in a difficult situation both in the LCY and the country. It is not as necessary to discuss now what should be done to resume the congress or to determine its date, as it is necessary to let the members know what is happening. Presently, not all members of all LCY parts are sufficiently informed. We proposed that the LCY Central Committee Presidium address the members through a bulletin explaining everything that has happened since the break off of the congress. This was not accepted. Today, LCY Central Committee members only got a chronological review of the events. Hence, not even the LCY Central Committee members are well informed, as can be seen by today's discussion.

I wholeheartedly approve of Momir Bulatovic's contribution. It is the right thing, Simic said. Members should be able to pass their views about his proposals. I believe that we are capable of addressing party members in this manner immediately. We should put everything aside and form a group that would, on two to three pages, formulate a letter to LC members. By explaining the essence of Bulatovic's proposals, by 25 April we would gain more than all meetings in this, or perhaps some other smaller, composition. Communists in the JNA are in favor of resuming the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress, which must be well prepared to avoid the fiasco "that is partly present even today," Simic concluded. [passage omitted in which Borislav Mikelic favors the convocation of the 15th LCY Congress and supports Ante Markovic's economic program; he points out that ethnic divisions are undesirable; Ljubomir Popovic favors the resumption of the 14th Congress; Stane Brovet points out that an incomplete Central Committee cannot make binding decisions; Ljubomir Popovic speaks again and stresses that all Communists work on continuing the 14th Congress]

After Petar Skundric proposed another break during which a statement for the extraordinary congress' members and delegates will be drafted, Perko Vukotic opposed the proposal by saying that participants in today's session represent just a minority of LCY members.

He held that the incomplete Central Committee should not elect a working group to draft a letter, but that the LCY Central Committee Presidium, as a legal body, should be charged with drafting a letter at its first session. Vukotic stressed that the date for the resumption of the congress should not be determined today because such a gathering would inevitably be incompletely attended. [passage omitted in which Milomir Minic disagrees with the above]

Having assessed that a more radical party program than the LCY declaration cannot be written, Minic stressed that "even in this composition and within the LCY there are conditions for us rallying people." The problem is that some want this and others do not, as well as that some republican LC organizations change their stands daily. We should confront this to enable the creation of a Yugoslav and democratic party, Minic added. A multiparty system presupposes that people are organized in order to realize their political goals. It seems that only the LCY is condemned to not rallying members and to waiting, something which it must not allow. Minic concluded that all conditions for the resumption of the broken-off congress were fulfilled in a very short time, so that after a new Central Committee is elected it could adopt a new program and statute.

An hour-long break followed, in the course of which and in line with Momir Bulatovic's proposal, a draft letter to LCY members and congress delegates will be drawn up.

At the end of today's discussion, participants of the consultative-working LCY Central Committee session endorsed the letter addressing the LCY members, bodies, organizations and the delegates of the recessed, Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress.

The letter first assesses that the declarations of the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress and the material of the LCY Central Committee Presidium drawn up within the framework of the preparations for the resumption of the congress' work lay down good foundations and preconditions for the LCY preservation and development on the basis of a coherent program and statute.

The LCY Central Committee members attending today's consultative-working session noted that due to the lack of a quorum, that is, due to the absence of LCY Central Committee members from several republican organizations, they could not have held a plenary session. Therefore, in this way they are addressing the members and, in doing so, express their willingness to give a full contribution to the LCY preservation and development.

We call on all LCY members, LC organizations and bodies wanting to continue with and affirm historical values and modern transformation of the LCY and wanting to invest effort in resolving the existing problems, to contact the LCY Central Committee Presidium with concrete proposals, the letter states. All proposals will be appropriately considered and used in the further work on the preparations for the resumption of the 14th congress or in the work of a new LCY Congress. On the basis of this and in line with the prepared proposals of the Presidium and the LCY Central Committee, it is proposed that the Extraordinary 14th LCY Congress resume its work by the end of April. Prior to this, an LCY Central Committee session should be held on 14 April, at which proposals of the members and LC organizations would be summed up and the date of the 14th Congress' third plenary session would be set.

The character and outcome of the congress depend on the response of the members and LCY organizations, that is, it will be known only then whether the third plenary session can be regarded as the continuation of the started congress or as the founding congress of a new party. The letter notes the need for the LC to be transformed into a modern, Yugoslav, democratic, and efficient party. It expresses a deep concern over the LCY's fate and overall social trends in Yugoslavia. We regard as necessary, the letter states, to invest additional effort in securing that the LCY continues to be the most important political force of the Yugoslav community, despite its momentary difficulties, and misunderstandings and conflicts between some leaderships.

Pancevski Speaks at Session

LD3003214190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1301 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Mar (TANJUG)—The League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] sees its perspective primarily in the consistent and comprehensive implementation of the social reforms that it put forward at its Extraordinary 14th Congress. This task is all the more difficult and responsible because the LCY, following the adjournment of the 14th LCY Congress and the one sided-secession of the Slovene League of Communists [LC] from the composition of the LCY, has faced vast problems of being denied existence as the uniform Yugoslav political party under the modern circumstances, the LCY Central Committee [CC] Presidium president, Milan Pancevski, said in his speech at today's session of the party plenum.

The principal causes behind the overall situation and the adjournment of the work of the 14th LCY Congress are much deeper and more complex than it was manifested at the congress, including also the departure of the Slovenian delegates. This is essentially a matter of the consequences of the social and political problems accumulated over the years that have been facing the LC and our society. These have generated differing attitudes toward certain fundamental issues regarding the LC and the social project of our further development, something that is conveyed by our dilemmas about the methods of advancing socialism and self-management, the character and the role of the Yugoslav federation, the development of interethnic relations, and the character, role, and unity of the LCY. [passage indistinct]

On the other hand, certain positive processes have also been initiated in the LCY, particularly in respect of the most crucial questions of the LC's transformation, such as its further democratization and its preparations for operating under the new circumstances of a multiparty system and the further crystallization of those stands that should become the fundamental contents of the LCY's new program and statute, etc.

While proceeding from the congress' conclusions and the demands of its grass roots, the LCY has historic responsibility and obligation to carry out the necessary political preparations to establish unity on new programmatic and statutory bases and to embark in the congress to resolve the chief problems that have led to its state of affairs today, Pancevski stressed.

Any further procrastination, without some fundamental reason, can only negatively influence the LCY's position and abilities in each of its parts across the entire Yugoslav political realm.

Nevertheless, the LCY has a basis for such political preparations in the already prepared and amended documents for the congress, particularly in its declaration, as well as in the stands prepared—through active participation on the part of the central and provincial committees and the LC Committee in the Yugoslav Peoples' Army—by the LCY Central Committee Presidium for today's sessions. It is also a fact that the other parts of the LCY have radically innovated their program along democratic lines of their own transformation and in keeping with a multiparty model of political organization and modern political development.

Despite all the efforts of the LCY bodies, above all by the LCY Central Committee Presidium, in preserving the unity of the LCY as a new political organization founded on a new basis, we must nevertheless be aware of the fact that the adjournment of the 14th LCY Congress constituted a serious political event in the LCY's history and that, apart from the great deal of patience and responsibility, its continuation also requires mutually agreed elements in order to complete the congress and thus create prerequisites for a quicker reform of the LCY. We believe, Pancevski pointed out, that favorable and widely accepted preconditions have been created for facilitating realistically and in a principled way the continuation of the work of the congress with radically renewed contents, commitments, and relations, having accepted and agreed in principle on those questions that turned out to be disputable and influenced the work of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress. On the other hand, the continuation of the work of the congress will essentially mean a departure from everything that was objectively outdated in the character and role of the LCY and its relations, that is, in its commitments.

We must not succumb to those occurrences and tendencies of the propaganda and political pressures on the part of certain political forces that want to impose the theory about the definitive disintegration of the LCY and negate its historic role in the development of the country up to now by setting out to destroy our country's constitutional order. On the other hand, certain LCY parts deny the legitimacy of the LCY top bodies. Based on the LCY statute and the conclusions passed by the congress, it is, however, clear that the LCY Central Committee and its other organs are legal and legitimate.

Irrespective of the LCY's departure from the position of the state party, certain forces will nevertheless be deliberately trying to project the controversies and problems surrounding the character of the LCY's unity onto relations within the Yugoslav federation and oppose the commitment to a democratic, efficient, and modern federation. This danger is all the greater since the pressures and motives for destroying the LCY's unity through various separatist and unitarist concepts are, in fact, the manifestation and the result of the current political situation in the country, whereby so-called national programs are dominant and claim ever more recognition; the ones that glorify the nation and the national state are viewed as the only interest and the only achievement of man's freedoms.

Such negative processes and relations, nationalism being their common demoninator, are not only influencing the disintegration of the LCY but are also disintegrating and destroying the fundamental scio-economic and political links of our community.

It is therefore obvious that all of our problems about the character of the LCY and its unity and relations have wide political significance and influence the entire social, economic, and political relations within the federal community. It is also clear that we must essentially overcome the familiar problems about unity in the LCY in a serious and democratic atmosphere, since it is obvious that in addition to the adjournment of the congress they are also an additional and very significant negative factor for the country's further destabilization. This responsibility is all the more important now as the initial results of the economic reform are already visible.

Stressing that in new circumstances the principal criteria for the survival of the LCY as the Yugoslav political party will be its capability to express a Yugoslav synthesis of the interests of all our nationalities, without any kind of majority rule, or dictates and blockades on the part of a minority, Pancevski added that a very significant and principled question arises: whether a consensus on the yet unresolved questions can be reached in the course of the preparations of the continuation of the congress.

The LCY and all other League of Communists leaderships build their principled and political stand on what the meaning and contents are of the unified program commitments and the LCY's unity along new premises, he explained. For, in some parts of the LCY there are certain program commitments and aims of strategic significance to the League of Communists and society that are at odds, or decisively different from, the commitments of the other League of Communists parts. For example, attitude toward socialism, the federation, the equality of the Yugoslav nations and nationalities, the country's integrity and independence and so on are such questions. In such circumstances, the key criteria for defining unity in the organizational and programmatic sense will be the degree of resemblance of the global and strategic programmatic aims shared by certain parts of the League of Communists rather than any sort of formally proclaimed affiliation to the LCY as the Yugoslav political party.

From the adjournment of the work of the 14th Extraordinary Congress until today, several points of view have been expressed in bodies of LCY parts on further work in the LCY, Pancevski recalled. According to one of them, the congress should be continued as soon as possible at precisely the point where it stopped at the last adjourned plenary session. Others, who are also for the continuation of the congress, stress that prior to this it is vital to create the conditions for the participation of all LCY parts in the congress, something that implies prior resolution of a specific number of questions of importance for the continuation of the congress itself. However, we must take note of the fact that for "the Slovene League of Communists-Party of Democratic Renewal," the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress has ended and that, on the basis of the decision of the first conference of the Slovene League of Communists, it has left the LCY. Finally, the Croatian League of Communists Central Committee has proposed the holding of a new LCY congress, and such proposals are also being made by the presidia of the Bosnia-Hercegovina League of Communists Cental Committee and the Macedonian League of Communists Central Committee, which do not exclude the possibility of the continuatiion of the 14th Extraordinary Congress.

In all this, the LCY Central Committee must also bear in mind the very broad-based general party discussion that is taking place in basic LC organizations and their leaderships, and the demands that prevail in it for the continuation of the work of the congress and for the LCY's organization in new circumstances.

Some also think that the declaration that has been put forward and complemented by amendments represents a basis for the continuation of the congress, and, accompanied by changes in the draft statute and changes in the rule book on the congress' work, would ensure the continuation of the work and the election of new LCY bodies with the fundamental task of preparing in the shortest possible period—within one year at the most—a new LCY program and statute, and in this way of holding the 14th LCY Congress.

All these are the circumstances in which the LCY Central Committee Presidium operated and worked in preparing this session. In the consultations with the bodies of LCY parts, the view was taken in the Presidium that it is our task and obligation to carry out, on the basis of the conclusions of the congress, all the necessary political preparations for the holding of an LCY Central Committee session as rapidly as possible, at which we should adopt a decision on the further work of the congress.

This is why the Presidium set about operational and concrete work and the launching of an initiative in this field, attempting to ensure direct linkage with LC bodies in all parts of the LCY, including the Slovene LC organization. To this end, a document has been compiled in the Presidium concerning issues and proposals in connection with the adjournment and concerning proposals for the further work of the 14th LCY Extraordinary Congress, which was previously considered and accepted in all parts of the LCY and sent on to today's discussion.

Recalling the basic orientations in this document, Pancevski stressed that the tendencies and behavior that are tantamount to isolation, blockade, or th negation of the work of LCY bodies bear the major political responsibility for its disintegration, and that they are, at the same time, on a direct collision course with the orientations of the congress and the conferences and the broadest membership of the LCY. In addition to the known, clearly political motives and desires to conceal their own responsibility for the overall situation in the LCY, the real essence of these demands, which have been initiated to a considerable extent in the Slovene LC, is the attitude toward the role and character of the federation, the Yugoslav People's Army, and toward the position of the federal bodies as a whole, and in this context also toward the position of the LCY Central Committee. In essence this is a matter of the extreme marginalization of the role of LCY bodies.

If, in the further work and preparations, we establish even more consistent and agreed program documents—and I believe that with the draft of this document we are on the road to achieving this—the vital political preconditions for the continuation of the 14th Extraordinary Congress and for its successful completion with the adoption of program documents and the election of new bodies in the LCY are ensured, Pancevski assessed.

It appears that this is a formal question and it is unproductive to exhaust ourselves in exacerbating the problems of whether the continuation of the work of a united LCY should be raised in the context of the continuation of the 14th Extraordinary Congress or in the context of the organization and renaming of this congress as the 15th congress. According to the LCY Central Committee Presidium's proposals, which have obtained support in LC organizations in the republics, provinces and the LC organization in the Yugoslav People's Army, the congress would work in accordance with a reduced agenda and with an altered rule book concerning its work, and with corresponding statutory changes setting out a new way of decision making in the LCY and the election of members of LCY bodies. The declaration would represent a basic program document pending the elaboration of a new LCY program, and here amendments to the text of the declaration, as well as new amendments and proposals that should be established by the Central Committee, would be taken into consideration.

I believe that the document put forward by the LCY Central Committee Presidium provides a principled and fundamentally agreed platform as to how to continue work in the LCY.

We believe that the documents for the 14th Extraordinary Congress that have been put forward, and in particular the declaration, represent a very important and radical move forward in terms of the LCY program on almost all program questions. It is also a quite clear and decidedly affirmed orientation of the LCY Central Committee that within an optimal period a new LCY program and statute be adopted, and here the holding of a new congress within a one-year period is proposed in the LCY Central Committee document. Therefore, the orientation concerning the holding of a new LCY congress is widely accepted, in other words, is least controversial. However, on the one hand, this orientation does not refute or negate in any essential way the need to continue and successfully complete the 14th Extraordinary Congress, in a modified sense of course, as is proposed in the document. On the contrary, the ending of the work of the 14th Extraordinary Congress, in essence, represents a specific transitional solution that can only be ensured by the preconditions for a new congress. On the other hand, if we truly want a new LCY congress, at which a new program and statute would be adopted, I believe that we need at least a year for the congress to be successful, indeed, it is necessary to prepare a complex, intensified, new, and agreed program and statute of the LCY, and here it is vitally important to ensure the overall involvement of the LCY and all creative forces within it. At the same time, the new congress requires the fulfilling of statutory obligations and completely new elections for delegates and for new members of LCY bodies. I believe that it is simply an illusion to think that all this can be achieved in a relatively short period.

Starting from the standpoint that the orientation to hold a new congress is undisputed, delay in completing the work of the 14th Extraordinary Congress objectively speaking has, and can have, major negative consequences for the overall position and authority of the LCY, especially in each republic and province and LC organization. The vacuum in activity, and the disorientation and the prolongation of uncertainty and confrontation, not only have an extremely negative effect on the LCY membership but also encourage all LC political oppoenents to have an arrogant destructive attitude toward it and express an unprecedented nihilism toward everything that has been achieved. Therefore, the attitude toward extending the work of the congress is, in essence, the atttiude toward the issue of the LCY's consistency and character as a Yugosalv political party, in other words, toward the continuity of the basic achievements and values of Yugoslav socialist society and the federal character of our community, Milan Pancevski, LCY Central Committee Presidium president, concluded.

Proposals on Party's Future

LD3003205390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1711 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Letter from the 30 March session of the consultative-working League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Central Committee to the party organizations and bodies and the delegates of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress]

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Mar (TANJUG)— To the LCY members, organizations and bodies and the delegates of the 14th Extraordinary LCY congress:

We, LCY Central Committee members, have come to the 31st LCY Central Committee session and noted that, due to the lack of a quorum, which is due to the absence of LCY Central Committee members from several republican organizations, we cannot hold a plenary session. Therefore, we concluded by exchanging views and stances in connection with a possible resumption of the work of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress, at a working-consultative meeting.

We knew that since the break off of the congress until today, several meetings were held in the LCY Central Committee Presidium, but we were only informed about them through brief statements. On the basis of the material we received for the plenary session, we assumed that the main differences were removed and that a higher degree of unity existed between all LCY parts. In discussing activities in all LCY parts aimed at transforming the LCY into a modern, Yugoslav, democratic, and efficient party, we noted at today's gathering that we ourselves are not sufficiently well informed about these and that the LCY members are incomparably less well informed. The LCY declaration for democratic socialism and federal Yugoslavia and the material of the LCY Central Committee Presidium—"The Issues and Proposals Regarding the Interruption and Further Work of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress"—lay down, according to us, sound grounds and presuppositions for preserving and developing the LCY on the basis of coherent programs and statutory foundations. However, although there are no essential differences, this time too we have witnessed insufficient differences; this time too we have witnessed insufficient willingness to understand each other and readiness, perhaps, to label even good intentions as evil ones. Therefore, in expressing our willingness to make our full contribution to LCY development on the new program and organizational basis, we address LCY members and propose as follows:

1. That all LCY members who want to continue and affirm historical values and the modernization of the LCY should devote efforts to resolve the existing problems and send us their views and proposals. All proposals will be appropriately summed up, considered and used in further LCY work on the preparations for the resumption of the congress and a later, new LCY congress, and in all proposals regarding the LCY's transformation.

2. That on the basis of this and in line with the prepared proposals for the work of the Presidium and the LCY Central Committee, the third plenary session of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress be convened and held by the end of April at the latest. At the next session, to be held on 14 April, we will sum up the reactions and proposals of the LCY members and organizations, and set the date for the third plenary session of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress. We propose that the session work according to the following agenda:

—The endorsement of the LCY declaration for democratic socialism and a federal Yugoslavia;

—Adoption of decisions regarding the drafting of a new program and statute;

—Setting the date for the new LCY congress;

—Confirmation of the composition of the LCY bodies elected by the republican and provincial organizations and the LCY organizations in the Yugoslav People's Army.

The success of the plenary session, that is, the issue of whether it can be regarded as the continuation of the congress that has started or as the founding assembly of a new party willing to continue positive LCY values, depends on the response of LCY members and organizations.

3. That this gathering establish the tasks, exponents, and date of a new congress that is to adopt a new program and statute for the LCY's transformation, that is, a new party. Rapid changes in the democratic life of our country demand that all left-wing, socialist, and social democratic parties be called to cooperate.

4. That all delegates of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress and the LCY bodies, as soon as possible, and at the latest in 10 days, submit to us their opinions and suggestions about the possible continuation of the congress.

As LCY Central Committee members, we are deeply concerned for the fate of our political organization and the overall social trends in Yugoslavia; we believe it is necessary to devote additional efforts to securing that and to convince ourselves that the LCY—despite momentary difficulties, misunderstandings, and conflicts between some leaderships—continues to be the most important political force in the Yugoslav community. Encouraged by the program of the economic integration of Yugoslavia, which is being implemented through the measures of economic reform and the democratization of political life, we believe ourselves to be duty-bound to strengthen overall Yugoslavia political support for all SFRY state bodies.

At the same time, we are aware of the existing problems and limitations in which we live. New processes of electoral democracy and all changes in the political organization of society will inevitably lead to big changes in certain LCY parts. Inevitably, various political alliances will be formed, as well as other forms of cooperation and association. True, the most important thing will not be what parties are called, but what their politial goals and programs are. We will not regard as opponents, and even less as enemies, those who hold different views. We must develop the spirit of mutual tolerance and cooperation, the spirit of political competition, which will observe new democratic rules of conduct.

Belgrade, 30 March 1990

[Signed] The LCY Central Committee members attending the working-consultative session.

Serbian Political Groups Elect Leaders

LD3103171490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1557 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 31 Mar (TANJUG)—More than 100 Democratic Forum suporters and about 70 sympathizers and members of the Social Democratic Alliance of Serbia (a republican branch of the Social Democratic Alliance of Yugoslavia) elected leaders today at their founding assemblies. Milan Nikolic was elected by a majority of the votes as the Social Democratic Alliance of Serbia chairman, while the Democratic Forum, an alternative organization that for the time being is not aspiring to appear in the elections, elected an executive committee of 25 members but did not appoint a leader. [passage omitted]

Gosev on Macedonians Not Attending LCY Plenum

AU3003200790 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Boris Djordjioski report]

[Text] [Announcer] Why did all of the members from Macedonia not attend today's session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY]? Petar Gosev, Central Committee president of the

League of Communists of Macedonia-Party of Democratic Renewal [Partija Demokratske Obnove], tried to explain that at a news conference. Here is a report by Boris Djordjioski:

[Djordjioski] Petar Gosev first pointed out that no influence was exerted on the Macedonian Communists to decide whether to attend today's session or not. Because the members from Slovenia and Croatia are not attending, the meeting has no legitimacy in making decisions, so it was thought that the session should be adjourned and a new, better one prepared.

This was one of the reasons not to take part in this meeting. The other is the fact that none of the demands that Macedonian Communists had made was taken into consideration. The demands were: This session should be turned into a consultative meeting that will not make any decisions; the remainder of the LCY Central Committee Presidium should resign; and a coordinating body should be formed for the reorganization of the LCY and for the preparations for the congress. At the session of the LCY Central Committee Presidium held on 29 March, these demands were outvoted and therefore rejected, Gosev said.

Members of the LCY Central Committee from Macedonia held a meeting on 29 March, too, at which they demanded the resignation of the entire LCY Central Committee if the method of work applied so far is not changed. It was feared that the manner of the LCY Presidium consultations held on 29 March may be continued at the LCY Central Committee session, Gosev said, and it is irresponsible to enter exhausting mutual conflicts and, following such an empty debate, adopt conclusions that will oblige nobody.

As far as Milan Pancevski, LCY Central Committee Presidium president, and Presidium member Milan Varoslija are concerned, Petar Gosev said that they do not enjoy the support of the Macedonian Communists and that the rest of the Presidium should resign, both because of the disunity within it and because of the need for some new people to create a new policy.

Durakovic Explains Bosnia LC's Walkout

LD3003203290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2007 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 30 Mar (TANJUG)—The Bosnia-Hercegovina League of Communists LC president, Nijaz Durakovic, said at a news conference tonight that the crucial reason for the members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee [LCY CC] from this republic walking out of the LCY CC session was their disagreement with the stances of the introductory speaker. The speaker had urged that this session's work be rendered valid and resumed in spite of the fact that the members from Slovenia, Croatia, and a considerable number from Macedonia had not attended it. We wanted, he said, this session to assume a working and consultative character that would not make decisions in so truncated a form about the crucial issues of the LCY, particularly not about the ones such as convening the continuation of the congress or of convening a new one. Our stand from an even earlier occasion was that a working group should be formed at the LCY level comprising representatives of all the nine LC organizations of the republics, provinces and the Yugoslav People's Army, which would try to reach an agreement at the Yugoslav level on at least the issues crucial to the party's unity.

Durakovic stressed that Peter Skundric, who had delivered the introductory address, had proposed, practically without the LCY CC Presidium's approval, that the CC session be continued by the composition that included only 87 members, as he also had put forward a series of crucial proposals, including, among others, the date of the congress. Although such decisions could not be made without a quorum, this reduced composition opted for a method of outvoting. He regarded this as a stupendous procedural swindle, undemocratic and arrogant, while lacking proposals verified by the country's party leadership, although the latter had been asked to decide about these prior to the agenda itself. Durakovic also said all the Bosnia-Hercegovina delegation's six proposals had been outvoted and rejected. Finally, he pointed out there is also willingness for further dialogue in the coming period about the LCY's fate that would be carried on about the party's activities along new principles.

Kosovo LC on Failure To Attend LCY Plenum

LD3103200290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1502 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Pristina, 31 Mar (TANJUG)—In connection with the course and outcome of the 30 March League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee [LCY CC] session, the Kosovo League of Communists [LC] Provincial Committee Presidium today adopted a statement in which it describes the failure to come to and the walkout from the LCY CC session by its members and individual parts of the LCY as "an extremely undemocratic act that, objectively speaking, frustrates the positive processes that have begun in the transformation of the LC and its survival as a Yugoslav political party."

After the adjournment of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress and the serious political consequences caused by this adjournment, especially in Kosovo, we were awaiting the LCY CC session, the statement says, with optimism. We were convinced that in the meantime the main controversial questions and essential differences had been overcome, that the necessary preconditions had been created in order to successfully bring to an end the work of the 14th Extraordinary Congress, and to then immediately set about the elaboration of a new program, statute, and preparations for a new congress. However, the LC at this juncture has imposed interference in terms of quasi-democratic activity, which most frequently is only verbally based on the true freedom of each person's democratic political expression.

Thus, in the current situation in the very environments that are declaring themselves most vocally in favor of alleged democracy, party leaderships are imposing themselves as the interpreters of the one and only will of the LCY membership, the membership of the LCY CC, and delegates of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress and their organizations. They are taking over the authority that in every democratic political party can only be assumed by its congress, and they are declaring as illegitimate the legally elected organs of the LCY, in other words decisions that the congress approved in a united and democratic way. [passage omitted]

Markovic, Agricultural Representatives Meet

LD3003224790 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1040 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Osijek, 30 Mar (TANJUG)—Agriculture has a key role in the realization of the program of the economic reforms, and as a result, special attention is devoted to it in the FEC [Federal Executive Council] measures, and this will continue to be done. This is the key statement voiced today in Osijek in the talks between FEC President Ante Markovic and several FEC members, including Vice President Aleksandar Mitrovic, and representatives of Yugoslav social and private sector agriculture, and the banks and other institutions and organizations connected with the monitoring of agricultural production.

The talks with Ante Markovic and members of the FEC, which are being held in the Osijek industrial agricultural combine, are being attended by about 400 representatives of Yugoslav agriculture from all regions of Yugoslavia. The topic of the talks is the position of agriculture in the context of the implementation of the economic reform measures. [passage omitted: need for greater economic rationality; the importance of agricultural exports; agriculture is an important factor in the stabilization of the overall economy]

In the planning of agricultural policy in the context of the elaboration of the program for implementing overall reforms in the economy, in society and in the political system, our basic orientation has been that we wish to have a wealthy peasant farmer in a rich and free democratic country.

This was stressed, among other things, this afternoon in Osijek by FEC President Ante Markovic in his address to about 400 representatives of Yugoslav agriculture from the social, cooperative and private sectors, and to representatives of the banks and other institutions and organizations which are monitoring agricultural production. The talks were also attended by FEC Vice President Aleksandar Mitrovic, and Antun Milovic, president of the Executive Council of the Croatian Assembly.

The aspiration toward our having a wealthy peasant-farmer does not imply that society's measures will further only private sector agriculture, but, Ante Markovic stressed, all kinds of ownership in agriculture, which means the industrial, cooperative, mixed and social sectors will receive equal social treatment. Nevertheless, this certainly means most for the peasant farmers because, over the last more than 40 years, they have been in a completely subordinate position as compared with the social sector of agriculture. Ante Markovic stressed that the economic policy measures will also facilitate the transformation of one kind of ownership in agriculture into another, which means social and cooperative ownership into private ownership and vice versa, depending on how people in a concrete situation and environment tackle and adapt to the requirements and competitive conditions in the domestic and foreign market.

Ante Markovic stressed the state would assist and stimulate the development of agriculture, something the new FEC has been doing to a large extent with concrete measures and solutions over the past year. This is, moreover, the practice in all developed countries of the world. However, this in no way means the interference of the state in agricultural policy in the old way by setting prices and suchlike, but only the creation of a framework and setting and corresponding conditions for the development of agriculture on modern bases so that it might be able to confirm itself in competition on the domestic and foreign market. Thus, the battle for more modern, rational, and effective production in the given new conditions remains a matter for the subjects themselves in agriculture, from peasant-farmers to cooperatives and combines.

Ante Markovic also stressed that space should also be opened up for the revitalization of villages but not in the sense of a return to the old village, but to develop a modern village such as exists in the most developed countries of the world. Markovic stressed that, in view of the great importance of agriculture for the overall stabilization of the economy, the FEC has in the past year devoted special attention to this sector. Only agriculture obtains support in terms of funds from federal budget—and these are not small. These funds amount to about one billion dollars, which is about 9-10 percent of the social product generated by agriculture in our country, in other words this is about 17 percent of the total budget. We are aware this is not what the most developed countries give to agriculture, but this is at the upper limits of what the federation can provide, Ante Markovic said. Here he added that the question is being raised as to what, apart from the federation, the republics and provinces and the municipaliteis themselves are doing in terms of stimulating agriculture. Obviously they are not doing enough, Ante Markovic concluded, because you have also stated on several occasions in these talks that the FEC measures are very good, but are still not making themselves felt sufficiently on the ground in agricultural organizations, and especially in relation to the position of peasant farmers.

Ante Markovic maintained that in some environments, mentioning here in concrete terms the Socialist Autonomous Province [SAP] of Vojvodina as the largest grain producer, funds for significantly increasing personal incomes beyond legal possibilities have all too easily been spent—and also at the expense of resources and common consumption—and now there are voices coming from combines in these and some other environments that the situation with illiquidity is untenable. Markovic stressed that the problem of liquidity will in no way and cannot be resolved by the printing of money, but greater financial funds can be obtained only by more rational and efficient business operations in the market, and he stated here that prices should be reduced. He stressed that solutions have been discovered to ensure sufficient funds for carrying out the spring harvest, which in the country should be performed over about 3 million hectares, but that in the process strict account has been taken so that the established global monetary policy is maintained.

Speaking about the import of food products, Markovic said things have been and will be taken into acount so that domestic production is not threatened by imports, but agriculture must be exposed to competition from imports, too, so that it might seek optimal international solutions to be competitive in the market. Illustrating his concern about domestic production, Markovic said the protection prices for livestock were established yesterday and that the federal commodity reserves are prepared to purchase all quantities of livestock at these prices.

Otherwise, as a society we are interested in the greatest possible agricultural exports.

Speaking about the vital need to involve all subjects in the country in the implementation of the intentions of the economic and social reforms, which means overcoming the crisis and more stable development, Markovic said serious resistance to these measures as also being felt.

We counted on the resistance of conservative, dogmatic, and separatist forces, as well as of those who have a monopoly position in society, because the radically new things we are implementing in society are threatening their position and ambitions. However, despite the resistance, the positive results provided by the FEC measures are in evidence. Inflation has been halted and should this month approximately amount to the planned one percent.

All realistic conditions exist for the exchange rate of seven dinar to one deutsche mark to be maintained. We have at our disposal foreign exchange reserves of about $7.6 billion, despite the fact that the purchase of foreign curency in the banks and the liberalization of imports are a reality. This convertibility of the dinar and the curbing of inflation should stimulate economic subjects to construct their market programs and development on this basis, and not continue to speculate and wait. Markovic stressed, however, that the implementation of the reforms cannot go ahead without the payment of a certain "social price," which means that the question of technological surpluses should be resolved adequately, and irrational and uncompetitive production abandoned. However, some people are now using this need—to resolve social questions with the aim of successfully implementing the reforms —in an incorrect way in the multiparty preelection one-upmanship.

Analyzing the need for the reform of state structures, Markovic stressed what we need is a modern state organization where, from the municpality and republic to the federation, each will have his autonomy and where the question of the constitutional position of a republic is not raised, but the federation should also be made capable of successfully performing its constitutional role.

Ante Markovic, at the end of the talks, assessed as very positive the numerous speches by the representatives of agriculture who were present, stressing the FEC would most attentively consider the multitude of proposals, suggestions, and criticisms because the FEC program remains open for the most rational solutions, but does not deviate from the established strategic guidelines of reform.

Serbian Democratic Party Holds Founding Assembly

LD3103164290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Summary] The Serbian Democratic Party's founding assembly took place in Benkovacko Selo near Benkovac. The meeting was addressed by party Chairman Jovan Raskovic. He said the party stands for freedom, democracy, and tolerance, and is open to cooperation with other parties. The Serbian people in Croatia want equality with Croats. He said the Serbs in Croatia recognize the values of Slobodan Milosevic who, he said, has given back to Serbs hope and faith in the future. At the same time, however, the party does not support the remnants of Bolshevik-type behavior.

Serbian Political Groups Elect Leaders

LD3103171490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1557 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 31 Mar (TANJUG)—More than 100 Democratic Forum suporters and about 70 sympathizers and members of the Social Democratic Alliance of Serbia (a republican branch of the Social Democratic Alliance of Yugoslavia) elected leaders today at their founding assemblies. Milan Nikolic was elected by a majority of the votes as the Social Democratic Alliance of Serbia chairman, while the Democratic Forum, an alternative organization that for the time being is not aspiring to appear in the elections, elected an executive committee of 25 members but did not appoint a leader. [passage omitted]

Pristina Roundtable To View Democratic Initiatives

AU3003191490 Pristina Domestic Service in Albanian 1700 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] A two-day roundtable began today in Pristina to coordinate democratic initiatives with the following theme: human rights and democracy in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. This is a continuation of the roundtable talks and consultations by various alternative groups held in Sarajevo on democracy in Yugoslavia.

From the very beginning, it was apparent that the Council for the Truth on Kosovo intended to force the representatives of Kosovo alternative groups to declare whether they are in favor of Yugoslavia and a unified Serbia, as well as of the [word indistinct] program approved some time ago by the Serbian Assembly, and whether they are committed to the return of Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo. The council representatives also insisted that the alternative groups distance themselves from everything that has happened in Kosovo. Otherwise, they stated, we will leave this table.

The representative of the People's Radical Party of Serbia supported the stand of the representative of the Council for the Truth on Kosovo, stating that this is only a minimal condition for beginning the talks.

Answering the aforementioned speakers, Dr. Veton Surroi [Kosovo Human Rights Defense Council chairman] said: In addition to everything else, you are considerably arrogant. However, this is my answer to your statement: First of all, we are, all of us here, citizens of Yugoslavia and we do not have to declare our stands in any way, because we all have the same kind of passport.

Following this exchange, the representatives of the Council for the Truth About Kosovo and those of the People's Radical Party of Serbia left the meeting.

The roundtable was then addressed by [first name indistinct] Popovic, president of the Commission for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, on the causes of the conflict in Kosovo.

The participants will attend a theatrical performance this evening.

Kosovo Serbs Leave Alternative Groups' Meeting

AU3003204190 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] A roundtable meeting organized by the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative opened a debate on human rights and democracy in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia in Pristina today. At the beginning, the meeting was attended by the representatives of all alternative movements in Kosovo. Here is a report by Milivoje Mihajlovic:

[Mihajlovic] Before the debate began, Mirko Cupic, Committee for the Truth About Kosovo representative, had insisted that leaders of the Albanian alternative movements should state whether they accept a united Serbia, Yugoslavia as a common homeland, and the Republic of Serbia's program on solving the Kosovo problem. He also wanted leaders of Albanian alternative movements to publicly condemn Albanian separatism and nationalism, all forms of attacks against the Slavic population, as well as other activities aimed at destroying Serbia and Yugoslavia. Serbian Radical Party for Kosovo representatives also deemed these demands minimum conditions for holding talks on problems in the province. It was said that if representatives of Albanian movements fail to accept holding talks as citizens of Serbia, there will be no talks.

While committee representatives and the Radical Party presented their demands, one could occasionally hear laughter in the hall. After they were told that no conditions for holding the talks will be accepted and their demands were not met, the Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo demonstratively walked out. The meeting then continued as if nothing had happened.

Kosovo Democratic Alliance Notes Situation

AU3003202890 Pristina Domestic Service in Albanian 1700 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Today the Kosovo Democratic Alliance held its regular news conference, at which journalists were handed a communique about the latest situation in Kosovo. The communique begins with a number of points pertaining to the reorganization of the internal affairs and state security forces in Kosovo and the arrival of an additional 2,500 militia members and a number of state security officers from Serbia.

On the other hand, the communique points out that within a short period the number of those who have been suspended, dismissed, or transferred to other duties was considerable. These measures, adds the communique, were taken on the basis of Amendment 43 of the Constitution granting Serbia considerably greater rights over the autonomy of Kosovo. This autonomy has practically ceased to exist, the communique goes on to say.

The communique adds that this determination to use repressive measures is in fact a reflection of weakness and that the dispatching of additional militia to Kosovo will have grave consequences in Serbia itself. The reorganization of security organs has resulted in only those who are obedient occupying leading positions in the province.

The Kosovo Democratic Alliance also comments on the poisoning of a large number of young Albanians and on the stand of the appropriate organizations that, it says, have acted irresponsibly. The communique also expresses dissatisfaction with the measures undertaken to date by the responsible organizations to investigate the matter. This has only exacerbated the situation, in that physical attacks have taken place against Serbs and Montenegrins in various areas, attacks that we condemn absolutely, as we condemn all violence on the part of those forces wishing to cause interethnic conflicts in order to be able to manipulate people.

Security Operation in Kosovo Extended

LD3003222490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1703 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Mar (TANJUG)—According to a decision of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic [SR] of Serbia, the republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs will carry out the tasks it has taken over in Kosovo as long as required by the security situation, it was made clear in a statement today by republican Internal Affairs Secretary Radmilo Bogdanovic.

In his interview with RILINDJA, the republican secretary for internal affairs implies that the Serbian SR Secretariat for Internal Affairs will extend its takeover of organizing state security tasks and their execution for another year and the tasks of the public security service for a month.

In this connection, we ask you to publish the following:

"The above one-year term and one-month term do not refer to the period of carrying out the transferred tasks. Following the decision of the SR of Serbia Presidency, the republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs will carry out the tasks taken over in Kosovo as long as required by the security situation, something that is assessed and decided upon by the SR of Serbia Presidency.

"Therefore, the given terms should only refer to those periods during which staff in Kosovo will be replaced. This replacement will be carried out on the three-month and six-month basis or annually, depending on the charter of individual duties and tasks."

Commentary on Milosevic Policy in Kosovo

AU0104135290 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 27 Mar 90 p 5

[Boris Jez commentary: Suspension of Kosovo Autonomy"]

[Text] The mass poisoning (or "poisoning") in Kosovo appears as another act of the Yugoslav political melodrama, which in fact would be a kitschy operetta were it not for the tanks, tear gas, and bloodshed. At first sight, this melodrama does not contain any clear story and rather involves a kind of a swell of people and events, but nevertheless it often indicates a malevolent covert presence of a "transcendent" moving force, a deus ex machina.

The Albanians in Kosovo should first ask themselves why all the disorders and demonstrations do not help them achieve anything; on the contrary, all the waves of dissatisfaction by the majority population have ended so far with the strengthening of Belgrade's hegemony. This happened a year ago when Serbia adopted the constitutional amendments and downgraded the two autonomous provinces, and it will obviously happen now when the anniversary of the event is under preparation. By the way: With 28 March as a Serbian national day, Slobodan Milosevic erected himself a monument while he is still alive; his name has risen above St. Sava, Prince Lazar, Karadjordje, and other giants of Serbian history, who lack "their own" holidays.

It seems that Belgrade has skillfully exploited the poisoning (or "poisoning") and will virtually disband the Kosovo police, which undoubtedly will be a holiday present to the Serbian masses. The holiday celebrations, by the way, would be even greater if by 28 March, Slovenia would pay what it does not want to pay; according to some reports, it has been given an ultimatum to pay by that day. One should also include the pressure on the Kosovo Assembly to give its consent to the initiative of the state Presidency for the change in the federal Constitution, and to the proposed republican bill on internal affairs. Belgrade has been thus preparing for some time to subordinate the provincial police and the poisoning (or "poisoning") affair was more than welcome. Slobodan Milosevic is implementing his Kosovo policy "according to the plan" and does not care much for the poor marks he is getting from various international humanitarian organizations; in any case, it is the federation that has to take the rap. It seems that in the past months and weeks, Milosevic rather precisely defined the international "image" that he wants to achieve with his "Thatcher-like unyieldingness." In this respect, he has been helped particularly by the recent events in the USSR and Lithuania, which of course may be interpreted in one way or another. With its silence so far, Belgrade has supported Gorbachev, so to speak, and in this way the "Yugoslav" policy of Serbia in the present internal political situation has gained some legitimacy.

In this context, the recent meeting between Milosevic and the entire Army leadership, at which he figured as the Yugoslav head of state, is more than eloquent. The joint statement on the meeting is unequivocal: The federation should be established as a ruling factor, political freedoms should be restricted, Yugoslavia's territorial integrity should be ensured, etc. Milosevic, of course, gained a few more points with this move, but it is not clear what the generals have gained. With its march into Azerbaijan and now Lithuania, the Soviet Army has lost what little prestige that it succeeded in retaining after Afghanistan, but it seems that our generals fail to, or do not want to, understand this. Thus, the inevitable "redeployment" of tanks is part of the Kosovo political scene these days.

For the sake of international political advertising in connection with Kosovo, the Serbian politicians have chosen another character role, in addition to Gorbachev's Hamlet-like tragedy: the role as the protector of "the holy places" and as a bastion of Western culture. They want to stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel, which skillfully accepts this game, but it is clear that Belgrade is exposing itself to ridicule with the increasing emphasis on the "exclusive" Serbian-Israeli relations. Serbia is supposed to be "historically forced" to treat the

Kosovo Albanians (Palestinians!) harshly, and Milosevic's staff is encouraged by the fact that the Palestine Calvary is somehow slipping out of the world's mind. The formula is rather unlikely to "catch" on in world public opinion, and it will be difficult to convince Paris or London that the bastions against the assaults of Islam on Europe stand precisely in Pristina.

In brief, it is a fact that all such and similar international political calculations by Belgrade stand on very shaky ground, but this does not reduce the dangerous consequences of a "Thatcher-like tenacity." Even with the latest measures by the Serbian authorities, Kosovo is sinking lower and lower to the bottom, where a true armed confrontation may begin, and when others in Yugoslavia will no longer want to share in it. As some people are stressing, Serbia may indeed pull all others with it into a war, but to tell the truth, this is less possible with every year that passes. There is an increasing number of states and peoples (including the Yugoslav peoples) that are prepared to think thrice before they embark on any new adventure for the sake of somebody else.

If Belgrade thinks that Serbia with Kosovo could be some kind of a new Israel in European geopolitics, in particular in the context of a confrontation between religions and civilizations, we indeed have to deal with political desperadoes or adventurists. Such thinking is not serious, to put it mildly, but its consequences are certainly extremely serious indeed.

Slovene Opposition Leader Pucnik on Elections

AU0204091290 Vienna Domestic Service in German 0500 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Interview with Joze Pucnik, leader and presidential candidate of the Demos election platform, by Friedrich Orter in Ljubljana; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Orter] Mr. Pucnik, you colleague Oman once stated that, basically, Slovenia is seeing the first free elections now. After a few weeks of election campaigning, how do you assess the situation?

[Pucnik] These are really the elections that one can describe as the most democratic elections that we have had in long time, specifically since the beginning of World War II. Maybe one has to go back even further.

[Orter] As the opposition, do you expect fair procedures? Who checks the votes?

[Pucnik] The electoral law provides for the possibility of sending observers to the polling stations. The formal details as to who is entitled to appoint them have not been clarified yet. In general, I can say that I expect that there might be individual attempts to rig the elections, but I think that, in general, this will not happen. I hope for a more or less acceptable form of the elections.

[Orter] What results do you expect for Demos?

[Pucnik] Well, it looks as if Demos have very good chances of winning the absolute majority. Of course, one cannot be certain. However, we are hoping for it, and we may even achieve a very clear absolute majority. As far as my candidacy is concerned, everything is still open. Everything suggests that there will be a second round, between Milan Kucan and myself. As I already pointed out, the latest trend suggests that I will win. According to recent information, Kucan is still leading. It is, of course, still very open whether this favorable trend will prevail and whether it will be sufficient.

[Orter] What do you want to change in Slovenia if you win the elections on behalf of Demos?

[Pucnik] Well, we foresee enormous changes. We want to eliminate this political system and all the consequences of this system—in a democratic way, of course, and without violence. We want changes in the educational system, in the control of the police. We want to disband the secret service, etc.

[Orter] However, it is not quite clear upon what path Slovenia will embark if it is to secede from Yugoslavia.

[Pucnik] First of all, things will remain as they are. What we want is the responsibility that allows us to tackle our own problems. The problems are getting worse and are out of control. We must start to tackle them as soon as possible. This means that we will have to cope with the bad economic situation. What we need is the possibility of making our own decisions. Then we know what we can do. We do not have to ask Belgrade all the time what we should do, and so on.

[Orter] You are also against the Yugoslav Army and in favor of a Slovene army. Is this realistic?

[Pucnik] This will not be possible overnight. The first step will be that Slovene soldiers will no longer be able to do their military service in other armies. Then the situation will slowly change.

Independent Slovene Union Founding Congress Held

LD3003222790 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1745 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Ljubljana, 30 Mar (TANJUG)—The founding congress of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Slovenia was held today in Ljubljana. The working Presidium's elected chairman, France Tomsic, said that this federation is an independent, democratic, interest-based, socioeconomic organization of voluntary members, the aim of which is to protect and represent the interests of employees against employers, their associations, and the state.

The federation of Independent Trade Unions of Slovenia is a Slovene organization that, because of different problems, does not intend to link up with other Yugoslav trade unions, France Tomsic stated. He added that this independent, supraparty organization will speak out for a change in the law, particularly in the sphere of economic, material, and social rights. [passage omitted]

Slovene Democratic Alliance Holds Convention

AU0104161890 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 28 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Marko Pecauer report: "Slovene Democratic Alliance Is for Secession"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 27 Mar—A convention of the Slovene Democratic Alliance [SDA] was held in the great hall of the Cankar Center today under the title, "The Project for the Achievement of Slovene Independence." At the convention, numerous distinguished SDA representatives presented their views on the future arrangement of the several spheres of life in Slovenia.

SDA President Dr. Hubert Pozarnik stressed in his introduction that the SDA will win the elections and that therefore it can confidently state now that after 8 or rather 22 April, it will succeed in eliminating the willful rule of Bolshevism in Slovenia, because the victory of Demos, as he put it, will be the proof of the vital force and interests of the Slovene people and democracy. Pozarnik especially greeted the guests attending the SDA convention, including the U.S. consul in Zagreb; Rudolf Suselj, Union of Slovene Americans representative; Dr. Dalibor Brozovic, Croatian Democratic Community vice president; and others.

After Pozarnik, Dr. Dimitrij Rupel stepped on the podium to present the basic characteristics of the Project for the Achievement of Slovene Independence. He said that the SDA stands at a crossroads, and therefore its task is to stop playing the role of the lamb in the fable of the wolf and the lamb. It is not enough, Rupel said, that we incessantly argue that we are not muddying the wolf's water because we are drinking downstream from the wolf; perhaps this is the right time actually to muddy the water and to prove ourselves, not as a herd but as responsible people who know what they want. The SDA has therefore prepared the draft of a new Slovene constitution, which he said could be the basis for the first proper Slovene Constitution. The SDA will submit this draft first to Demos and other parties, and it should be decided upon at a referendum. Having presented the most important points from the draft of the new Slovene constitution, he addressed a few caustic words at the Communists who now assert that they are capable of ensuring a peaceful transition to democracy in Slovenia. "In the past, the Communists have not shown themselves to be very good at searching for the way to democracy; why should they be the only reliable guides on this road?" Dimitrij Rupel concluded.

He was followed by Dr. France Bucar, who presented the basic starting points of the draft of the new constitution, which in the first place contains the stand that Slovenia is a sovereign state of the Slovenes and the citizens of Slovenia, which decides independently on its statehood and its affairs, and thus also on its cooperation with other states. According to this constitution, Slovenia should have a single-chamber representative body (state assembly), a state council as an advisory body to the legislative chamber, a president of the republic (no presidency), a government as a council of ministers, a public administration separated from politics, changes in the communal system, a possibility to change the constitution exclusively at a referendum, and the like.

Dr. Peter Jambrek spoke in more detail about the road to the establishment of a sovereign Slovene state. The SDA will first submit the draft constitution to Demos, and later to an assembly for the constitution, which should be a joint institution of the new Slovene constitutional coalition. The various expert views on the new constitution should be in harmony by the time the new assembly is convened, and at the first session of the assembly, the Slovene opposition would officially propose the initiation of the procedure for the adoption of a new Slovene constitution. The new constitution would be adopted at a referendum, and in his opinion the new Slovene constitution could be promulgated at a session of the Slovene Assembly before the summer recess.

Dr. Rajko Pirnat compared the present situation of Slovenia in Yugoslavia with the state of a colony. In his opinion, it is a most absurd fact that Slovenia has a colonial status in Europe. For Slovenia, Yugoslavia is an alien state, because it has no influence on its decisions. He supported the idea that the new assembly should immediately adopt a declaration on the independence of Slovenia on the basis of constitutional Amendment 10, initiate procedures for the adoption of a new constitution, proclaim that federal laws are no longer valid in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, divest the SFRY state bodies of their right to carry out their tasks in the territory of Slovenia while their tasks are taken over by newly constituted republican organs, and propose a confederal treaty to be concluded with other Yugoslav peoples.

In reply to the growing fears among the people about what will happen after the elections, Janez Jansa said that Slovenia cannot be fully compared with Lithuania. Jansa thinks that a occupation of Slovenia has not been possible since the day the Croatian Spring burst out.

Marjan Cerar talked about the economy of the new Slovene state. After the confederal system is introduced, one will have to act wisely, thoughtfully, and following a precise timetable. The SDA has a clear vision: the settlement of the economy requires autonomy for the several parts of the economy, an integral market, a thorough rearrangement or even complete abolition of some of the present institutions (first of all the Social Accounting Service), and a different management of the banks. As regards social property, state capitalism will be necessary for a short time, followed by a transition to private property owned by those who are prepared to pay for it.

Igor Omerza spoke about Slovenia's own money, which apart from one's army is the key attribute of every sovereign state. In his opinion, the change of money should be carefully prepared and then quickly carried out. He proposed that Demos should at once set up a commission for changing the money, and this commission should prepare laws on the change by the first session of the new Slovene Assembly at the latest. He thinks that by changing the money, we will at once obtain a much harder currency than the present one, which forces us into a fatal embrace with Markovic's monetary fantasies and dictatorial ambitions.

A modern Western state now uses 16 to 20 percent of its social product for its functioning. The Slovenes' quasi-state costs them so much, and the federal state costs them between 15 and 20 percent of the social product. The Slovenes are thus paying for two states and neither really belongs to us, Igor Bavcar said. The end of transfers from Slovenia is not just a question of how to set up the Yugoslav confederation in principle, but is a key condition for a normal conduct of the economy.

Slovene Political Weekly Paper Folds

LD3003175390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0926 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 30 Mar (TANJUG)—The publication of the last issue of the TELEX political weekly signals, at the same time, the end of this magazine.

Former TELEX chief editor Uros Mahkovec explains that the weekly sustained enormous losses due to many causes, from the "production and distribution policy of the Delo newspaper and publishing work organization to the weekly's comparably narrow profile."

The fact is also that in Slovenia, competition is very stiff among political magazines.

Croat Youth Federation Conference Disbands

LD0104155190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1255 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Zagreb, 1 Apr (TANJUG)—After the two-day work, the 12th congress delegates of the Croat Socialist Youth Federation, the first youth forum, today reached a decision to disband the republican conference of this federation.

At the same time, it was decided that those organizations that accept the Croat youth federation documents should voluntarily transform their organization into such an organization at the republican level.

The others, who do not wish to do so, are left to decide autonomously how to organize themselves in the future, on the condition that they cannot organize themselves at the republican level. In addition to this, all new forms of organizing are entitled to be the legal heirs of the Croat Socialist Youth Federation. The deadline for changes is two months.

These decisions are a compromise solution adopted following the confrontations and completely controversial stands and views of the delegates on the future activity and organization of young people in this republic.

Serbs From Benkovac Area Want Autonomy

AU0204135990 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Mar 90 p 13

[Z. Tarle report: "How Cubrilovic Welcomed Franjo"]

[Text] Benkovac—The consequences of what happened on 18 March at the Croatian Democratic Community's founding assembly in Benkovac, when Bosko Cubrilovic from Ceranje Donje frightened Dr. Franjo Tudjman with a gas pellet gun, are still felt in Benkovac. People are jokingly talking about how Cubrilovic welcomed Franjo, alluding to the famous incident that led to World War I [member of the group responsible for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo was also named Cubrilovic]. In the villages around Benkovac—we visited the villages of Islam Grcki, Islam Latinski, and Kasice—there is much anxiety because Croatian nationalists from other villages threatened that they will embark on a campaign of revenge. This was also confirmed by Rajko Cosic, Zadar Secretariat for Internal Affairs chief, who briefed journalists on what happened in a Tomislav bar on 18 and 19 March, when Zeljko Baljak from the village of Policnik and Dragoslav Radosevic from the village of Islam Latinski suffered slight injuries. The workers of the Zadar Secretariat for Internal Affairs immediately came to the scene, but the names of the troublemakers have not as yet been revealed, nor have the charges against those who started the fight been filed with the Benkovac court. The alleged assassin, Bosko Cubrilovic, has been transferred from the hospital to a prison, and the inquiry into the case will be probably result in charges. The Benkovac Socialist Alliance stated that one could have expected troubles in Benkovac after the first general assembly of the Croatian Democratic Community and Tudjman's appearance. The president of Prosvjeta [a cultural society of Serbs living in Croatia], Dusko Starcevic, condemned this incident, while a member of the Main Committee of the Serbian Cultural Society Zora, Nenad Kostovic, said that both the Serbs and the Croats must get used to the fact that Serbs live in Croatia and that their rights guaranteed by the ZAVNOH [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Croatia] cannot be rescinded by anybody. The statement issued by the Croatian Democratic Society from Split, demanding that the privileges enjoyed by Serbs in Croatia be taken away, has been met with a negative reaction. The Communists in Benkovac have also condemned the incidents that occurred at the assembly meeting of the Croatian Democratic Community Benkovac branch, saying that the smallest number of those present at the meeting were actually from Benkovac. Today, we spoke to Jovan Opacic, president of Zora and Serbian Democratic Party vice president. The Serbian people expect that their rights to preserve cultural traditions and identity will be confirmed if the elections are won by those parties that favor a confederation rather than a federation. The Serbian Democratic Party will demand political autonomy for Kordun, Banija, Lika, and Kninska Krajina. This implies that the part of Bosanska Krajina populated by Serbs would also be attached to these areas. A founding meeting of this party is scheduled to take place in one week's time in the village of Zegar near Benkovac, where the atmosphere is still tense and where new, unnecessary clashes could occur again.

Newspaper Views Benkovac Case

AU3103164190 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 90 p 4

[Seada Vranic article: "Black Preelection Gem"]

[Text] Zagreb—The preelection time in Croatia has finally had its Benkovac case. We say finally because it was only the matter of time for seething passions to reach a shooting climax. Fortunately, the intention of the man with the gun did not come true. The bullets were not fired and, after his party's meeting in Benkovac was interrupted, Croatian Democratic Community leader Dr. Franjo Tudjman, alive, well, and cheerful, surrounded by members of the "unit" [term used in the Ustasha Independent State of Croatia in World War II] of his bodyguards, went to attend the other preelection happening at Posedarje and the would-be assassin ended up in hospital with a concussion.

Therefore, since last Sunday, this Croatian form of the Balkan version of the Speakers Corner in Hyde Park has been ornamented with a black preelection gem, something that tells us that there are still many things that can happen to us in the "democracy we just discovered." Unfortunately, the Benkovac incident only shows that passions have pushed reason into the background completely. The use of a gun (even if it is a harmless gas pellet gun) is nothing else but an uncivilized and unacceptable act. No reasonable person can excuse such an incident and nobody can and should justify or cover up a death threat, even if the threat is only feigned. That cannot be justified even by the hapless man's fear or fanaticism, no matter whether he is an exhibitionist or a real assassin. His deed has done manifold harm because its effects have resulted in an increased traumatization of the Croatian political reality that is already sensitive.

In brief, paranoia or a phobia cannot serve to anybody as an extenuating circumstance or a justification to commit aggression or to threaten or to use force. Those people on whose behalf or on behalf of whose fear or hatred the "gunman" "spoke" should be aware of this fact, too. However, just the same, democracy should not serve as a justification for provoking or producing fear and hatred. Therefore, political parties and their leaders should be careful not "to invite" "assassins" or real killers by their inflammatory statements. In our circumstances, every unmeasured statement or inflammatory speech can only help produce fanatics and undermine the foundations of a democracy that is already too frail.

Tudjman's party, which avoided "offering a sacrifice at the altar of martyrdom," would also have to be aware of this. With its election campaign being so excessively colored by extreme views and exalted statements, it itself provoked an atmosphere that, in case reason fails to prevail, could soon have a human toll. Of course, we are not trying to justify the forced interruption of the Benkovac meeting of the Croatian Democratic Community, nor are we diminishing the responsibility of the man who brandished a weapon in the name of his own security. We are only warning that different kinds of extremism are mutually productive. After all, Dr. Tudjman himself has claimed that his party is a result of the "avalanche of Great Serbian hegemony and extremism that is threatening Croatia."

If this is so and if Tudjman believes in these words of his, he should then be asked whether he is aware of the fact that his party has fomented national and nationalist passions among Serbs in Croatia, to whom his verbal guarantees of "peaceful and stable life" do not mean a thing when they are facing an amnesty of the "Independent State of Croatia," which represents the greatest historical trauma in the minds of Serbs in Croatia.

After all, Tudjman knows that his appearance in Croatia has increased the fear in the minds of many Serbs. That fear may be irrational and fabricated, but it is a fact. It is also known to him that political meetings of the Croatian Democratic Community held in regions populated mostly by ethnic Serbs and under the conditions of revived Serbian nationalism, as well as fear for one's own destiny, can only aggravate provocateurs. Party symbols and exalted Tudjman's followers (whether Tudjman wants that or not) are only calling for a counteraction. After all, only a naive person (something Tudjman is not) can believe that his form of "Croatism" will not be replied with an unacceptable form of "Serbianism."

Of course, we are not advocating any kind of repression or pressure on the Croatian Democratic Community or on any other (Croatian or Serbian) pronouncedly national party. We are only pointing out that points that the parties are gathering in various ways, making use of any event, even such as the one in Benkovac, may increase the number of votes, but that these points will be lost by democracy, if responsibility fails to prevail in party leaderships. As long as the end is justifying the means, we will not be spared events such as the one in Benkovac.

3 New Parties Established in Croatia

AU0104172290

[Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 20 March on page 5 carries three separate reports of approximately 100 words each, under the joint headline of "Parties," concerning the parties most recently set up in Croatia.

The first report, which is unattributed and entitled "A Harmony of Views of the World," says: "The Muslim Democratic Party has formed a coalition with the Croatian Christian-Democratic Party. According to yesterday's announcement by Ivan Cesar, Croatian Christian-Democratic Party president, the group will soon be joined by the Society of Albanians in Croatia. The agreement on working together was based on the great harmony of views of the world, human rights, and the national structure, Cesar explained."

The second report by D.B., entitled "Seventh Dubrovnik Party," reports that "the founding session of the communal committee of the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party was set up on Sunday 18 March in the 'Ivan Mordjin-Crni' workers hall in Dubrovnik."

The third report by B. Lj., entitled "They Are Not Autonomists," reports on the presentation of the program of the Party of Istrian Democratic Council [Stranka Istarskog Demokratskog Sabora] at a meeting attended by "500 people at the Histrija hotel in Pula." The report states that "the party fully accepts the existing state and republican borders and the existing statehood, but is against any form of centralism."

Radio Yugoslavia Expects New Sponsor

AU0204132990 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 90 p 3

[TANJUG report: "Will the Assembly Sponsor Radio Yugoslavia?"]

[Text] Radio Yugoslavia, which is the only Yugoslav station that broadcasts to the world, will probably get a new sponsor [osnivac]—the SFRY Assembly instead of its present founder, the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia.

The initiative to change the founder of Radio Yugoslavia was supported at a recent session of the SFRY Assembly's Commission for Information, which discussed and endorsed the report on the work last year and the program for this year. The session also supported the proposal according to which Radio Yugoslavia would prepare and broadcast programs in the languages of our peoples and nationalities. These programs would cater to Yugoslav citizens who live and work abroad, as well as those who speak the languages spoken in Yugoslavia.

Last year, the reception of Radio Yugoslavia was considerably improved. The present 500-kilowatt transmitters and well-chosen frequencies enabled people in various countries in the world to "tune in" some of the 26 programs in 10 languages, which was the extent of Radio Yugoslavia's daily broadcasting last year. Radio Yugoslavia broadcasts 10 and one-half hours a day.

"According to the letters from our listeners from abroad, Radio Yugoslavia is a station that people trust." This was stated by chief editor Pance Zafirovski.

Quarterly Magazine for Gypsies Published

LD3103101190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0034 GMT 31 MAR 90

[Summary] Novi Sad, 31 Mar (TANJUG)—The first magazine of the Romanies in Yugoslavia named ROMOLOGIJA has appeared in the book shops in Novi Sad. The magazine concentrates on the culture, history, literature, language, and lifestyle of the Romanies. It is edited by the Vojvodina society for the language, literature and culture of the Romanies, and is published by DOBRA VEST of Novi Sad with a circulation of 1,000 copies. The first issue was published in Serbo-Croat to make it more accessible to a wider audience in Yugoslavia and abroad. It will be a quarterly bilingual magazine in Romany and Serbo-Croat. Its editor in chief is Trifun Dimic.

Bogicevic on European Changes

LD3003182590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1229 GMT 30 mar 90

[Text] Sarajevo, March 30 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav State Presidency member Bogic Bogicevic stressed in an interview to today's Sarajevo daily OSLOBODJENJE that Yugoslavia upholds democratic changes in East and central Europe, but is concerned over the emergence of radical right, chauvinist and secessionist movements in the states in this part of the continent.

Bogicevic assessed that the rise of national exclusiveness in states which are currently breaking off with real-socialism is also manifested by results of recent elections in East Germany and Hungary.

Yugoslavia is especially sensitive to such occurrences because they affect negatively the position of Yugoslav minorities in East European states—Yugoslavia's neighbours, Bogicevic said.

Bogicevic stated that Yugoslavia views the unification of two Germanys as a part of European democratic and integration processes.

Bogicevic stated the belief that the unification of two Germanys is the legitimate right of its people. However, he added that European countries which have suffered the Third reich aggression have an equal right to firm guarantees for their borders, material compensations and a moral satisfaction for victims, the suffering and the destruction they bore in the World War II.

Bogicevic warned all principals of national options in the country attempting to go to Europe separately, that the common European home cannot be entered through Strasbourg or Geneva, but only through Yugoslavia. Europe knows us through all our nations, but will receive us only as Yugoslavs, he explained.

Bogicevic assessed that Yugoslavia will eliminate all institutional, economic and political obstacles on the road to Europe if it succeeds in completing the already begun program of reforms.